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SUMMARY 
 
Modern Pattani is an outlying province of Thailand; its population is largely 
Malay and Muslim. Once a small settlement (14th century), it grew into a major 
trading centre and a significant Islamic Kingdom (15th /16th century).  Pattani’s 
political history has been well studied, but the internal dynamics of the society remain 
vague. Although most of the local people were peasant farmers, there were also 
trading groups operating along the coast and in the hinterland. Pattani produced 
various goods and traded with both the west and east coasts of the peninsular region. 
There were two categories of traders representing two distinct economic activities. 
The Malay ruling elite and Chinese were largely involved in hilir (estuary) based 
activities while the Malay farmers and the Indian Muslim traders were involved in 
darat (inland) activities. The two main activities then were tin mining and cattle 
rearing and trade.       
This study focuses on economic changes in the Pattani region between the late 
19th century and about 1930. This period coincided with important administrative 
developments, which contributed to change in Pattani, viz., the Thai government’s 
internal reforms (thesaphiban), Anglo-French-Thai relations and economic growth in 
the neighbouring Straits Settlements (SS) and the Federated Malay States (FMS).  The 
increasing demand for Pattani cattle from the SS and FMS resulting from the 
agricultural, commercial, and population growth in both these places brought changes 
to Pattani’s economy.  
There are three main parts to the thesis.  The first part provides an overview of 
Pattani’s geography and history, covering the period before the 1880s and elaborates 
on the hilir-darat dichotomy as the basic division in understanding Pattani’s economy 
and society.  The second part focuses on the period when tin mining experienced 
significant change. It discusses first the role of the Malay elites and the Chinese. 
Discussion then shifts to the role of the European/British tin mining interests, in 
particular the changes resulting from the introduction of western technology (the 
dredge), capital, and related modern infrastructure along the east coast states.  The 
third part deals primarily with the darat economy of Pattani i.e. the role of Malay 
cattle farmers and Indian-Chulia cattle traders. Cattle as an export commodity, was a 
major income earner for Pattani.  The study concludes that the southern region was of 
economic importance to Siam between c. 1880-1930, and therefore there is a need to 
integrate economic with political perspectives in the study of Pattani. Furthermore, 
regional economy is often of sufficient importance to be studied on its own terms for 































   
The area comprising the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, in the 
southern part of the present day nation-state of Thailand1 was formerly the seat of a 
Malay kingdom called Patani.2 Initially a small independent kingdom (c. mid-14th to mid-
15th century), Patani grew in size and fame as a trading centre in the Malay Peninsula. To 
protect its trade and to ensure its political survival, the rulers of Patani sought alliance 
with militarily powerful neighbours especially Ayutthaya, which was located to the north 
of Patani. In return for Ayutthaya’s protection and patronage, Patani paid allegiance and 
tribute to the Ayutthayan court. The relations between the two (suzerain-overlord and 
vassal-tributary) were largely voluntary.  
In the course of the succeeding Chakri dynastic rule in Bangkok, the symbolic 
payment of tribute came to be seen as obligatory on the part of the tributary state. In due 
course, unlike Ayutthaya, Bangkok began to exert greater control over Patani. This was 
the beginning of Patani’s transition from a tributary state to an inner province under 
Bangkok rule.  Gradually, Patani fell under the orbit of direct Thai hegemony. By the 20th 
                                                 
1 Thailand was known as Siam to the West prior to 1939, and again for a brief period after World War II. In 
this study, which covers the period prior to 1939, the words Siam (for the country) and Siamese (for the 
people) are used. In Thai language, however, the country is referred to as muang Thai. The words Siamese 
and Thai are therefore interchangeable.        
2 Patani is the Malay transliteration and it refers to the name of the ancient Malay kingdom of Patani, prior 
to its disintegration in 1809. Pattani is the official Thai transliteration used to refer to the muang (province 
or principality) monthon (administrative circle) and later changwat (province) of the same name.  In this 
dissertation, Patani will be used when discussing events prior to 1809 and Pattani (with double ‘t’) will 
refer to the muang, monthon or province after 1809. The term Pattani region in this study refers to the area 
formerly occupied by the Kingdom/Sultanate of Patani, specifically the territories encompassing Pattani, 
Yala and Narathiwat (or the muang Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat).     
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century, through a treaty between Siam and Britain in 1909, Pattani’s present status as a 
province within the borders of the Buddhist Thai3 state, was firmly sealed.   
The physical boundary created to demarcate British and Siamese territories, 
however, was porous to the people on both sides of the divide who were ethnic Malays 
sharing kinship, language and cultural ties. They were, moreover, part of the Islamic 
ummah (community of Muslims). Placing Pattani within predominantly Buddhist Thai 
rule disrupted this bond, prompting feelings of marginality among the Malay Muslims of 
Pattani. The people viewed Siam’s direct control of Pattani as an incursion into their 
negeri Melayu (Malay territory).     
The move to incorporate the Pattani Malays firmly within Siamese jurisdiction, 
however, had begun more than a decade before the 1909 Treaty, particularly after 
Bangkok implemented a centralized provincial administrative system called thesaphiban 
in 1892. In the south, administrative restructuring under the thesaphiban took place 
gradually between 1892 and 1899.4 By 1906, the area formerly belonging to the Patani 
kingdom had been restructured to comprise three main provinces namely Pattani, Yala 
and Narathiwat. 
Resistance to direct Siamese control, led mostly by the Malay aristocracy, was 
evident between the 1910s and 1920. There were sporadic disturbances and agitations for 
separation from the Thai state but, lacking the participation of the masses, these attempts 
met with no major success. 
Not surprisingly, previous studies of the region of Pattani have largely attributed 
the tension and conflict between Pattani and Bangkok to ethnic, religious and geo-
political differences. These have been broadly accepted as crucial to the understanding of 
                                                 
3 Thai (or the former spelling Tai) refers to the state and people of Thai /Tai ethnicity but in the period after 
1939, Thai state and Thailand have been  interchangeably used to refer to the country of Thailand, whose 
population is Thai (including all non-ethnic Thai groups who have become Thai citizens).        
4 Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam 1892-1915: The Ministry of the Interior under Prince 
Damrong Rajanubhab, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford, 1977, p. 137.   
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the relationship between the Muslim border provinces and the Thai central government. 
It is contended here that previous studies have tended to overemphasize the political-
cultural factors in explaining the tensions between the centre and the periphery.  There is 
an aspect of Pattani’s history, which has been neglected – its economy. The late 19th and 
the early 20th centuries indeed witnessed significant change in the region of Pattani. 
Much of it was economic in nature.  
Furthermore, the economic changes were not just relevant in and of itself, but 
more importantly, in the case of Pattani, the changes were directly relevant to the issue of 
Siamese control. In other words, a study focusing on economic change is necessary and 
important to complement previous studies focusing on politics, culture and religion so as 
to provide a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of the Pattani region. It is 
therefore necessary that the following questions should be addressed. 
(i) What were the internal dynamics of Pattani’s economy?  
(ii) Who were the principal traders or main groups involved in the economy? 
(iii) What were the networks and mechanisms of trade at work in Pattani? 
(iv) What were the economic changes in Pattani during the period under study, 
and why? 
Through these questions, Pattani’s history is explored here by using economy as a 
central theme of investigation and as an alternative to the political-cultural historical 
approach. The study aims to approach local or regional history through three main 
parameters: (1) trade (here it refers to trade commodities and networks),   (2) traders:  
both local (i.e. ethnic Malays) and non-indigenous (i.e. Chinese and Chulia Indians), and 
(3) agencies: internal (the Siamese state) and external (the British in Straits Settlements 
and Federated Malay States). Through an examination of the interactions and interplay of 
roles among trade, traders and agencies, the dynamics of inter-regional relationships is 
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unravelled. At the same time, it provides a perspective of Pattani as part of an area 
actively engaged in trade. The nature of the trans-national linkages between traders and 
agencies underscores the notion of Pattani as part of a wider zone or area, transcending 
political and administrative boundaries.  
These natural zones comprising multiple centres can also be considered part of a 
socio-cultural sub-stratum, in which they share similar socio-economic traits or 
characteristics, reflective perhaps of a Southeast Asian cultural matrix5. In fact these 
natural economic territories (or NETs in the context of ASEAN) have evolved into what 
is popularly called sub-regional economic zones or growth triangles in present day 
Southeast Asian regional diplomacy and economic cooperation.  
Hans-Dieter Evers describes a similar category of trading networks transcending 
political or state boundaries. Referring to such patterns as intermediate trading networks 
in island Southeast Asia, Evers listed a number of “ Nusantara intermediate trading 
networks” such as the northern Straits of Malacca (Aceh), the Riau-Singapore network, 
the Bugis network and the Trengganu/Kelantan-Thai networks among others.6 Evers’ 
trading networks are reminiscent of the concept of natural economic complementarities, 
the underlying (or essential) idea behind the ASEAN growth triangles as well as the 
market-driven approach of present day economies.  The Penang- Kedah- Perak- Pattani 
                                                 
5 The notion of a cultural matrix as advanced by George Coedes (and later popularized by O.W. Wolters) 
refers to wet-rice technology as one of the fundamental features of a cultural substratum common in 
Southeast Asia. Here, I have adopted the notion with a slight revision to include trade as one of the 
features. At the same time, I have retained the idea of the shared features or communalities in a Southeast 
Asian society demonstrated in Wolters’ use of the concept of a Southeast Asian cultural matrix.  See O.W. 
Wolters, “Some Features of the Cultural Matrix”, in History, Culture, And Religion In Southeast Asian 
Perspectives, Singapore: ISEAS, 1999, pp. 15-26. See also, Craig J. Reynolds, “A New Look at Old 
Southeast Asia”, in The JAS, 54, (2), 1995, p. 422-424 and O.W. Wolters, “Southeast Asia as a Southeast 
Asian Field of Study”, in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Vol. 58, Oct 
1994, pp. 1-17.        
6 Hans-Dieter Evers, “Traditional Trading Networks of Southeast Asia”, in Archipel, 35, 1988, p. 93.  
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network connecting the east and west coasts, although not included in Evers’ “by no 
means exhaustive” list, is one other such trading networks in the region. 7
 
Scope 
As stated previously, the present study addresses two central questions, namely, 
the internal dynamics of Pattani’s trade and the main players in the economy. It will be 
demonstrated, initially, that Pattani was indeed part of a larger trading network, and then 
the study will attempt to elaborate on both the commodity and the traders involved in the 
activity. Evers’ checklist of the criteria that define a trading network, such as (1) the 
presence of an ethnic or religious homogeneity of traders but a diversity of partners, (2) a 
regular interaction between trading partners along definite routes, (3) the development of 
distinctive trading practices, customs and types of exchange such as typical ways of 
travelling and means of transport, and (4) the utilization of a market place system, will 
provide a basis for the scope of the current study.8 Furthermore, such a structure will also 
help in identifying the kind of economic changes (in kind and volume) that the Pattani 
region experienced during the period of study.              
The two main economic activities of the Pattani region, firstly, tin mining and, 
secondly, cattle farming and trade, were indeed subjected to change as a result of Siam’s 
administrative reforms. An examination of the nature of this economy and the role of the 
relevant groups involved in both the sectors reveals the economic significance of these 
two commodities, nationally and regionally.   
There were other economic activities as well during the period of study; these 
included rice farming, fishing and coconut growing. These activities involved large 
sections of the population but remained primarily subsistence in nature and, therefore, 
they were of comparatively little importance in terms of augmenting the national 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Hans-Dieter Evers, “Traditional Trading Networks”, p. 92.   
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revenue. Rubber was yet another crop of significance and an important component of the 
national economy, but large-scale rubber growing in the Pattani region postdates the 
period of the present study. It was only after the 1920s, especially after the development 
of modern transportation, in particular the railway, that rubber for export was cultivated 
in Pattani.9 The focus of the present study therefore is on the two most important 
commodities of the Pattani region from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries.      
A detailed description of the tin and cattle commodity-economy will provide 
evidence of the economic importance of the region as a whole to Siam. The potential for 
deriving revenue from the commodities as well as the activities of the various groups 
involved led to a gradual take-over of the economy of the region, resulting in changes to 
the economy itself. Both internal and external factors contributed to change. The internal 
factor specifically relates to state actions or government initiatives. The external factor 
has to do primarily with the Anglo-French demands on the state (Bangkok) and the 
repercussions on Pattani’s economy as well as the commercial growth taking place in the 
neighbouring Malay Peninsula, including the Straits Settlements (SS), which had direct 
impact on Pattani’s economy.  
The Tin-Cattle Economy and the Hilir-Darat Dualism 
Tin and cattle have been chosen here for several reasons, the principal of which 
was their importance in the national and regional economy of Siam. Tin and cattle, along 
with salt, were the principal exports of Pattani in the early years of the 20th century.10 
                                                 
9 Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, 1850-1950: Response to the Challenge of the 
World Economy, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Monograph No. 042, 
1989, p. 110.  Even if rubber trees were planted beginning the early 1920s, it would have taken at least 5-6 
years (late 1920s) before the trees could be tapped. The depression years of 1930-33 may have further 
delayed the entry of rubber as a significant income earner for the people of the Pattani region at least until 
1934/35. For a detailed study of  rubber in south Thailand see, Wichit Kalakan, ‘Policy of Production and 
Marketing of Natural Rubber in Southern Thailand, 1901-1960’, M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 
1984.            
10 Salt was the third important item of export from Pattani. See Diplomatic and Consular Reports of Siam 
on the Consular district of Senggora, hereafter DCR, Siam (Senggora), 1910/1911, p. 4 and 7.  See also 
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Additionally, tin mining and cattle trading represented a hilir (estuarine or coastal) versus 
darat (interior) contrast within Pattani society. Mining was chiefly an activity involving 
people from the coastal area while cattle involved those from the interior. Although, it 
must be noted that mining activity gradually moved away from the river beds of the main 
rivers in the Pattani region and shifted to the interior, mainly to the hills and limestone 
ranges, the people involved in the mining activity were mostly from the coastal areas, i.e. 
Malay elites and Chinese. Besides, tin ore was always transported to port cities in the 
coastal areas for purposes of smelting and processing before being sent abroad and this 
accentuated the hilir nature of this activity.  
Malay farmers living in the plains and upland areas reared cattle. While the trade 
in tin was primarily riverine (estuarine) or sea-borne, the cattle trade was conducted 
mainly overland. Indian traders from Penang travelled to Pattani to buy cattle from the 
local people, and drove them overland to ports in Trang or Kedah. Malay cattle farmers 
too travelled overland with their cattle to market places such as Province Wellesley (a 
part of Penang) to sell their stocks. The tin-cattle economic sectors therefore exemplified 
the hilir-darat nature of the regional economy, i.e. one is water-borne and the other 
overland.  
The tin and cattle trade involved two main groups or categories in Pattani society: 
tin mining involved the elite while cattle rearing and trade involved the masses.   
Foreigners participated in the tin-cattle economy too, namely the Straits Chinese and the 
British in tin mining and the Indian Muslims in the cattle trade. There is sufficient 
evidence to show that the Siamese government recognised that tin and cattle had the 
potential to generate revenue for the state. This is a particularly important aspect of this 
study.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Table 3.2 listing exports from Pattani from 1908 to 1914 in Chapter 3. However, in this study, salt will not 
be discussed at length because there is very little data on the subject.    
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In a nutshell, this study is essentially an empirical study of the main economic 
activities of the Patani region as well as the economic changes that the region 
experienced during the period under study. However, the study also takes into account 
multiple overlapping or interlocking themes, demonstrating the interactions among trade, 
traders and state-bureaucracy. These themes are explored within the overarching 
emphasis on local particularisms, in this case the hilir-darat dualism in the area of study, 
i.e. Pattani.  
This dualism is important because it was not confined to only the economy but 
had wider implications embracing culture, hierarchy and conception of space within the 
Pattani society. Firstly, the hilir-darat contrast exemplified an urban–rural divide among 
the people of Pattani. The hilir was part of the urban landscape while the darat 
represented the rural areas. Secondly, the hilir represented inner city located within the 
seat of the administrative capital (muang or amphoe-muang), while the darat was part of 
the frontier territory. Thirdly, the hilir culture was associated with court (or kraton) 
culture, i.e. elitist, while the darat referred to mass or rural culture. There will be further 
explication of the socio-economic cum cultural meanings of the hilir-darat dualism in 
Pattani society.  For now it is sufficient to reiterate that the geo-economic importance of 
the hilir-darat divide in this study is viewed within the scope of trade, traders and 
networks. The two main commodities of trade (tin and cattle), the main groups of traders 
(Malay elites and Chinese vis-à-vis Chulia Indians and Malays) as well as the trading 
networks (coastal/ seaborne and overland) represented a hilir-darat dualism.     
The hilir-darat dualism is not unique to Pattani. Works by scholars on other parts 
of the Archipelago identify similar trends. B.W. Andaya’s work on Jambi and Palembang 
(Sumatra) demonstrates that there were tensions between the lowlands (ilir) and uplands 
(ulu) arising from the control of economic resources, particularly the production and 
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trade in Sumatran pepper.11 The socio-cultural connotations of the ulu-ilir are also 
discussed in this study. Andaya points out that the ulu and ilir were distinct not only in 
terms of geography (i.e. ulu in the upper and ilir in the lower reaches of the river 
systems) but also in terms of language and customs, creating therefore distinct ethos and 
lifestyles.12   
O.W. Wolters, in delineating some of the common features in Southeast Asian 
society and in arguing for a Southeast Asian field of study, also referred to the upstream-
downstream dualism as “vital economic interdependencies”.13 The complementary nature 
of agrarian (interior) and maritime (coastal) economies has been described too by J.K. 
Wells in an introductory overview outlining the development of Southeast Asian ports 
and polities.14 Archaeologists, meanwhile, have explained the exchanges at the upstream 
and downstream, especially in island Southeast Asia, based on a dendritic model, 
popularly referred as the Bronson theory.15   
 
Geo-Economic Unit   
Unlike the more common trend of studying geo-political units, the present study 
is concerned with exploring the idea of economic zones that incorporate numerous areas 
and therefore transcending political boundaries as a unit of study.  In other words, it 
focuses on a geo-economic unit or a commercial mandala instead of a political mandala. 
The practice of approaching history through sub-state localities in fact is not new in the 
                                                 
11 Barbara Watson Andaya , To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993. See Chapters 2 and 3.   
12 Ibid., p. 17.  
13 O.W. Wolters, “Southeast Asia as a Southeast Asian field of study”, in Indonesia, p. 10.  
14 J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers (eds.), The Southeast Asian Port and Polity, Rise and Demise, 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990, p. 3.     
15 Bennet Bronson, “Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model 
of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia”, in Karl Hutterer (ed.), Economic Exchange and Social Interaction 
in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History, and Ethnography, Ann Harbor: Michigan Papers 
on South and Southeast Asia, 1977, pp. 39-52.    
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writing of Southeast Asian history. The precedence set by the works of James Warren (on 
the Sulu Zone), Leonard Andaya (on the Sunda Zone /the Malacca Straits /the Sea of 
Melayu) and Heather Sutherland (on the Java Seas), to name just a few, in perceiving 
Southeast Asia within a wider zone, using the seas as a point of reference and as units of 
study, has contributed significantly to the idea of a more holistic approach to Southeast 
Asian historiography.     
Although “the heart of the zone” in Warren’s The Sulu Zone refers to the Sulu 
Sultanate, the study focuses on a wider geographical unit, namely “the world of the Sulu 
trading zone situated in the margins of three empires in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries”16 Andaya’s  “Sea of Melayu” meanwhile incorporates a network of collectors, 
distributors, and buyers spanning the northern parts of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula 
(in other words the northern parts of both sides of the Straits of Melaka) as well as the 
Isthmian region as part of a larger trading world.17  
The Java Seas project uses the concept of the Java Sea as an analytical tool to 
examine the predominant role of Java in Southeast Asia. The focus however is not on the 
island per se as a single unified whole but rather as encompassing a wider region 
overlapping with a complex of separate sea basins such as the Malacca Straits (or 
Malayan Sea) and the Macassar Strait and Flores Sea.18   
Similarly sub-state localities within a trading (economic) network operating 
across regions overland can be useful units of study. The tin-cattle zones of the southern 
Siam region (Phuket on the west coast and Nakhon Sithammarat as well as Pattani on the 
                                                 
16 James Warren, The Sulu Zone, Singapore: Singapore University Press, p.xii.    
17Leonard Andaya, “A History of Trade in the Sea of Melayu”, in Itinerario, European Journal of 
Overseas History, 24 (1), 2000, pp. 87-110. See also Leonard Andaya, “Orang Asli and Melayu Relations: 
A Cross-border Perspective” in Antropologi Indonesia, Indonesian Journal of Social Science and Cultural 
Anthropology, No.67, Jan-Apr 2002, p. 63.  
18See a collection of articles on the Java Sea in V.J. Houben, H.M.J. Maier and W.van der Molen (eds.), 
Looking In Odd Mirrors: The Java Sea, Semaian 5, Leiden:  Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost-
Azie en Oceanie, 1992.                     
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east coast) and the northern Malayan region (Hulu Perak, Penang and Kedah) can 









Zones of Connected Experience  
Economic zones, as opposed to power zones, can also be looked at from another 
dimension. Zones of power refer, more specifically in the past, to areas inhabited by 
certain groups of people who came under the patronage of a monarch. Economic zones, 
on the other hand, incorporated people regardless of territorial boundaries. Their common 
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occupations tended to create a common economic and cultural bound. David K. Wyatt 
advocated the idea of “zones of connected experience” as an approach to studying the 
histories of people across territorial or natural boundaries such as rivers for a more 
comprehensive understanding of people between territorially distinct entities.19  The 
study of the tin-cattle economy of the Pattani region indeed falls under this category of 
“zones of connected experience”. It demonstrates that Pattani, which was under Siamese 
rule, was more closely linked economically to non-Siamese areas such as Penang, the 
Federated Malay States (FMS) and Singapore. It is unavoidable that a study of the 
economy of Pattani would blur the administrative boundaries and instead highlight 
regional economic zones.  
These regional economic zones illustrate the interplay of different groups of 
people with specific expertise in trade and commodities. The social interaction between 
the groups facilitated the exchange or trade of goods, thus underscoring the notion that 
trading networks are indeed social processes of exchange.20 But, more importantly, these 
social interactions through trade also served as a conduit for the dissemination of culture, 
language and lifestyles. This is particularly true of non-indigenous migrant trading 
groups such as the Chinese and Indians who operated within the local network as well as 




                                                 
19 David K. Wyatt used the term  “zones of connected experience” vis-à-vis “zones of power” when 
delivering a keynote address at the International Thai Studies Conference in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, 
Jan 2002. He proposed a “history of connected experience” to redress the extremes in historical writings 
focused on kings, royals and events in the capital (i.e. rulers and national history), on the one hand, and the 
ruled or the local people, on the other (i.e. local/regional history). For an abstract of the keynote address,  
see David K. Wyatt, “History is more than the study of the nation”, in Proceedings on the Keynote 
Addresses, The 8th International Conference on Thai Studies, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, Bangkok: Faculty 
of Humanities Ramkhamhaeng University, January 2002, p. 3.           
20 Hans-Dieter Evers, “Traditional Trading Networks” p. 92.  
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Hokkien - Chulia Zone  
Two non-indigenous ethnic groups dominated the tin-cattle trade between the two 
trade zones incorporating Siam and Malaya. These were the Hokkien Chinese who 
played a prominent role in the tin trade and the Chulia Indian traders who were the 
dominant group of traders in the cattle trade.  
A prominent Hokkien-Chinese family, whose descendents still live in Pattani 
today, namely the Tan-Kannanurak family were actively involved in the tin trade there. 
They established trade ties with fellow Hokkien traders operating in Penang and other 
parts of the north of Malaya. A vertically-integrated industry incorporating smelting, 
banking, insurance and related financial services, operated by fellow kinsmen and 
associates on both sides of the border spurred the growth and success of mining and other 
businesses operated by fellow Hokkiens. This was indeed a trademark of the Hokkien 
Chinese business-mechanism.21   
The cattle trade, on the other hand, was linked to a Chulia-Indian zone. The 
Chulia Indian traders from Penang were the main players in the cattle trade. This group 
of traders liased with Malays of the darat areas, and transported cattle from the inland 
areas to Kedah and Province Wellesley via an overland route. Indeed the Indian Muslim 
group in Penang played a primary role as importers, middlemen as well as exporters in 
the cattle trade of Pattani.   
The tin and cattle zones incorporating south Siam and north Malaya were also 
reflective of the extension of a cultural zone as well as a continuum of the two world 
systems of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, namely, the worlds of India and China. The 
Indian world system referring to the Indian Ocean system, for instance, remained 
                                                 
21 Examples of Hokkien family business networks transcending state boundaries include the Khaw family  
(Penang-Ranong-Phuket) and the Lim-Choong families (Kedah-Penang). See Jennifer Cushman, Family 
and State: The Formation of a Sino-Thai Tin-mining Dynasty, 1797-1932, Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1991; Wu Xiao Ann, Chinese Business In the Making of a Malay State, 1882-1941, Kedah and 
Penang, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.     
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competitive and, according to the Wallersteinian world system theory, was absorbed into 
the expanding European world system.22   
In the context of Siam and Malaya in the 19th and 20th centuries, non-indigenous 
groups like the Chinese and Indian traders, while continuing to deal with the local traders 
had to contend also with the British and Siamese authorities. They had therefore to 
operate within a new regional trading environment. However, these traders continued to 
retain links and operate within a sub-network that involved people of their own ethnicity 
or, in other words, an extension of a trans-national, diasporic community (trade) network. 
The Chulia network, for instance, is an extension of an Indian cultural zone extending 
from Penang-Kedah westwards to Burma and eventually India.  
 
Agencies: State versus External Threats 
Meanwhile, the political scenario within which Pattani and Siam existed had 
important consequences on the operation of the tin and cattle zones. The British and the 
French had, by the 1890s, gained a strong hold over territories in the areas north (France) 
and south (Britain) of Siam. To protect French trade interests in the Mekong region, and 
British commerce in the Kra Isthmus region, both powers signed in 1896 a declaration to 
retain Siam as a neutral (buffer) zone.23  
At the outset, the commitment by two rival powers to maintain Siam as a buffer 
would have secured Siam’s independence but the presence of these militarily strong 
powers as neighbours, however, forced Siam to be extremely cautious when dealing with 
                                                 
22 For an analysis and historical development of a modern world economy see, Immanuel Wallerstein, The 
Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 
Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press, 1974.    
23 Chandran Jeshurun, “The Anglo-French Declaration of January 1896 and The Independence of Siam” in 
JSS, Vol. 53/2, July 1970. For a detailed study of Anglo-French rivalry in Siam see Chandran Jeshurun, 
The Contest for Siam 1889-1902: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1977.  
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provinces close to British and French territories.24 The economic changes in Pattani, a 
province, bordering British territories during the period of Siam’s administrative reforms, 
were indirectly a result of the imperialist threat to Siam.  
Thus during the period of administrative reform and the process of boundary 
demarcation, resulting from Anglo-French demands, the regional economic zones were 
made to conform to the political zones. These state-sponsored actions inadvertently 
changed the economic landscape of the region. Attempts to link the economies of the 
outlying provinces (those along the borders of the nation-state) to the central government 
followed as a consequence. Apart from legislation to advance national interests, 
infrastructural developments such as the railway, which began to impact southern Siam 
from about the late 1910s, while enhancing economic growth, linked provincial 
economies with the state.25  
 
People and Places 
Throughout this present study, various terms (Thai and Malay) will be used to 
refer to places and people. The geographical focus is on the muang of Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat. The word muang can be translated as town, state or province.26 Here, muang 
is used to denote both principality and province while amphoe-muang refers to the main 
city of the principality or province. In official correspondence, King Rama V and his 
                                                 
24 For example, the agreement complicated Siam’s northern and southern railway construction project.        
25 The southern railway, however, also facilitated inter-regional freight and passenger traffic between south 
Siam and Peninsular Malay States as well as Singapore.                             
26 The word muang was used to refer to the larger political territory (present day: state) as well as the centre 
of power (present day:  urban centre). When there is a need to make a distinction between the two, other 
terms are used (similar to an adjective) to explain one from the other. For example the centre of power or 
the town may also be called wiang. Territory, in traditional times, was an unbounded domain. See F.K. 
Lehman, “On the Vocabulary and Semantics of ‘Field’ in Theravada Buddhist Society”, Contributions to 
Asian Studies, Vol. 16, pp. 101-111. Another definition of muang is of a “politically integrated river 
valley” referring particularly to a grouping of settlements in a valley surrounded by mountains. See Chris 
Baker, “Afterword: Autonomy’s Meanings”, in Sunait Chutintaranond and Chris Baker (eds.), Recalling 
Local Pasts: Autonomous History in Southeast Asia, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002, p. 172.      
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Ministers used muang khaek or boriwen khaek jet muang (area of the seven khaek 
states).27  Khaek jet muang or seven khaek muang referred to the seven Malay muang in 
the Pattani region which were tributaries of Bangkok. Khaek was a generic term and Thai 
scholar, Thongchai Winichakul, translates the term as a reference to “people of tanned 
skin”, including Malays, South Asians (south and north Indians as well as Bengalis) and 
people from the Middle East (Arabs, Persians and others).28  
In the Ayutthaya period, Muslims from the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian 
archipelago were called khaek.29  In the Bangkok period, the seven muang of Pattani, 
Yala, Saiburi, Nongchik, Yaring, Raman and Narathiwat were called “muang khaek” 
because a large majority of the population there comprised Malays.30 Some of these 
muang had older Malay names but when Siam extended direct control over these muang 
and administered them as part of its inner provinces, these names were either replaced by 
Siamese names or transliterated into Siamese. The Malay or other alternative names for 
some of these muang are as follows: Pattani (Tani), Yala (Nibong or Jalor), Saiburi 
(Teluban), Nongchik, Yaring (Jering), Raman (Reman), Rangae (Legeh, Tanjung Mas or 
Bangnara) and Narathiwat (Menara).31  Other muang adjacent to the Pattani region, such 
as Songkhla and Nakhon Sithammarat, were also referred to by their Malay names, that 
                                                 
27 NA, praratchahataleka ratchakan ti. 5 ti kiew kab pan kit kong krasuang mahatthai, (Royal 
Correspondence of the Fifth Reign on the Ministry of Interior) compiled and published by the Ministry of 
Interior, 1978.     
28 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation, Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books, 1994, p. 204. The word is considered derogatory by the Malays and became one of the “sore 
points” in Pattani Malay-Thai relations for a long time. During premier Phibun’s reign, the politically 
correct word concocted by the Thais- Thai Islam began to replace khaek. Again, the Muslim elites of 
Pattani contested the term Thai Islam because of the reference to Thai and therefore the close association to 
Buddhism, preferring instead the term Malay Muslim. The word Thai Islam, however, is commonly used to 
refer to the Muslims of southern Thailand today. “Khaek” incidentally is a Hokkien word, which means 
“guest”. In Malaysia, the Khaek are usually referred to as Hakka whereas in Thailand, the term is used 
largely on South Asians and never in reference to the Chinese (khon cjin).       
29 Charnvit Kasetsiri” Origins of a capital and seaport: The early settlement of Ayuthaya and its East Asian 
Trade” in Kennon Breazeale (ed.), From Japan to Arabia: Ayuthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia, 
Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks project, 1999, 
p. 75.     
30 For details on the population see Chapter Two.  
31 By 1932, Saiburi, Nongchik and Yaring were incorporated under the province of Pattani while Raman 
became part of Yala and Rangae part of Narathiwat.  
 16
is: Singgora (or Senggora) and Ligor. Some of these older Malay names are still used in 
everyday conversation among the Malays. Anthropologist Andrew Cornish has argued 
that the use of Malay names instead of the official Thai names indicates a conscious 
political choice made by the speaker.32 Indeed, the preference for traditional Malay 
names can be construed as part of “everyday forms of resistance”, indicating covert 
Malay opposition to Thai rule or control.33
 Prior to the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and 
Pattani were all part of Siam’s khaek (Malay) states. In other words, Siam saw these 
states in terms of people, i.e. ethnic Malays rather than territories. When borders were 
drawn to separate British from Siamese territory, the territories replaced people (or 
ethnicity) as the crucial variable.  
 
Ethnicity and Government Reforms  
An important point that needs to be stressed is that Bangkok applied similar 
administrative and economic reforms to both the northern and southern tributary and 
frontier provinces, irrespective of the ethnic and religious differences. Siam’s 
centralization efforts pursued in the northern part of the kingdom where the people were 
khon muang also involved the gradual take over of the northern economy.34 While the 
south was rich in tin fields, the north was endowed with rich teak forests. Like tin, the 
teak of northern Siam attracted much attention from European timber companies and 
private concessionaires. Like the Malay Raja of the south, the northern aristocracy, 
                                                 
32 Andrew Cornish, Whose Place Is This? Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government Officials in Yala, 
Studies in Contemporary Thailand No.5, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997, p. 6.  
33 The expression “everyday forms of resistance” is borrowed from James Scott. See his Weapons of the 
Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.      
34 For a study of Siam’s administrative centralization in the north, see James Ansil Ramsay, ‘The 
Development of a Bureaucratic Polity: The Case of Northern Siam’, Ph. D thesis, Cornell University, 1971; 
Nigel J. Brailey, ‘The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement in Western Laos, 1850-1892’, Ph. D 
thesis, University of London, 1968.         
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namely the Chao muang, were replaced or pensioned off. Thai language as spoken in 
central Siam was preferred by the Bangkok administration over phasa kham/nua 
(language spoken by the people of north Siam). There was much resistance to Siam’s 
efforts at integrating these territories within its central government. The resistance was 
led by not only the ruling elite (chao muang) but also by “men of merit” i.e. phu mi bun/ 
phu wiset.35 Similarly, in the south, Malay ruling elites and clerics led the resistance 
against Siamese rule.36 The extension of Siam’s political and economic control 
encompassed all the regions in Siam, particularly the frontier regions. In other words, 
expansion was a kingdom-wide phenomenon and it was not polarized along ethnic lines, 
although it did, however, represent the expansion of one ethnic group’s power over 
another in both cases, that is, the north and the south. The discussion of Pattani’s 
economy in the following chapters must therefore be viewed within this political setting. 
 
Methodology     
Anthropologists, compared to historians and political scientists, have written most 
of the more recent works on the economy or specifically the economic livelihood and the 
culture of the people of the Pattani region.37 A study of the fishermen of Rusembilan, a 
                                                 
35There were two major uprisings opposing Bangkok’s reforms in the north and northeast of Siam, “the 
Shan Uprising” of 1902 (north) and “the Holy Men Rebellion” of 1902 (northeast). Siam successfully 
quelled these uprisings using military forces but failed to stop the people’s growing resentment towards 
Bangkok’s policies. See Tej Bunnag, “khabot phu mi bun phak isan r.s. 121” (“The Holy Men’s Rebellion 
in the Northeast”), Sangkhomsat Parithat (Journal of Social Sciences), 5 (1), June-August 1967; Tej 
Bunnag, “Khabot Ngiao muang phrae r.s. 121” (“The 1902 Shans’ Rebellion in Phrae”), Sangkhomsat 
Parithat (Journal of Social Sciences), 6 (2), September-November 1968.       
36 For example, the Raja of Pattani led the Malay rulers of the seven khaek muang in a conspiracy against 
Siam in 1901/02. See Kobkua Suwannathat- Pian, Thai-Malay Relations, pp. 178-179.    
37 Most works by historians and political scientists focus on Malay nationalism, political separatism, anti-
Thai resistance movements, violence in the south, Thai integrative policies, Thai education and language 
policies and comparative studies on Thai Buddhism and Islam. See Omar Farouk Bajunid, ‘The Political 
Integration of the Thai Islam’, Ph. D thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1980; Panomporn Anurugsa, 
‘Political Integration In Thailand: The Case of the Malay Muslim Minority’, Ph. D thesis, University of 
Texas at Austin, 1984; Seni Mudmarn, ‘Language Use and Loyalty among the Muslim-Malay of Southern 
Thailand’, Ph. D thesis, The State University of New York, Buffalo, 1988; Uthai Dulyakasem, ‘Education 
and Ethnic Nationalism: A Study of the Muslim Malays in Southern Siam’, Ph. D thesis, Stanford 
University, 1981; Apierat Samail, ‘Politik dan Islam di  Narathiwat, Thailand, 1970-1980 (Politics and 
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fishing village in Pattani by T.M. Fraser in 1960, is an often-cited work.38 Other 
anthropologists have carried out micro-studies on fishing villages and rubber 
smallholdings.39 Patya Saihoo’s doctoral dissertation entitled, ‘Social Organization of an 
Inland Malay Village Community in Southern Thailand’ (1974) and Andrew Cornish’s, 
Whose Place Is This? Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government Officials in Yala 
(1997) focus on the rubber economy in Yala.40 Chavivun Prachuabmoh’s “Changing 
Values in Market Trading: A Thai Muslim Case Study” provides information on market 
and trading patterns among Malays, particularly women in Pattani.41 More recent works 
offer information on the oil and gas industry linked to the Malaysia-Thailand economic 
growth triangle.  
Owing to a near absence of writings on Pattani’s economic history during the 
period under study, much of the present work discusses in detail the two main economic 
activities of the period. The primary approach here is to provide a clear perspective of the 
expanding economic activities of tin mining around the hilir (estuary) and cattle rearing 
for export in the darat (interior). The role of the principal groups of people involved in 
the respective sector is first identified, followed by the modes of trading, markets and 
marketing systems as well as the changes that took place in both the sectors mostly as a 
result of government intervention.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Islam in Narathiwat, Thailand, 1970-1980’), Masters thesis, University of Malaya, 1998. For a discussion 
and select bibliography of literature on Pattani see Chaiwat Satha-Anan, “Pattani in the 1980s: Academic 
Literature and Political Stories in Sojourn, Vol. 7, Number 1, 1992.   
38 See T.M. Fraser, Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in Southern Thailand, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1960.  This work follows the tradition pioneered by Raymond Firth’s study of  the 
fishermen of Kelantan. See Raymond Firth, Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1946.  
39 The most recent addition to studies on fishermen in Pattani is Saroja Dorairajoo’s ‘No Fish In The Sea; 
Thai-Malay Tactics of Negotiation in a Time of Scarcity’, Ph. D dissertation, Dept of Anthropology, 
Harvard University, 2002.    
40 Patya Saihoo, ‘Social Organisation of an Inland Malay Village Community in South Thailand’, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1974; Andrew Cornish, Whose Place Is This? Malay Rubber Producers and 
Thai Government Officials in Yala, Studies in Contemporary Thailand No. 5, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997.  
41 Chavivun Prachuabmoh, “Changing Values in Market Trading: A Thai Muslim Case Study” in Karl L. 
Hutterer, A. Terry Rambo and George Lovelace (eds.), Cultural values and Human ecology in Southeast 
Asia, Ann Arbor: Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1985, pp.279-
306.     
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The involvement of locals, Chinese and increasingly, foreigners indicates the 
multi-faceted aspect of Pattani’s economy and society. The general economic scenario in 
the FMS and SS also had an impact on Pattani’s economy and the present study takes 
cognisance of these developments.   
 
Sources and Limitations 
  A variety of primary sources have been used in this study. Among the most 
important are documents from the Thai archives, namely files of the Ministries of 
Agriculture (including Dept of Mines), Interior, Communication, Finance as well as 
documents from the Office of the Royal Secretary of the Fifth Reign.   
Still there is a lack of statistical data for the period prior to 1900. This is generally 
the case for the whole of Siam, and details for the provinces are far less and fewer.42 This 
study has relied on trade figures found in annual commercial reports from Britain’s 
Consuls in Siam, published as Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance 
(abbreviated in this study as DCR, Siam). Reports for the respective consular districts or 
monthon, for example, Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani, will be referred to as DCR, 
Siam (Nakhon Sithammarat) and DCR, Siam (Pattani). 43 The earliest and fairly extensive 
trade report for monthon Pattani is dated 1908.  
Records of the Colonial Office (CO), Foreign Office (FO) (Series 422 and 371 in 
particular) and files under the High Commissioner’s Office (HCO) in British Malaya 
were important source materials. FMS Government Gazettes and Proceedings of the 
Straits Settlements Legislative Council provide statistics on the cattle import-export trade. 
                                                 
42 James Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1971 
(reprint), p. 5 
43 However, names of the districts or monthon will be cited as it appears in the original.For instance, Nakon 
Srithamarat (for Nakhon Sithammarat) and Senggora (for Songkhla).  
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Information on British Companies formed and liquidated are available at the Public 
Records Office (PRO) in the United Kingdom under the BT series, providing valuable 
information on British companies operating in Pattani, in particular mining concerns.             
It must be acknowledged that the present study suffers from certain constraints.  
There is, firstly, insufficient information on the Malays, particularly the masses compared 
to the elites. Secondly, apart from Malay sources such as the Hikayat Patani (HP) or “the 
Story of Patani” and Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (SKMP), both traditional Malay 
histories of Pattani, there appear to have been no other surviving Malay records.44  The 
HP, the older of the two, is similar to works of the phongsawadan (dynastic history) 
genre in Thai historiography.45 Court politics and dynastic or genealogical history is the 
central theme of both the hikayat and phongsawadan genre.   
The SKMP belongs to the Sejarah (Malay histories; Thai: prawatsat) genre of 
Malay writing. The Sejarah, like the Hikayat is also a tale of history - a narrative - except 
that Sejarah (for example, the Sejarah Melayu) contains fewer myths and legends 
whereas the Hikayat (for instance, the Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa) tends to 
intermingle fact and fiction. But until more recently, there was no distinction made in the 
language between Sejarah (now having the same meaning as “History”) and Hikayat.  In 
the school curriculum, history was known as Tawarikh (now Sejarah) with the emphasis 
on tarikh (date). 46
                                                 
44 A. Teeuw and D. K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani: The Story of Patani, 2 Vols, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970; 
Ibrahim Syukri, History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani, Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Pattani, Conner 
Bailey and John. N. Miksic (trans.), Ohio University Center for international Studies, Monograph in 
Southeast Asian Studies, Series Number 68, Ohio, 1995.  
45 See Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Thai Historiography From Ancient Times To The Modern Period”, in David 
Marr and Anthony Reid (eds.), Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Heinemann Books 
Ltd., 1979, pp. 156-170.   
46 Personal Communication. Professor Khoo Kay Kim, Professor of Malaysian History, University Malaya, 
Kuala Lumpur. Prof Khoo Kay Kim was a member of the first History Terminology Committee of Dewan 
Bahasa & Pustaka (Malaysian Literary Agency).  See also J..C.Bottoms, “Some Malay Historical Sources” 




Both the HP and the SKMP, unfortunately, focus on political history and provide 
almost no information on the economic activity of the people of Pattani, let alone 
statistical data.  There is a sizeable corpus of secondary literature on Pattani, written in 
the Malay language by ethnic Malay writers. The most prominent of these is Patani: 
Dahulu dan Sekarang by A. Bangnara (pseudonym). Initially written in Thai (entitled, 
Pattani: adit-patchuban), the book was banned from circulation in Thailand for its 
“overt” political overtone. The book traces Pattani’s history from the time of the Malay 
Sultanate of Pattani to the more recent period marked by Siam’s increasing control of the 
Pattani region. The author highlights the Dusun Nyior Killings of 1948 and the mass 
protests against Bangkok in 1975 and includes photographs of historical sites, maps and 
genealogical charts to illustrate Pattani’s glorious past. At times, the book reads like a 
close copy of the SKMP, with the author often acknowledging the SKMP in his footnotes 
as the source of his information.47    
Similar to Bangnara’s political history is Nik Anuar’s, Sejarah Perjuangan 
Melayu Patani, 1785-1954.48 The use of the word perjuangan meaning “struggle” in 
reference to the history of the Malays of Patani is revealing of the trend of modern Malay 
historiography, beginning from, more specifically, the period of decolonisation.  There is 
a preoccupation with the subject of nationalism, which often is very broadly defined.  
There is, for example, nasionalisme (in Malay) for “nationalism” but no widely 
acceptable word for “nation” although bangsa has been in use since at least the time of 
the foundation of the United Nations, which in Malay is Bangsa-bangsa Bersatu.  
However, bangsa in the past was used to mean “race” (hence bangsa Melayu, bangsa 
Cina, bangsa India, etc.)49 So, a history of a people that is referred to as a perjuangan or 
                                                 
47 A. Bangnara, Pattani: Adit-patchuban, (Pattani: Past-Present), Bangkok: Chomromseathean, 1976. 
48 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani, 1785-1954, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999.    
49 See Khoo Kay Kim, Malay Society: Transformation and Democratisation, 1991, pp. 177-179.   
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struggle is part of the “nationalist type” history common in the Malay world in the 
postcolonial period.50     
Because of the engrossment with politics, primary and secondary Malay sources 
on Pattani not surprisingly make little mention of the economy or the livelihood of the 
people. The lack of facts and figures on the economy of Pattani from indigenous records 
is the biggest drawback in this study. Even where data was available, it was always in 
fragments or incomplete. There has been therefore a heavy reliance on foreign sources as 
well as secondary literature to complement the information obtained from the Thai 
archives. Interviews, however, were conducted with numerous persons in Pattani to help 
fill in the gaps.     
 There were also difficulties in the scheme of organization. While the approach 
here is both chronological and thematic, it has not been possible to follow a strictly 
chronological order because the sections are inter-related and often over-lap.  
Historical works dealing with Pattani’s economy in the period of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries are indeed rare. This study, by focusing on the tin and cattle trade of 
Pattani in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, hopefully will be able to fill, at least 
partially, the gaps in the knowledge of the economy and people of Pattani. It will, at the 
same time, underscore the importance of economic factors, hitherto deemed of secondary 
importance compared to political and security considerations in the formulation of 
Siam’s policy towards Pattani.51  
                                                 
50 Other political histories on Pattani with a “perjuangan” (nationalist) overtone include, Mohd. Zamberi 
A. Malek, Umat Islam Patani: Sejarah dan Politik, Shah Alam, Selangor, 1993. Also by the same author, 
Patani dalam Tamadun Melayu, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1994.     
51 Historian Kobkua Suwanathat-Pian claims that “it is not that Bangkok paid no attention to the economic 
advantages to be gained from these prathesaraj [seven Malay provinces], but in deciding a policy or move 
in the Malay Peninsula, Bangkok was first and foremost guided by its own political and security needs. 
Economic factors played a secondary role in Siamese calculations” See Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-
Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-Regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the early Twentieth 
Centuries, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 210.      
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The provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, situated along the northeastern 
coast on the narrow Kra Isthmus, were in effect the physical boundary separating the 
Siamese and the Peninsular Malay territories. These provinces were endowed with either 
deltas suitable for agriculture or hills and mountain ranges rich in mineral resources. The 
principal rivers in all three provinces encouraged coastal commerce, and trade activities 
were focused on the ports along these rivers.  The following provides a brief overview of 
the geography and economic significance of the provinces of Pattani (including the 
district of Saiburi), Yala (including the districts of Bannang Sata and Raman) and 
Narathiwat in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.      
 
Pattani 
The province of Pattani contains both deltaic regions and mountainous ranges. 
The main mountain range, called the Central Range or the Kerbau or Korbu Range, 
extends in an arc from Pattani (Siam) to Melaka (Peninsular Malaysia).52 The Pattani 
River flows through the northeastern mountain range of the Peninsula into the Gulf of 
Siam. The Pattani River, beginning at its source in the Upper Perak watershed, is the 
principal river in the Pattani region. It runs through Raman, Yala, Nongchik and Pattani. 
From Pattani, the river extends into the Bay of Pattani, a narrow strip of land, about 7-8 
miles in length projecting westwards to the Gulf of Siam. This projection is the Cape of 
Pattani and it is protected from the ravishing monsoon winds, enabling the safe passage 
                                                 
52 E.H.G. Dobby, Southeast Asia, London: University of London Press, 1964 (8th edition), pp. 87-88.   
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of vessels throughout the year, irrespective of the wind changes.53 Thus Pattani, endowed 
with a natural harbour, and therefore ideal for stopovers throughout the year, was the 
main reason for the many traders calling at the port in the past. According to W. Bougas, 
this favourable geographical position promoted the growth of commerce and enhanced 
the coastal or pasisir characteristic of Pattani.54      
 The numerous tributaries of the Pattani River, on the other hand, created a deltaic 
region appropriate for farming. These rivers supported a riverine trade and allowed for 
communication and transport between market centres along the main river and the inland 
areas. The Kuala Tujong (at Nongchik), a bifurcation from the main Pattani, for example, 
was navigable for small tongkang (boats) and allowed for regular contacts with the town 
of Pattani which was the upstream hub of the commerce of this region.  It is located about 
two miles from the kuala (estuary) of the Pattani River.  
 
Yala 
The province of Yala is located amidst a series of limestone ranges that lie further 
down to the south of Pattani. The principal river running through Yala is the Biserah 
(Biserat) and dotting the plains are mountain peaks of more than 4000 feet.55 The Bukit 
Besar (also called Indragiri) is the highest peak in the province and in former times used 
to be a prominent landmark for ships approaching Pattani.56 This peak is formed of 
granite and extends into similar granite hills such as Bukit Bilau.  South of Yala is 
                                                 
53 W. Cameron, “On The Patani”, JSBRAS, No. 11, June 1883, p. 123.  
54 Wayne A. Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani: Between Thai and Malay Mandalas, Bangi, Selangor: 
Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Terbitan Tak Berkala No. 12, 1994, 
p. 76   
55 W. Cameron, “On the Patani”, p. 129.  
56 Bukit Besar is located between Yala (Jalor) and Nongchik (sometimes spelt as Nawngchik in European 
accounts). See Nelson Annandale and Herbert C. Robinson, Fasciculi Malayenses. Anthropological and 
zoological results of an expedition to Perak and the Siamese Malay states, Part II a, University Press of 
Liverpool, London: Longmans Green and Co., 1903, p. 30; C.A. Gibson Hill (ed.), The Cambridge 
University Expedition to the North-Eastern Malay States, and to Upper Perak, 1899-1900, by W.W. Skeat 
and F.F. Laidlaw, JMBRAS, Vol. 26, Part 4, 1953, p. 21-22; Wayne Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani, p. 51.       
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located the district of Bannang Sata, a predominantly inland territory rich in tin fields.  
Granite ranges alternating with limestone surround the area around Bannang Sata. 
Foreign mining companies and individuals were attracted to invest in the Bannang Sata 
tin fields in the early part of the twentieth century, following the movement away from 
the depleted mining areas on the west coast (i.e. Phuket) to the east coast areas (i.e. 
Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani).57        
Further south, down the Pattani River, in a southeasterly direction is the muang 
(later district) of Raman, a largely mountainous area comprising limestone caves. Raman 
is located closest to the source of the Pattani River and borders the Upper Perak territory. 
Raman was rich in tin, and during the 1880s, its tin fields became a source of contention 
between the Raja of Raman and the British authorities in the Malay Peninsula prompting 
border rectification between the two.  
 
muang Saiburi  
Although Saiburi is a district in Pattani today, in the past the muang of Saiburi 
formed one of the seven muang khaek under Siamese patronage. The river Saiburi waters 
a large section of the muang bearing the same name –Saiburi (at times the older name 
Teluban was used). This muang was also known as Selindung Bayu - a Malay term 
meaning “protected from the winds”. The gold mines in Sai were the most important in 
the Pattani region and formed the principal export from the Malay muang in the early 
nineteenth century.58 Late nineteenth century writers referred to the mines in Sai as the 
Tomoh/Temoh Mines or the Telubin mines (the valley in which the Tomoh mines were 
located).59 Gold in the Tomoh Mines in Saiburi used to be worked by Chinese labourers 
                                                 
57 See Chapter 5 for details on the shift from the west coast tin producing areas to the east coast states. 
58 Nicholas N. Dodge, “Mineral production on the east coast of Malaya in the nineteenth century”, 
JMBRAS, Vol. 50, Part 2, 1977, p. 93.  
59 C.A. Gibson Hill (ed.), The Cambridge Expedition, pp. 91-93.  
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until the late nineteenth century.  Thereafter little mention has been made of the gold 
produced in this area.60   
 
Narathiwat 
The principal river of the province of Narathiwat is the Tanjung Mas River. This 
province is the most easterly province in the Pattani region, bordering Kelantan to the 
south.  In the past, Tanjung Mas, as its name suggests, was rich in minerals especially 
gold and also tin.   Its port, at the mouth of the river Tanjung Mas, used to be an 
important port of call for boats from Kelantan, Trengganu and Singapore. This river port 
was also a collection and distributing centre for goods from the inland areas of the Malay 
provinces for export to places such as Singapore.     
 
The climate 
The Pattani region is situated along the passage of the NE and SW monsoons, 
blowing between the months of November- March and April-October respectively. The 
cape of Pattani is safe from the impact of the winds, thus it provides for a natural 
harbour, accessible throughout the year.61
The ports, located on the Kra Isthmus (latitude of 6 and 11 degrees North), were 
ideal for stop over when travelling between the Indian Ocean (India and the Middle East) 
and the South China Sea. All the ports of call along the trade route between India and 
China were located at the isthmus for geographical reasons. Their locations matched the 
rhythm of the monsoon winds, blowing alternatively between the months of April to 
October and November to March, and were therefore ideal places to wait for a change of 
favourable winds before proceeding either to India or China. Archaeological studies of 
                                                 
60 J. McCarthy, Surveying and Exploring in Siam, London: John Murray, 1900, p. 16.  
61 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 1.   
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the Malay Peninsula have revealed that traders from the west, e.g. India and the Middle 
East, reached the peninsula at the latitude between 6 and 11 degrees north after crossing 
the Gulf of Bengal by the shortest route which goes via the north of Sumatra. Similarly, 
traders from the east, e.g. China, who “wanted to sail quickly to the peninsula had to 
cross the Gulf of Thailand to reach the latitudes of the isthmus”.62 The ports at this 
latitude (6-11 degrees north) served as halting centres for the change of winds before 
continuing journeys to either the west or the east. The ports also played the role of 
entrepot where goods from both the east and west were exchanged and distributed 
widely.63  
In the late 1880s, and throughout the first quarter of the 1900s, talks of a canal 
cutting across from the west to the east of the Kra isthmus, aimed at reducing the time 
taken to travel between the two oceans, viz. the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam, 
were rife but scientific studies conducted on the proposal showed that the project was not 
feasible owing to the soil profile of this region.         
Geologically, sandstone and limestone make up the section of the Kra Isthmus 
where the Pattani area is located. 64 The force of short torrents on the granite-limestone 
hills on the narrow Isthmus, over a period of time, eroded tin-bearing alluvial land.65 This 
explains the presence of the rich tin mines in the area.  In the limestone hills are found 
innumerable caves inhabited by bats, providing valuable guano, sought by the Chinese 
for commercial purposes. They were also homes to birds that produce the edible birds’ 
nests, a highly prized trade item. 
The provinces on the Kra Isthmus experience the same type of climate as that of 
the northern part of peninsular Malaysia, with rains at all seasons. Heavy and regular 
                                                 
62 Michel Jacq-Hergoualc’h, “Archaeological Research In The Malay Peninsula”, JSS, Vol.85, Parts 1&2, 
1997, p. 123.   
63 Ibid.  
64 E.H.G. Dobby, Southeast Asia, p. 19. See Figure 2 (A Section of the Kra Isthmus).  
65 Ibid., p. 261. 
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rains along with the high altitude of the Isthmus promote a tropical rainforest type of 
vegetation.  The coastal and deltaic plains are suitable for wet rice farming and, in the 
uplands, dry rice cultivation and animal farming is common. Forest products, in 
particular aromatic resinous woods such as aloeswood (Malay: gaharu), camphor 
(Malay: barus), lakawood and ebony, were also found in the hinterland of the Pattani 
region.66 In short, the geography and climate of the Pattani region were crucial factors in 
determining the economy of the area.  
 
                                                 
66 David J. Welch and Judith R. McNeill, “Archaeological Investigations of Pattani History”, JSEAS, Vol. 
20, No. 1, 1989, p. 27. 
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Map 2.1: The Kra Isthmus Region (Latitude 6 – 11 Degrees North) 
  
Source: FO 371/21050 (Siam), 1937.  
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(II) HISTORY  
Origins and Early Years of Patani (7th – 13th Century) 
The Pattani region was the location of a Kingdom most likely founded in the 
second century A.D. The early history of this area and its population remains unclear but 
archaeological evidence suggests that the area was the seat of Langkasuka, otherwise 
known as Langya-hsiu in Chinese records.67  
Located on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, Langkasuka was an important 
trading port for Asian sailors travelling directly across the Gulf of Siam, from the 
southern tip of Vietnam to the Malay Peninsula.68 Arab accounts dating from 1511-1544 
A.D. place Langkasuka between Songkhla and Kelantan.69 More recently, archaeologists 
have discovered the location of the former Langkasuka in the Pattani River Basin, 
commonly referred to as the Yarang Complex.  The complex is located in the present day 
district of Yarang, about 12 to 16 kilometres inland from Pattani Bay.70 Religious relics 
discovered at the Yarang site and inferences based on Chinese records suggest that the 
inhabitants were influenced by Hindu-Buddhist beliefs, and that both Hinduism and 
Buddhism constituted major components of the culture of this settlement.71  
 
From Hindu-Buddhist Langkasuka to Muslim Patani 
Little is known about the transition from Langkasuka to Patani.72  Langkasuka 
originally may have been located upriver for protection from raids and invasion by other 
powers, while Patani, on the coast, may have served as the harbour for Langkasuka.73 At 
                                                 
67 Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961, pp. 387-412. 
68 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 1-2.  
69 David J. Welch and Judith R. McNeill, “Archaeological Investigations of Pattani History”, p. 7. 
70 Wayne A. Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani, p. 6.  
71 David J. Welch and Judith R. McNeill, “Archaeological Investigations of Pattani History”, p. 29. Michel 
Jacq-Hergoualc’h, “Archaeological Research In The Malay Peninsula”, p. 124. 
72 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 3.  
73 In the 8th century A.D. for example, Langkasuka succumbed to Srivijayan control. 
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some point in time, the ruler of Langkasuka decided to move his palace to Patani. The 
precise date and reasons for the move are unknown.74        
The Hikayat Patani (HP) states that the ruler of an inland Kingdom called Kota 
Mahligai founded Patani. This could well have been the move from the inland-based 
Langkasuka to the coastal village of Patani. Another Malay source, the Sejarah Kerajaan 
Melayu Patani (SKMP) also tells of a ruler of an inland town (i.e. Kota Mahligai) who 
moved his capital or palace to a coastal site that was known as Kampung Pak Tani 
(Village of Pak Tani).75  
According to the HP, Patani derived its name from an old man called Pak Tani, 
who lived on the spot where the new capital was established. The HP explains that the 
King and his men who were out on a hunting trip spotted Pak Tani and his wife on the 
beach where a white deer chased by the King’s hounds disappeared.76  The Kedah Annals 
(or the Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa), on the other hand, claims that a Kedah princess, 
sent on a journey eastwards, founded the settlement and named it after her magical keris 
(sword). 77The founding of Patani by a princess appears in a Thai version as well.78 
According to this source, the settlement was named Patani because a deer that the 
princess had been pursuing disappeared along the beach, and her followers reported the 
incident as “ma hai sia thi trong pata ning” (meaning “it came and disappeared directly 
at this spot on the beach”). All the words in this phrase are Thai except for “pata ning”, 
                                                 
74 Wayne A. Bougas, The Kingdom Of Patani, p. 8.  
75 Ibrahim Syukri, History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani, p. 15.  
76 A. Teeuw and D. K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, pp. 147-148.  The Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) provides 
a similar story to explain the founding of Melaka by a Prince from Palembang.   
77 According to the HMM, the princess rode on an elephant named Gemala Johari, and her magical keris 
was named Lela Mesani. See Siti Hawa Saleh, Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa, Kuala Lumpur, Singapura: 
University of Malaya Press, 1970, p. 1ii.   
78 Ibid., pp. 218-219.The version recorded by Phra Sri Burirat is called Pattani San [Pattani Writings] dated 
1935. The author is also referred to as Waema Marohabut.  
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which the author explains is the east coast Malay rendering of pantai (meaning beach) 
and ning (meaning this, these or here).79  
This explanation indicates that the story of the founding of Patani in Thai was 
based on a combination of sources, which included stories from the Malay Peninsula 
such as the HMM.   More importantly, it indicates Kedah’s role in the founding of Patani 
and the fact that it was not geographically distant from Patani (the princess rode on the 
back of an elephant over land).80 The use of the Thai language underscores the influence 
of Siam on Kedah and, by extension, Patani. The link between Siam- Kedah and Patani 
opens up a whole range of significant questions: (1) Was the Kingdom of Patani founded 
by Thai-speaking people?  (2) Can the kingdom of Patani or the Patani/south Siam region 
be considered a Malay-speaking area?  These questions are open to debate.81 But 
linguistic and political associations aside, the Siam-Kedah- Patani link is important for 
this study for two reasons: (i) it proves that an overland route was in common use and 
linked Kedah on the west coast with Patani on the east; and (ii) this link established a 
traditional relationship between the two which was far older and perhaps historically 
more important than Patani’s (political) relations with Kelantan.     
                                                 
79 Ibid.  
80 See Hendrik M.J. Maier, In The Center Of Authority: The Malay Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa, Cornell: 
Southeast Asia Program, 1998, p. 68.     
81 See Saroja Dorairajoo, ‘No Fish in the Sea’, p. 21. Sociologist Geoffrey Benjamin is of the opinion that 
the northern areas of the Malay Peninsula beginning from Kedah and extending to the southern region of 
Siam are part of a (traditional) Mon-speaking area. The presence of a number of Mon-Khmer loan words in 
the northern Malay dialect, for example, bendang (for wet rice fields) and glong (for canals) indicates the 
influence of Mon culture on the region. See Geoffrey Benjamin, “Ethnohistorical Perspectives on 
Kelantan’s Prehistory”, in Kelantan Zaman Awal: Kajian Arkeologi dan Sejarah di Malaysia, (ed.), Nik 
Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abd. Rahman, Kota Bahru: Muzium Negeri Kelantan, 1987. See also, Leonard 
Y. Andaya, “The Search for the ‘Origins’ of Melayu”, in Timothy P. Barnard, Contesting Malayness: 
Malay Identity Across Boundaries, Singapore: Singapore University Press, National University of 
Singapore, 2004, pp. 56-75.     
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 Islam: from Pasai to Patani  
As mentioned earlier, the precise date of the founding of Patani is not known. 
Teeuw and Wyatt suggest that Patani may have been founded between the middle of the 
fourteenth and the middle of the fifteenth centuries.82 The Hikayat Patani claims that the 
founder-ruler of Patani, Phaya Tu Nakpa, converted to Islam upon his recovery from a 
strange disease. According to the HP, the ruler sought the help of Sheikh Said, a Muslim 
healer from Pasai, after all attempts to cure him had failed. The Muslim healer from Pasai 
agreed to cure the ruler on condition that the ruler embraced Islam should he recover. 
When he regained his health, the ruler fulfilled his promise. 
From this time, Patani gradually adopted a political system based on Islamic 
doctrines, In other words, the system it adopted was similar to the system practised in 
other Malay states in the Peninsula. At the apex of the state’s hierarchy was the Sultan. 
Phaya Tu Nakpa adopted the name of Sultan Ismail Syah and became the first Muslim 
ruler of Patani.  Apart from adopting a Muslim name, the ruler gave up worshipping idols 
and eating pork but continued with other pre-Islamic beliefs such as making offerings to 
trees and spirits. It was only in the reign of his successor that the first mosque, an obvious 
symbol of Islam, was built in Patani, and Islam began to be more widespread in the 
interior.83
The conversion to Islam brought economic advantages to Patani. Along with 
Islam came Muslim merchants who brought not only commerce but also Islamic cultural 
influences to Patani. Complementing their trade activities with the dissemination of 
Islamic teachings, the early traders supported the rise of institutions of Islamic learning. 
                                                 
82 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 3. 
83 The phrase “Islamization in terms of a progression” used by Anthony Reid succinctly explains that 
conversion to Islam was indeed a slow and gradual process. See Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the 
Early Modern Era: Trade, Power and Belief, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 156.  
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The pondok religious schools in Patani, where communities of Muslims lived close to 
religious scholars (Malay: Tok Guru), were possibly an extension of similar religious 
institutions in Pasai or Aceh in Sumatra.84
Patani retained close links with Pasai, from where Islam in the Archipelago 
emanated. The court provided patronage to Muslim merchants and scholars. Sufi 
missionaries, in particular, played a prominent role in the conversion of Patani to Islam.85 
A similar type of missionary activity in the states of the north coast of Java, founded and 
led by nine Pasai-born Sufi leaders, known collectively as the Wali Songo, is noteworthy, 
for it may have had an influence on other Islamic centres/states in the Archipelago.  
Sufism in Patani came from various directions. The foremost ulama of Patani, 
Shaykh Daud Patani (or Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris al-Fatani) was himself initiated into 
a Sufi order called the Shattariyya while in Mecca (c.1790s-1843). The Shattariya order, 
which had its origins in India, also had the prominent 17th century ulama of north 
                                                 
84 It cannot be precisely ascertained if the pondok education system in Patani was influenced by the 
Sumatran langgar (religious schools). The role of Patani as an Islamic learning centre in the 19th-/20th 
century with direct links to Mecca, and consequently becoming a nodal point of learning and transmission 
of Arabic Islamic scholarship in the Malay Archipelago, is reminiscent of the   role played by Aceh in the 
17th century. Perhaps there was a degree of external influence from Aceh on the Patani pondok but 
according to Omar Farouk, the pondok system in fact originated in Patani. See Omar Farouk, “The 
Muslims of Thailand”, in Islamika: Esei-Esei Sempena Abad ke-15 Hijrah, KL, 1981, pp. 97-120. For a 
study of the pondok in Patani, see Hasan Madmarn, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani, Bangi: Penerbit 
Universiti Kebangsan Malaysia, 1999.  Although, Hasan makes no reference to the origins of the pondok in 
Patani, his book provides details on some of the more popular pondoks in Patani and the works of the four 
most famous ulama of Patani. His chapter on the printers, publishers and bookstore owners dealing with 
Kitab Jawi (Islamic literature written in Malay/Jawi script) illuminates Patani’s links with Arabia through 
Hadramaut descendents operating in both Patani and Penang. See Hasan Madmarn, The Pondok and 
Madrasah, pp. 52-53. Matheson and Hooker in their article on Kitab Jawi refer to a group called the Indian 
Islamic Mission of Patani who were involved in the publishing of Kitab Jawi in Penang through the 
Jelutong Press of Penang (belonging to Syed Sheikh al-Hadi). See Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, 
“Jawi Literature In Patani: The Maintenance Of An Islamic Tradition”, in JMBRAS, Vol. 61(1), 1988, p. 76 
(Footnote 242). The information teased out from both the works cited here points to the possibility of a 
wider network of Islamic scholarship, linking Patani to the Middle East through Hadramaut (Arab) and 
Indian Muslim traders operating in Penang and likely linked to Sumatra as well. This could have been a 
parallel development with the activities of the Malay ulama on the east coast states of Patani and Kelantan 
who also had direct links with Mecca.                 
85 Wayne Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani, p. 34.  
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Sumatra, Abd al-Ra’uf as one of its members.86   Thus, the Sufi order, doctrine-wise, to 
some extent, helped to bond Patani, north Sumatra and India. 
 The Islam spread by Sufi missionaries was tolerant of local popular beliefs. In 
the Malay world, the local law or Adat was maintained along with the acceptance of 
Islam. This led to claims by some scholars that Islamization in Southeast Asia was a 
process that entailed the adoption and adaptation of Islam according to local conditions 
progressively. There was no abrupt transformation or conversion.87 This type of 
Islamization (a combination of local beliefs and Islam) was peculiar to the Archipelago 
because it was associated largely with the activities of Muslim traders along the coastal 
areas.88 The term pasisir culture, referring to the duality of trade and Islam along coastal 
areas, which became closely associated with the Archipelago was also a feature of Patani.   
Meanwhile, the (Islamic) capital of Patani, located at Krisek along the Patani 
River, marked the separation of Islamic Patani from the former inland Buddhist-Hindu 
state of Kota Mahligai (Langkasuka). This change also marked the transition of Patani 
from an inland polity, in the pre-Islam period, to a coastal-urban or pasisir state in the 
Islamic period.  
 Patani’s conversion to Islam was significant for political reasons as well. It 
detached Patani from the political and cultural identity of past Buddhist kingdoms such 
as Sri Vijaya and Ayutthaya. Similar to the harbour principalities in the north coast of 
                                                 
86 Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, “Jawi Literature in Patani”, p. 20.  
87 DGE. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1968 (Third edition), p. 
218. See also A.C. Milner, “Islam and the Muslim State”, in M. B. Hooker (ed.), Islam in Southeast Asia, 
Leiden, 1983.      
88 In fact the Muslim rulers of the Javanese ports were largely descended from foreign merchants who had 
won both respect and power among the local people. See M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade And 
European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1962, p. 113.     
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Java, which used Islam as a common ideological base to break away from Hindu 
Majapahit, Patani too used Islam to distance itself from Buddhist Ayutthaya.89  
Thus, Patani’s problems with Siam (both Ayutthaya and Bangkok), based on 
religious ideologies, i.e. the emphasis on the differences between the Buddhist-Islamic 
mandalas (circles of power), can be seen as rooted in this period. Ayutthaya, in 
particular, was an emerging power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Its 
expansionist zeal threatened Patani’s position and survival throughout the period of the 
fourteenth to eighteenth centuries.     
 
The Ayutthayan period (14th to 18th centuries)    
Patani had become a rich and powerful Sultanate by the mid-1600s. It became 
well known to the international world especially after the fall of Melaka to the 
Portuguese (1511). The Portuguese attacks on Muslim shipping between Goa (India) and 
Melaka, to break their monopoly of the spice trade in Southeast Asia, forced Muslim 
traders to seek alternative ports and routes. Muslim traders who previously visited 
Melaka rerouted themselves to ports such as Aceh, Bantan and Patani.90 Significantly, 
Patani was also the eastern terminus for the overland trade from Kedah on the west coast. 
Traders from India and the Middle East, therefore, could avoid the long sea-journey 
through the Straits of Melaka by stopping over at the port of Kedah to obtain goods 
carried overland from Patani.91 Chinese traders too avoided Melaka and visited these 
alternative ports to eschew the exorbitant taxes imposed by the Portuguese in Melaka.92 
The port of Patani became an important port of call particularly between 1584 and 1688. 
                                                 
89 Wayne Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani, p. 30. 
90 Ibid., p. 39.  
91 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, The Malay Unrest In South Thailand: An Issue In Malayan-Thai Border 
Relations, Bangi: Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Terbitan Tak 
Berkala No. 17, 1994, p. 2.  . 
92 Meilink- Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, pp. 169-170.    
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Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese and Middle-eastern as well as Indian merchants traded at 
Patani.93  
Patani’s commercial prosperity coincided with the period when a series of 
queens, descendants of the first Raja of Patani, ruled the kingdom. This period is 
popularly known as the era of Raja Perempuan (female Raja) rule (c.1584-1688).94  The 
first of the Raja Perempuan was Raja Ijau (1584-1616), during whose reign the English 
(1611) and Dutch (1623) founded factories at Patani. Increasing international trade under 
her rule encouraged Patani to retain good relations with Ayutthaya through which it was 
ensured of protection. Although this period when the Raja Perempuan ruled was the most 
prosperous time for Patani, politically it was also the most challenging.  
Raja Ijau ruled amidst a very complex web of political relations. She had to 
maintain a delicate balance between her relations with Ayutthaya, founded on the basis of 
commercial interests, on the one hand, and her political relations with her powerful 
Malay neighbours- Johor and Pahang- on the other. Relations with these polities to the 
north and south of Patani were of utmost importance to Patani’s commercial and political 
survival. In addition, the Queen needed to strategize amidst domestic strife to forestall 
uprisings. Raja Ijau successfully retained her position and was succeeded by her sister, 
Raja Biru, upon her death. Biru retained Ijau’s friendly relations with Ayutthaya. Her 
successor, Ungu, unlike her two older sisters, refused to acknowledge Siamese suzerainty 
                                                 
93 Englishman, Peter Floris, who lived in Patani in 1612-1613, observed that Patani was a busy entrepot 
with ships arriving from and departing for Ayutthaya, Brunei, Jambi, Makasar, China, Japan, Cambodia, 
Sumatra as well as European countries. See, A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 13.  
94 Some scholars argue that the Queens had limited power in the court, the nobility led by the Bendahara 
(known as Datok Besar) as well as the merchant class commonly called Orang Kaya wielded greater 
authority in Pattani especially in regard to commerce. Relations with Ayutthaya and the offering of bunga 
mas tribute however were conducted through the office of the Queen. See Wayne Bougas, The Kingdom of 
Patani, pp. 57-62. Patani was not the only kingdom in the region under the rule of Queens. At about the 
same time, the Kingdom of Aceh, in northern Sumatra was under the reign of three queens who ruled 
consecutively between 1641 and 1699. The factors that led to the succession of female rulers and their real 
power and role in the kingdom is the subject of a study currently conducted by a TANAP researcher in 
Leiden. The study conducted by Sher Banu A. Latiff Khan is titled, ‘Rule Behind The Silk Curtain: A 
Study Of Aceh Under The Reign Of The Queens, 1641-1699’.        
 38
because the ruler of Ayutthaya at that time, King Prasat Thong, was a usurper.95 She 
claimed that he had no right to be on the throne.  
When Acheh defeated Johor in the Johor- Acheh Wars at this time, Ungu severed 
relations with Ayutthaya for she no longer needed Ayutthayan protection or military aid 
against possible attacks from Johor. So brave had she become that, in 1630, Pattani 
attacked Phattalung and Nakhon Sithammarat. The attack was repulsed, but a Siamese 
counter attack in 1634 failed to subjugate the queen of Pattani. Ungu died in 1635 before 
the Siamese could launch further attacks. Her successor, Raja Kuning, accepted Prasat 
Thong’s suzerainty. She resumed sending the tribute to Ayutthaya, and restored ties with 
Johor by marrying the brother of the Raja of Johor. However, she died without an heir. 
This marked the end of the Inland Dynasty started by Phraya Tu Nakpa, and the line of 
succession shifted to the Kelantan Dynasty.  
Patani faced serious political difficulties in the 41 years (1688-1729) that this 
Dynasty was in control. The court was ridden by pro- and anti- Siamese factions.  
Domestic strife throughout this period culminated in a civil war in 1729 causing 
extensive losses to Patani. After the last ruler of the Kelantan Dynasty died in 1729, 
Patani fell into a period of turmoil without a King. The situation was made worse when 
Burma then engaged in war with Ayutthaya in the 1760s, mobilized its troops in the 
peninsular region, jeopardizing Patani’s position. After the fall of Ayutthaya, the new 
King, Phya Taksin, led the Thai forces in counter attacks against the Burmese. In the 
south, Taksin suspected Patani of providing refuge to some of the chiefs of the southern 
states attempting to free themselves from Siamese rule. This in turn caused Taksin to 
mount an invasion against the kingdom.96  
                                                 
95 DGE. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p. 361.   
96 Ibrahim Syukri, SKMP, p. 45. 
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In 1784, Taksin’s successor, Rama I, appointed a Malay by the name of Raja 
Bendang Tengku Lamidin as a puppet Raja. He was a Siamese vassal and expected to 
show loyalty and submit the bunga mas as tribute to Siam. Tengku Lamidin, however, 
attempted to break away from Siamese vassalage. The Siamese King discovered his plot 
to attack him when the ruler of Annam, whom Lamidin approached for military aid, 
informed the King of Lamidin’s intentions. Lamidin was arrested and in 1791 Siam 
installed a Thai governor in Patani and simultaneously moved ethnic Thais to settle in 
Patani.97        
The extent of Ayutthaya’s influence on Patani cannot be precisely ascertained. In 
fact, it is not known when Patani first became a tributary (muang prathetsarat) of 
Ayutthaya. Tome Pires claims that Patani- Ayutthayan relations were well established by 
the end of the fourteenth century.98 However, where Thai sources indicate that Patani was 
in a tributary-suzerain relationship with Ayutthaya, Malay sources claim that the 
relationship was between equals.99 Malays viewed the sending of the ornamental gold 
and silver tree (Malay: bunga mas dan perak) tri-annually by Patani to the Siamese 
capital as a symbolic expression of this relationship (Malay: tanda sahabat dan sepakat). 
The ruler of Patani was also expected to provide manpower and military aid when 
demanded by the Siamese King. In turn, Patani’s political relations with Ayutthaya 
assured Patani’s trading position of protection in the region. Thai sources, on the other 
hand, claim that the Siamese Kings regarded the gold and silver tree as a tribute and sign 
of loyalty and submission in return for the military protection offered by Siam.100    
                                                 
97 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 23. Ibrahim Syukri, SKMP, pp. 47-48.  
98 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 12.  
9. For Malay views on the gold and silver tree see, James Low, trans., Marong Mahawangsa: The Kedah 
Annals, Bangkok: The American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1908, p. 101. See also, Kobkua Suwannathat- 
Pian, Thai-Malay Relations, pp. 56-57. 
100 Damrong Rajanuphab, Sadaeng banyai Phongsawadan Syam (Lectures on the History of Siam), 
Bangkok: Khurusapha, 1949, p. 23. 
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At some point, sending the bunga mas became an obligation of a tributary state, 
and failure to do so could be construed as an act of rebellion against the suzerain. It 
appears that the relationship was firm when Siam’s military prowess was evident and 
grew weak in periods of Siamese decline. For example, when Ayutthaya appeared weak 
as a result of its extended war with both Burma and Cambodia, between 1564 and 1590, 
Patani tended to be more independent of Siamese influence and attempted to sever its ties 
with the former.101 Nonetheless, Patani was vulnerable to military attacks from the 
powerful Ayutthayan polity. Twice, in 1632 and 1633, Ayutthayan army attacked Patani. 
Although Patani was able to repel these attacks, Ayutthaya challenged Patani when its 
loyalty and support towards the Ayutthayan court wavered.  
The status of Patani in the larger orbit of the kingdom of Ayutthaya is not clearly 
defined. It appears that Patani was a muang prathetsarat (tributary) to Ayutthaya; it was 
subject to military and naval conscriptions and the submission of tribute to the 
Ayutthayan court. Ayutthaya’s political and cultural influence on Patani was minimal 
throughout this period. Patani remained an autonomous state with periodic military 
intervention and control from Ayutthaya. It was customary for Patani’s ruling elite to 
seek Ayutthaya’s approval of a new successor to the Rajaship of Patani. Although the 
position of Raja was inherited, Patani, like other vassal states, sought the support of a 
powerful patron. 102  
Ayutthaya’s policy of non-interference in Patani’s politics and cultural system was 
reversed during the reign of the Bangkok (Chakri) dynasty. The accession of King Rama 
I, who deposed King Taksin of the Thonburi period, was followed by a period of 
                                                 
101 A. Teeuw and D.K Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 8.  
102 During the Chakri period, it was common practice for the Rajas of the tributary states to receive the 
kruang yot (insignia of rank) from Bangkok, thus confirming their position as phraya (chief/Raja). The 
Rajas in turn offered their allegiance to the Siamese monarch. This practice continued right up to the fifth 
reign of the Chakri Dynasty. Kelantan, for instance, is reported to have received the kruangyot as late as 
1888.  See NA, R.5, M.12 K/1, Baiboak muang Nakhon Sithammarat, p. 108.   
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extensive military attacks and territorial expansion. In 1785, Rama I began expanding 
southward and subjugated Patani along with two other Malay states in the south namely, 
Kelantan and Trengganu. It is possible that Rama I launched a punitive attack on Patani 
for its failure to support Nakhon Sithammarat and Phattalung when the Burmese army 
attacked them.103 Thus, during the reign of Rama I, Pattani lost its previous status of a 
vassal with reasonably autonomous power under Ayutthayan patronage and began a new 
chapter in its history, as it gradually became an integral part of the Kingdom of Siam 
under the rule of the Chakri Kings.  
 
Extension of Siamese Control - 1785-1867                         
Following the subjugation of Pattani by Rama I, the state was placed under the 
supervision of Nakhon Sithammarat, Siam’s administrative agency in the south. The 
Malays of Patani were increasingly restless with the loss of their ruler’s autonomy to 
govern their state. Between 1785 and 1809, Patani attempted to free itself from the 
Siamese yoke. There were at least three failed uprisings (1789-91, 1802, 1808/9) against 
the Siamese government during this period. The uprisings led Siam to reduce Patani’s 
strength. Bangkok in 1809 divided the state into seven small muang.104 The divisions 
were Pattani, Saiburi, Nongchik, Yaring, Yala, Raman and Rangae. These muang were 
collectively known as the seven Malay principalities or rendered in Thai as khaek jet 
muang. They were administered as Siam’s third or fourth-class provinces. Songkhla, a 
province bordering Pattani, was appointed to supervise these seven muang and the 
                                                 
103 A similar situation is recorded in the HP when Patani attacked Nakhon Sithammarat and Phattalung in 
1630. Although the attack was repulsed, in 1631, the King intended to attack Patani as a punishment for the 
attack launched on Nakhon Sithammarat and Phattalung. See A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 
17.  
104 The date of the division of the former Pattani is given as 1817 in the HP.  
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treatment accorded the seven muang was similar to Siam’s treatment of its outer 
provinces.105  
Provincial governors were appointed to administer these muang and in most 
cases, the former Malay Rajas became the new designated governors (phraya). The 
governors were directly subordinate to the Royal Commissioner of Songkhla. Taxes on 
timber and tin too were paid to the Governor of Songkhla. This move, in fact, meant that 
these states had been reduced from their former semi-autonomous status to mere outer 
provinces; the Raja-governors’ communication with the central government was 
conducted through the Commissioner.106 Furthermore, the reference to these muang as 
Siam’s outer provinces, distinguished it from other Malay states such as Kelantan and 
Trengganu which remained Siam’s prathetsaraj (tributary state). Siam’s role in directly 
appointing the chiefs of the respective jet muang, reinforced its increasing control over 
these states. Six of the seven muang were placed under Malay governors, and for the first 
time a Siamese candidate was appointed as governor in a Malay state. The exception was 
Yaring whose governor was a Siamese, of Chinese descent, by the name of Kwan Sai.107 
The Malay Raja-governors resented Siamese intervention in the politics of their states 
and in turn attempted, on several occasions, to rebel.  
Encouraged by the success of Kedah’s uprising against Siam, in 1832, six of the 
seven Malay states (the exception was Yaring) joined in an attempt to overthrow Siam’s 
rule. The rebellion was quickly quashed by Siamese troops. The chiefs of the provinces 
of Raman, Rangae and Saiburi were captured and exiled to Bangkok, while the rulers of 
Pattani and Yala escaped to Kelantan. Not long after, in 1838, yet another attempt was 
                                                 
105 Phraya Wichiankhiri, “Phongsawadan Muang Pattani” (The Chronicle of Pattani) in Prachum 
Phongsawadan (Collected Chronicles), No. 3, Bangkok: Wachirayan National Library, 1914, pp. 19-21.  
106 For details on Bangkok’s administration of Pattani see, Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, 1824-
1852, New York: J.J. Augustin Incorporated, 1957, Chapter 5; Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay 
Relations, Chapter 5.     
107 Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand, 
Part One, JSEAS, Vol. 7, No.2, September 1976, p. 200.  
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made to rebel against increasing Siamese hegemonic control. This time, the chiefs of four 
of the seven states allied with Kedah to fight the Siamese, while the chiefs of Pattani, 
Yaring and Saiburi abstained. The attempt was also unsuccessful.                        
In 1839, in an attempt to weaken Kedah, which it had occupied since 1821, Siam 
divided the state into three principalities. These principalities namely Kedah, Kubang 
Pasu and Perlis were placed under the control of Nakhon Sithammarat. In 1840, Satun, a 
former tributary of Kedah, was made a separate state and placed under the control of 
Songkhla.108 Then in 1842, the former Sultan of Kedah, removed since an uprising 
against Siam in 1821, was pardoned by Bangkok and reinstated to the position of Sultan 
of Kedah.109 Thereafter, between the 1840s and the early years of the fifth reign, although 
there were sporadic attempts to fight the Siamese, none posed a serious threat.  
In the later part of the fifth reign, increasing British and French presence in the 
region, forced King Rama V to adopt a more aggressive policy towards the “vulnerable” 
outlying provinces of southern Siam. Much has been written on the wide-ranging reforms 
introduced by King Rama V. For Pattani two major events resulting from the reform 
were crucial. First, the 1901 Royal Decree on the administration of the khaek jet muang 
resulting in the centralization of Pattani’s administration and its finances through a 
centrally-controlled Revenue Department. Second, in 1906, the boriwen jet muang (area 
of the seven provinces) was renamed monthon Pattani (meaning Pattani administrative 
circle). The former seven muang fragmented further, Yaring and Nongchik became part 
of the province of Pattani, while Raman came under the province of Yala (see Figure 
2.1). Suffice it to say that the period after 1901 witnessed a general transfer of control of 
revenue from the Raja to the commissioners, reflecting a transition from the traditional 
                                                 
108 Satun was under Songkhla’s supervision between 1840 and 1844, thereafter it was returned to the 
control of Nakhon Sithammarat. See Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1852, p. 75.   
109 Siamese troops defeated Kedah in 1821. Thereafter, between 1821 and 1842, Kedah was placed under 
Siam’s rule.  See Bonney, Kedah, 1771-1821: The Search for Security and Independence, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1971, Chapter 7.     
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(old) order to a new order in which collection of taxes e.g. poll tax in lieu of the symbolic 
tribute appeared more straightforward and appropriate with the changing times and 
needs.110  By 1902, Siam had replaced the Malay Rajas with Thai Commissioners who 
also gained control over import and export taxes, and sent revenue from the khaek jet 





Figure 2.1: The Political Evolution of muang Patani c. 1809-1933 
 
 
                                                 
110 Margaret L.Koch, “Patani and the Development of a Thai State”, JMBRAS, Vol. 50, Pt. 2, 1977, p. 72. 
111 For further details on the reforms of King Rama V see Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai 
Muslims”; Margaret L. Koch, “Patani and the Development of a Thai State”; Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 
Thai-Malay Relations and Somchote Ongsakul, ‘Kan patirub kan pokrong monthon Pattani, BE 2449-
2474’ (‘The Administrative Reforms of monthon Pattani, 1906-1931’), Masters thesis, Sri Nakharinwirot 
University, 1978.   
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The reign of Rama V: Changes in Siam’s administrative system 
It is the concept of a nation in the modern geographical  
sense that requires the necessity of having boundary lines  
clearly demarcated.112
 
 Prior to the creation of modern nation-states in Southeast Asia, power was not 
always defined in terms of territorial control. In the old Siamese political system, the 
state derived its power from controlling its people (manpower). The control of manpower 
was important for various reasons. Firstly, it provided labour for rice farming and other 
agricultural pursuits. Secondly, control of manpower was important for the purpose of 
defending the country against invading armies. Thirdly, taxes in kind (suai) and cash 
collected from the people were an important source of revenue to the state.  
In the Ayutthayan period, the administration of the people was divided between 
the Ministries of the Kalahom (Ministry of Military Affairs) and the Mahatthai, which 
were in charge of the southern provinces and the northern provinces respectively. In the 
later Ayutthayan period, a third Department called the Port Department was created to 
further facilitate administration. The Port Department had two separate divisions namely 
the Right Port and Left Port. The Right Port (Krom Tha Khwa) was in charge of trade 
with the Malay Peninsula, Arabia and India, namely the khaek states whereas the Left 
Port supervised trade with China and Indochina. 113
Ayuthaya’s system of administration through the Mahatthai and Kalahom 
continued during the Bangkok reign. Under Rama I, the southern states were retained 
                                                 
112 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, p. 56.  
113 For a study on the role of the Right and Left Ports see Adisorn Muakpimai, ‘Krom tha kab rabob 
sethakit Thai: wikroah krongsang kan plian pleng tang tair samai thonburi teng kan tham santi sanya 
Bowring, BE. 2310-2398’(‘The Department of Port Authority and the Thai economic system: Change and 
Development since the Thonburi period to the signing of the Bowring Treaty, 1767-1855’), Masters thesis, 
Thammasat University, 1988.     
 46
under the control of the Kalahom.114 The Minister of Kalahom (Samuha Phra Kalahom) 
had the authority to register and monitor manpower in the southern states. He collected 
taxes for the central government, liased with the provincial governors by receiving 
reports and sending orders and led as commander of the troops to pacify or subdue 
resistance or revolts taking place in the provinces under his control.115
The control of manpower demonstrated the extent of Bangkok’s control over the 
provinces. Increasing control over manpower in the provinces demonstrated increasing 
hold over the provinces. The Kalahom communicated with the respective administrative 
intermediaries in the south such as Nakhon Sithammarat and Songkhla on matters such as 
tribute contribution, tax payment, labour for royal work and men to participate in royal 
processions and wars. Thus, manpower was highly valued compared to land. Whereas 
land was available in abundance, manpower, on the other hand, was scarce.  
 
From rights over men to rights over land116  
By the 5th reign of the Bangkok period, land had begun to assume greater 
importance and correspondingly, there was a growing need to define territorially the 
areas under the control of the Siamese monarch. Why did the change from the high value 
placed on access to manpower to access to land take place?     
There were two possible explanations for this transition, one internal and the 
other external. The internal factor was the inefficiency of the old labour-tax system that 
was implemented through local leaders (nai) at the provincial level. Under this system, 
                                                 
114 For some time in the later Ayutthayan period, the Port Department took over the control of the southern 
muang from the Kalahom because he fell into disfavor, and was removed from the job of overseeing the 
southern muang. See Neil A. Englehart, Culture and Power in Traditional Siamese Government, Ithaca 
New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2001, p. 77.          
115 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society In The Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No 74, 1969, pp. 66-67.     
116 The phrase is taken (and slightly modified) from David Feeny, From Property Rights in Man to 
Property Rights in Land: Institutional Change in Thai Agriculture, 1850 to 1940. Hamilton, Ontario: 
Department of Economics, McMaster University, Working Paper No. 77.     
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commoners (phrai) became followers or were registered under the control of a certain 
master or superior (nai) as the patron. The nai was personally responsible for the phrai: 
for their taxes, labour services and protection. The phrai in return worked for the nai or 
followed his orders so that his duties towards the king could be fulfilled. The main task 
of the nai was to manage his phrai and ensure that labour and resources were accessible 
to the king. The relationship between nai and phrai was neither bound by contract nor 
based on land; instead it was overwhelmingly personal.117         
A list of manpower registered to their respective masters was sent to the central 
government. The list formed the basis for the government’s tax and corvee demands from 
the people.118 The efficiency of the system of control of manpower depended on the nai 
and phrai. There were many ways for the phrai to flout registration, and for the nai to 
avoid giving the accurate number of phrai registered under him so as to reduce the taxes 
due to the state.  The dishonest reporting by the nai also led to arrears in tax payments 
due to the state. The nai would claim that the phrai under his control had fled and 
therefore taxes could not be collected in time for the annual payments to Bangkok.  
The Malays of the south were generally categorized as phrai suai [people whose 
responsibility was to contribute taxes in kind (suai)]. In other words, through their nai 
(the Malay elites) they contributed tribute taxes in the form of tin (suai dibuk) and timber 
(suai kradan). These people of the muang khaek were also obligated to work on the rice 
fields of their respective Raja without remuneration. When it was time for the triennial 
bunga mas, the people contributed towards the cost and labour in making the bunga mas. 
                                                 
117 Neil A.Englehart, Culture and Power, p. 37. 
118 Ibid., p. 42. 
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The bunga mas tax contribution was known as ase; each Malay commoner contributed 
between $2- $3 while slaves paid between 50 cents to $1.119         
A large group of people under the control of a nai posed a potential danger to the 
state, especially if the nai’s loyalty was suspect. Moreover, officials from Bangkok relied 
on the nai for information, and utilized their local influence. They cultivated personal 
relations with the nai in the provinces to facilitate their jobs, a situation that sometimes 
encouraged the officials and the nai to conspire against the state or to benefit from state 
resources.  
In an administrative system based on the control of people, administrative centres 
tended to be located where the population density was greatest.120  Such concentrations of 
people were called muang, and in traditional society the muang was not defined 
geographically but by a grouping of people.121 If great numbers of people moved, one 
muang might disappear or a new muang might be created. The following illustrates the 
position of land vis-à-vis people in a muang.  
Land within a muang was not carefully mapped out either. Periodic assessments 
were made for the rice tax, but it was the crop that mattered, and little importance 
was attached to the land itself. No maps were made or records of land transfers 
kept, and title deeds, such as they were, were really tax receipts. Land was 
important only in that it was farmed by someone who paid taxes on the produce. 
Non-productive land was not taxed and no records were kept of it. Land was only 
valuable if and when it was worked, and people could generally claim as much as 
they could cultivate. 122   
 
Based on the above, it is clear that without labour or people, land had little value. The 
need for labour therefore made it imperative for the control of manpower, thus the 
emphasis placed in the traditional political system of nai-phrai. Cultivated land gave the 
                                                 
119 NA. R5. T.5.1/54, Report of Phra Songsuradet, 15 Feb 1891 (RS 109), as cited in Phuwadol 
Songprasert, ‘The Development of Chinese Capital in Southern Siam, 1868-1932’, Ph. D thesis, Monash 
University, 1986, pp. 36-37.  
120 See Larry Sternstein, “The Distribution of Thai Centres at Mid-Nineteenth Century”, JSEAS, 7/1, 1966. 
121 Neil A. Englehart, Culture and Power, p. 57. 
122 Ibid., p. 58. 
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state revenue because taxes were collected on the produce. The people, on the other hand, 
worked the land for as much as they had the labour and capital to do so.  
When people moved from one place to another, they occupied new uncultivated 
areas and the state collected taxes on the crops that they grew. Unlike crops such as rice 
that could be cultivated in any vacant land suitable for agriculture, mineral resources and 
teak forests were found in situ.    
The lack of delineation of land areas within a muang led in some cases to disputes 
over rights to resources between neighbouring muang. In the north, the expansion of 
European timber companies presented the officials of the muang with the opportunity for 
large income in exchange for the rights to cut timber given to these companies. Disputes 
arose when officials of separate muang claimed rights to the same forest area leading to 
legal recourse and friction. 123  
Disputes over forest and mining matters compounded the threat of foreigners 
using these disputes as a pretext for annexation of territories. In Burma, a dispute over a 
fine levied on the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation by the Burmese government for 
underreporting teak extractions served as an excuse for Britain’s annexation of Upper 
Burma in 1886.124 Siam faced a similar threat, and to forestall colonial intervention in its 
economy or the possibility of losing territories to foreign powers, Siam undertook to 
reform its administration. The European threat to Siam’s territories was therefore the 
external factor leading to the transition from a system based on labour to land. As a 
consequence, the Siamese government needed knowledge of modern geography and 
                                                 
123 Apart from the lack of clear demarcation of forest areas, the northern rulers (Chao muang) also engaged 
in dual-agreements, that is leasing the same forest area to more than one-party. The British Consul in 
Bangkok pressured the Siamese government to alleviate the situation, citing that British and Burmese 
loggers suffered huge losses because of the mal-practices of the northern rulers. The Bangkok government 
responded by introducing legislation on teak logging, which was incorporated in the Chiang Mai Treaty of 
1874. See Mala Rajo Sathian, ‘Northern Siam, 1867-1910: The Impact of Missionaries and Teak Traders ’ 
Masters thesis, University of Malaya, 1995, pp. 188-190.  
124 Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu: East West Center 
Press, 1966, p. 62. See also, David Steinberg et al., In Search of Southeast Asia, pp. 175-176.      
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mapping technology. Modern geography displaced indigenous conceptions of space and 
introduced in its place concepts such as boundary and territorial sovereignty.     
The establishment of the Department of Survey (1885) and the process of proper 
demarcation of territories through surveys and mapping indicated this transition from the 
indigenous to modern (western) concepts of space. These were also attempts to change 
the system of administration from one based on personal ties and loyalties (or traditional 
hierarchical relationships) to one based on territorial jurisdiction.125
At the same time, a more systematic administration to counter arrears in tax 
revenues, corrupt local leaders, and tax evasions led to the creation of various ministries 
and departments with specific functions and duties to take over the task of the 
administration of the kingdom. Chief among these was the Mahatthai or the Ministry of 
Interior placed under the charge of Prince Damrong. 
The prince outlined a systematic provincial reform for Siam. In 1894, Damrong 
introduced the thesaphiban system of provincial administration. The word “thesaphiban” 
is derived from the Sanskrit desa (meaning area or territory) and abhipala (meaning to 
protect or guard). Thongchai Winichakul translates thesaphiban as “protection over 
territory”.126  The word indicates the importance territory had assumed in the new Thai 
political system compared with the geographically ambiguous muang in the old system. 
The importance of guarding one’s territory meant the need for demarcating territory and 
claiming ownership over land.  This change replaced the former emphasis placed on 
manpower control with control of land.  
How did the change affect the huamuang whose responsibility hitherto was to 
contribute taxes and men to fight in the kingdom’s armies? The change in the importance 
placed on men and land significantly altered the traditional relations between tributary 
                                                 
125 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, p. 120. 
126 Ibid., p. 103. 
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states (huamuang) and its suzerain ruler. For Pattani, as with all other huamuang, the 
change involved a transition.  From an area whose people contributed taxes in kind and 
cash, Pattani became first and foremost a territory that Siam had to protect; it was in fact 
a transition from sovereignty over people to sovereignty over land.  
 
(III) TERRITORY (NEGERI) AND SOCIETY  
Organization of the Malay negeri 
Similar to other Malay state systems, the kampung (village) was the smallest unit 
of the negeri (territorial unit) of Pattani.127  The river was the main artery of 
communication and transport. Villages were mostly situated along the coasts and rivers 
where transport by small boat, drinking water and irrigation water for rice farming were 
available. It was common practice in traditional Malay states to regulate their boundaries 
according to river basins. It was also common for the negeri to adopt the same name as 
the principal river where it was first established. In some cases though, a river may run 
through numerous territories and thus does not belong exclusively to a particular negeri. 
The Patani River, for example, watered three negeri. The upper part of the river, also the 
closest to its source in Upper Perak ran through Raman, while the middle part watered 
sections of Yala and the lower part was in Pattani.  
 The coastal areas, the plains and the foothills were both farming and dwelling 
sites (kampung), and constituted an essential part of the negeri while the uninhabitable 
forest region in the mountainous areas, which were difficult to reach, served as the 
frontier of the negeri. This perception of the dwelling site as the essential part of the 
negeri and the frontier as the uncivilized forest lands - wild and unknown space - is 
                                                 
127 For example, the kampung is the smallest political unit in Kedah, the oldest Malay kingdom. See 
Sharom Ahmat, Tradition and Change in a Malay State: A Study of the Economic and Political 
Development, 1878-1923, Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph 
No. 12, 1984, p. 2.      
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similar to the Siamese concept of space. The Siamese viewed the baan (dwelling) as 
forming the integral part of the muang (inner city) and the pa (forest) as the frontier.128 
Additionally, the centre of the muang, the capital housing the royal palaces and the 
state’s most important Buddhist temple, was the locus of the cultural and religious 
activities of the state. Similarly, in Pattani, the heart of the negeri was in the area where 
the King resided.129    
The Raja’s house, the Kota Raja or Kota Istana (palace grounds) occupied the 
central place.130 According to an account dated 1900, the Raja’s house was about a mile 
and a half from the mouth of the river Patani.131  The same account indicates that the 
Chinese town, the commercial hub of the state, was located close to the shore of the river, 
giving the impression that the Chinese town was the first thing that a visitor entering 
Pattani via the river encountered. The Chinese town may, in fact, have been part of the 
outer city of the negeri, leading up to the inner city where the Kota Raja was located. 
According to Bougas, this was the mercantile section called bandar where, in former 
times, Chinese, Indian, and European traders stayed and conducted business. The ports 
and markets (Malay: kedai) were also located in the bandar section of the negeri.132  
In the account dated 1900, the writer spoke of “a large area that had been under 
rice cultivation over which cattle of an excellent breed were grazing”.133 This area under 
cultivation appears to be a short distance away from the Kota Raja. Assuming that the 
Chinese traders, who dealt principally in lead, tin, gutta-percha, ivory and hides, obtained 
                                                 
128 See Philip Stott, “Mu’ang and pa; elite views of nature in a changing Thailand”, in Manas Chitakasem 
and Andrew Turton (eds.), Thai Constructions of Knowledge, London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 1991, pp. 144-146.    
129 Malay Mail, “Siamese Malaya, Notes by a Traveller” 16 and 18 October 1900 (Parts 1 and 2). Also 
reproduced in a compilation of articles on Pattani, see Khoo Kay Kim, “Patani During the Turn of the 20th 
Century”, JMBRAS, Vol. 61, Part 1, 1988, p. 93.   
130 Although Kota Raja is more common, the author of the SKMP uses the term Kota Istana. See Ibrahim 
Syukri, History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (or SKMP), p. 15.  
131 J. Mc Carthy, Surveying and Exploring in Siam, p. 10.  
132 Wayne Bougas, The Kingdom of Patani, p. 51. The Malay word kedai is likely derived from the Tamil 
word kadai, which means market or shop.     
133 J. Mc Carthy, Surveying and Exploring in Siam, p. 10.  
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their stock from the cultivated areas further up the river, it is likely that their goods were 
taxed by the Raja as they made their way down to the mouth of the river. Similarly, the 
local people who brought their merchandise to the Chinese towns or the market centres at 
the mouth of the river had to pay taxes to the Raja at these stations before they proceeded 
to the markets. It is also very likely that the Rajas and other members of the royal 
household purchased local produce from the people and resold to the Chinese traders and 
Chinese workers employed in the tin mines for profits. Controlling supplies to the 
Chinese workers gave the Rajas the leverage to discipline disobedient workers: those 
found flouting tax payments owed to the chief were punished by having the supply of 
their provisions cut.134  
The Raja and his officers were the principal traders. The position of the Kota Raja 
in between the kampung area and the bandar was ideal for collecting taxes. All goods 
that passed through the rivers from the inner areas to the market points could not avoid 
paying the taxes due to the Raja. These revenue-collecting stations were found elsewhere 
in the Pattani region too. The Raja of Yala, for instance, collected taxes from his revenue-
collecting station at Ta-sap (also along the Patani River).135    
 
Society 
The population of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat consists predominantly of ethnic 
Malays. A small percentage of the population comprised Indians and/or Pathans. British 
Trade and Consular Reports tended to refer to all Indians as Pathans whereas the local 
people distinguished the Indians (as Malayalam or Tamil speaking groups) from the 
                                                 
134 Ibid., p. 16.   
135 Ibid., p. 11. 
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Pathans (as Urdu speaking people from areas adjacent to India).136 Both the Indians and 
the Pathans there were Muslims.        
The local people who are generically known in academic writings as Malays do 
not, however, refer to themselves specifically as Malays. They use the term orang Nayu 
or Orang Jawi when referring to themselves and orang Melayu when referring to the 
people in the neighbouring Malay states.137 The latter case is probably a more recent 
development, where the term Malay has become more or less synonymous with 
Malaysians. The term Nayu is the Pattani Malay dialect rendering of the word Melayu 
and the term kecek nayu is used in reference to speaking Malay in Pattani.   
However, it is interesting to note that the term Melayu was not a common term of 
reference to the Kingdom of Patani as compared to other contemporary Malay sultanates 
such as Melaka, Johor and Pahang. The HP records an event in the reign of Raja Kuning 
when she sent an entourage from Patani to the court of Johor. Two days after arriving in 
Johor, the leader of the convoy approached a royal servant in the Johor court, with the 
intention of wanting to learn the norms of the people there. He claimed, “ I do not know 
the Malay rules for conduct.   If I make any silly mistakes I ask you to teach me the 
correct behaviour”. To this the servant responded by asking “Is Patani really different 
from Johor?”  The leader replied thus, “Indeed   Johor and Patani are very much alike, 
but still there are differences in customs and rules”138 From these exchanges, Patani is 
portrayed as not familiar with the ways of the Malays and hoped to learn Malay ways and 
norms from Johor, which it regarded as a Malay state. There is no reference in the HP to 
                                                 
136 Interview with Dr. Pirayot Rahimmula, of the Institute of Maritime Studies, PSU (Pattani) and Mr. 
Abdullah Abru, Lecturer at the Economics Section, College of Islamic Studies, PSU (Pattani). Rahimmula 
is Urdu speaking and of Pathan descent while Abdullah Abru is a Malayalam speaking Peranakan (of 
South Indian Muslim and Malay mixed-parentage).   
137 Saroja Dorairajoo, ‘No Fish in the Sea: Thai-Malay Tactics of Negotiation’, pp. 2-3. Historically, 
however, “Jawi” was a term used by the Arabs to refer to the Malays.  
138 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 193.   
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Patani as being a Malay sultanate, the word Melayu appears only once in the text and is 
used in reference to Johor.139  
The incident above is illustrative of the distinction between the Malay cultures of 
the Melaka- Riau- Johor- Pahang states as compared to the northern Malay states of 
Kelantan- Trengganu- Kedah- Perak. The former category represents what is often 
considered the centre of the Malay world, with Melaka as the apex and symbol of rich 
Malay-court culture. Consequently the Malay spoken in the southern part of the Malay 
Peninsula is accepted as the more standard (and literary) or sophisticated form.  It is quite 
commonly referred to as the Riau-Lingga dialect.  
However, even within a state, differences in spoken Malay (or dialects) do exist. 
Linguist Asmah Haji Omar in her study of the Kedah dialect of the Malay language 
points out the differences between the plains (lowland) sub-dialect and that of the non-
plains (outer/inland) sub-dialect in the sub-region including Kedah, Perlis and Penang. 
The plains Malay, also referred as the “prestige or High (H)-Variety” is considered the 
“true” or standard Kedah dialect. This is because the H-variety is spoken in the plains 
(e.g. Kuala Muda, Kuala Nerang, Kuala Kedah and Anak Bukit) where the centre of 
administration as well as the court, which is patron to all Malay cultural activities, is 
located. Thus, this type of Malay is associated with the elite and naturally regarded as the 
more sophisticated form.140       
Asmah also states that the “Patani dialect shares features which are also common 
to varieties spoken in certain parts of Kedah”.141 However, the shared features, she adds, 
were not necessarily a result of inter-marriages or political conquest (extension of 
                                                 
139 Virginia Matheson, “Concepts of Malay Ethos in Indigenous Malay Writings”, JSEAS, Vol. 10/2, 1979, 
p. 361.      
140 Asmah Haji Omar, “The Kedah Dialect: Its Distribution, Development and Role in the Kedah Speech 
Community”, in Asmah Haji Omar (ed.), Darulaman: Essays on Linguistic, Cultural and Socio-Economic 
Aspects of the Malaysian State of Kedah, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1979, p. 6. 
141 Asmah Haji Omar, “The Kedah Dialect: Its Distribution, Development and Role”, p. 4.   
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administrative rule) but rather as a result of travel and communication. She singles out 
the arrival of “Patani workers by the thousands every year” to Kedah during the harvest 
season there as a major factor providing continuity to the geographical spread of 
dialects.142 Asmah also refers to the Pelet Patani, a dialect with a Patani accent, which is 
spoken in Baling (northern Kedah bordering Perak and Kelantan) today as evidence of 
the geographical spread of dialects resulting from the close intercourse between places 
through economic and trade networks.  
In the past, people from the Pattani region came to neighbouring Baling in search 
of jobs.  These people eventually settled down at Baling and continued to speak their own 
Patani dialect, which came to be known as the Pelet Patani among the people of 
Kedah.143 It was relatively easy for people to move or travel between Patani and Kedah 
because both places as well as other territories in the north of Malaya (including Province 
Wellesley before 1786) were under Siamese suzerainty. This unhindered movement of 
people and passage of goods from the Siamese area of Patani to the Siamese areas in the 
north of Malaya therefore contributed to “a geographical spread of dialects”.  
She adds that apart from the influence of Kedah, the Kelantan dialect too has had 
an impact on Patani Malay. Kelantan’s influence unlike Kedah’s was largely through 
marriage alliances between the courts of Patani and Kelantan and the rule of the Kelantan 
Dynasty in Patani.144         
In her analysis, the Malay dialects spoken in Perak, Kedah and Penang, on the 
basis of linguistic characteristics, belong, in fact, to one single dialect. She refers to the 
Malay spoken in Kedah-Perlis-Penang and Upper Perak as part of a single grouping 
collectively called the northwestern group. This is in contrast with the northeastern group 
                                                 
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid., p. 5. 
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(viz. the Kelantan dialect), the Eastern group (viz. the Trengganu dialect) and the 
southern group (Johor, Melaka, Pahang, Selangor, central and southern Perak).145   
The similarities between Kedah and Patani Malay, in a geo-economic sense, 
accruing from links through travel for trade and job purposes justify a comparison in this 
study of the Kedah- Patani link with that of the Kelantan- Patani link. The latter is seen as 
resulting largely from intermarriages between royal and aristocrat families of Patani and 
Kelantan as well as the close geographic proximity between the two regions.146  There is 
no denying that for a long time now Kelantan and Patani have shared strong cultural, 
political and religious (i.e. through the pondok and Kitab Jawi tradition) links.147 At the 
same time, the importance of the Kelantan- Patani link in no way nullifies the claim here 
that, during the period which forms the time frame of the present study, there were 
inextricable geo-economic ties between Patani and Kedah. And this contrasted noticeably 
with the Patani- Kelantan ties, which were more strictly political-cultural in nature.      
It may not seem far-fetched then to view Pattani as geo-economically a part of the 
north-western Malay states comprising Kedah, Penang, Perlis and Upper Perak.  
Moreover, the source of the Patani River and its network of tributaries that served as an 
important source of water for agriculture, communication as well as for daily living, in 
the Upper Perak region, lends further support to the geo-economic link with the north-
western states.   
                                                 
145 Ibid, p. 1.    
146 On marriage alliances between the Patani and Kelantan royal families see, David K. Wyatt, “Nineteenth 
Century Kelantan: A Thai View”, in William R. Roff (ed.), Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a 
Malay State, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 15-16; Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay 
Nationalism, pp. 44-47.      
147 There isn’t any detailed study of the relations between Kelantan and Patani although numerous works 
on Kelantan and the northern Malay states refer to the political, religious-cultural link between the two 
states. See William R. Roff (ed.), Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State; Clive Kessler, 
Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan, 1838-1969, London: Cornell University Press, 1978; 
Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, “Jawi Literature In Patani: The Maintenance Of An Islamic 
Tradition”; Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations.       
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It makes sense then that the HP would refer to the norms of the Malay culture in 
Johor as something uncommon to Pattani, for in fact Pattani belonged in a different 
category or grouping of the Malay-speaking world. The link with Kedah, which is the 
oldest Malay, state in the Peninsula places Pattani firmly within a larger or a Greater 
Malay World, with Kedah as the   centre of   that   world.      
The term Melayu, however, appears in more recent works, particularly those 
written at the height of the Malay separatist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (SKMP), written in 1949 by Ibrahim Syukri, uses 
the term Melayu extensively, in part to legitimize the call for a union with the Malay 
states of British Malaya.148 This is in sharp contrast with the HP, although Syukri admits 
that in compiling the SKMP, he used the HP as his panduan (guide). Teuuw and Wyatt in 
their analysis of both the HP and SKMP point out that “Syukri freely selected from his 
sources whatever he considered relevant for the history of Patani, adding his own 
interpretation”.149 There is an obvious political overtone in Syukri’s text and it is from 
this perspective that the word Malay is often used. Both the HP and SKMP convey 
different meanings of the term Malay and each represented the different times in which 
they were compiled. In the HP, Malay is used in the context of court culture (or royal 
lineage), in this case, the Johor court culture of the 17th century. In the SKMP, the term 
“Melayu” is also used to illustrate royal lineage, but more importantly the term is used in 
the context of race i.e. the Malay race (or bangsa Melayu).150    
                                                 
148 More recent research among the Malay population of Pattani has revealed that Malay youths from 
Pattani consider themselves Thai citizens more than being Malay. This is especially true among Pattani 
Malay youths who are employed in Malaysia today.  This group of people who work as cooks and workers 
in Thai restaurants in Malaysian cities speak Thai among themselves and distinguish their “Malayness” 
from that of the Malays of Malaysia. See Mala Rajo Sathian and Saroja Dorairajoo, “Being Malayu the 
Thai way: Perceiving the Thai-Malaysia Border from a People’s Perspective”. Paper presented at the 9th 
International Thai Studies Conference in Nakhon Panom, Thailand, 9-12 Jun 2002.        
149 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, pp. 46-48.   
150 For a discussion on the meanings of Malay and Malayness as well as Malay identity see Anthony Reid, 
“Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities” in Timothy P. Barnard (ed.), 
Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries, Singapore: Singapore University Press, National 
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The Thais, it appears, never used the term Malay in their official correspondence. 
The traditional use of the word “khaek” continued right through to the sixth and seventh 
reigns. Names of Malay mining applicants in the files of the Ministry of Agriculture were 
prefixed with the work “khaek”. Two Malay applicants, Tuan Ismael and Che Umar, 
seeking mining licences in the province of Yala as late as 1919, for example, appear in 
the files as khaek Tuan Ismael and khaek Che Umar respectively.151         
British reports, however, always used the term Malay when referring to the 
people of Pattani. While the British distinguished the Indians from the Malays and the 
term Indians (sometimes carelessly referred to as Pathans) was used to refer to the 
former, official Siamese population census tended to categorize the Malays and Indians 
as one collective group.152 This was because the Thais called both Indians and Malays as 
“khaek”, a term inclusive of all people of tanned skin e.g. Malays, Indians, Persians and 
Arabs. 
According to the population census of 1929, the population of Siam for that year 
comprising both male and female totalled 11, 506, 207.153 Of these, Indians and Malays 
totalled 379, 618. Table 2.1 shows the breakdown of the major ethnic groups as recorded 
in the census of 1929.154     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
University of Singapore, 2004, pp. 1-24. Also in the same issue see, Shamsul A.B., “A History of an 
Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice of ‘Malayness’ in Malaysia Reconsidered”, pp. 
135-148 and Leonard Y. Andaya, “The Search for the ‘Origins’ of Melayu”, pp. 56-75.     
151 NA, R. 6, KS 16/687 and KS 16/690, 1919.   
152 FO 371/14775, Mr. J.F. Johns to Mr. A. Henderson, Comments on “ A memorandum containing 
comparative statistics of the population of the three administrative circles comprising the Senggora 
Consular district based upon the figures recorded by the census of 1919 and that of 1929”, 18 Aug 1930, p. 
306. On Pathans, see Chapter 6.   
153 Population census in the early Bangkok period recorded only the male members of the population. 
Female members were excluded because they unlike the men were not valuable as a source of manpower or 
contributor of capitation taxes to the state. In later years (1920/30s), women too began to be accounted for 
in the population census. When exactly and why this move was made remains unclear.  
154 FO 371/14775, Mr. J.F. Johns to Mr. A. Henderson, Comments on   “A memorandum Containing 
Comparative Statistics of the population ”, p. 306.  
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 Table 2.1: Major ethnic groups – Population census 1929  
 
Ethnic group  Number of people 
Siamese  10, 493, 304 
Chinese               445, 274 
Indians and Malays        379, 618 
Cambodians                        60, 668 
Total   11, 506, 207 
 
Of the total number of Indians and Malays, 272, 494 were in Pattani, in other words, 
72 per cent of the total number of the Indians and Malays in the kingdom of Siam 
resided in Pattani.155  In a separate report, the number of people in all the provinces in 
monthon Pattani for the years 1919 and 1929 is given as follows.156  
TABLE 2.2: Population in monthon Pattani for the years 1919 and 1929   
Province    1919   1929 
Pattani    134, 991  143, 216 
Narathiwat     79, 921    93, 284 
Yala    48, 822    59, 596 
Saiburi     36, 154    39, 052 
Total population   299, 888  335, 148 
Males    150, 370  169, 145 
Females    149, 518  166, 003 
 
Pattani was the most highly populated province compared to Yala, Narathiwat 
and Saiburi, although in terms of size, Narathiwat was the largest province followed 
by Yala. When compared with the population of other administrative circles 
(monthon) in the south, such as Phuket and Nakhon Sithammarat, the total number of 
                                                 
155 Ibid. 
156 FO 371/14775, Enclosure 2 in No.1, W.W. Coultas to FO, “A memorandum containing comparative 
statistics of the population of the three administrative circles comprising the Senggora Consular district 
based upon the figures recorded by the census of 1919 and that of 1929”, p. 302.     
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people in Pattani was less than that of Nakhon Sithammarat but higher than that of 
Phuket. Table 2.3 illustrates this.157  
Table 2.3: Population in N.Sithammarat, Patani and Phuket: 1919 and 1929. 
 
Year  N.Sithammarat  Pattani  Phuket 
1919  744, 169   299, 888  209, 440 
1929  909, 175   335, 148  242, 041 
 
Whereas in the early 1900s, 90% of the people of Pattani were Muslims, more 
recent data (1996-1997) show that the average Muslim population in the three 
provinces is between 77-80 %.158 The increasing number of non-Muslims is due 
largely to the “nikhom” resettlement project started in the late 1950s or early 1960s 
by the Thai government to encourage its people to take up land clearing, cultivation 
and husbandry in places hitherto unoccupied or sparsely populated.159 It was also a 
scheme aimed at redressing the population imbalance between Thai-Buddhists and 
Malay Muslims in the Pattani region.160 The interior of Narathiwat and the area close 
to the border of Malaya began to be populated by Thais from all parts of the 
kingdom, in particular from the less fertile and poorer sections of the northeast. 
 
The Hilir - Darat Socio-Economic Culture    
There were generally two groups of people in the three Muslim provinces. People 
living in the lower reaches of the river or kawasan hilir were simply called orang hilir 
                                                 
157 Ibid.      
158 Commercial Office Narathiwat, Thailand, Market Information: Yala (1997), Pattani (1996), Narathiwat 
(1997). 
159 In neighbouring Malaysia, a similar project called the FELDA scheme encouraged Malays to take up 
rubber and oil palm cultivation. The scheme provided opportunities for small land-holdings among Malays.    
160 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros Of Southern Philippines And The Malays Of Southern 
Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 38. 
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(estuary people) while those living in the plains and the foothills were orang darat (land 
people). The hilir people fished, planted rice and panned for salt for their livelihood. The 
darat were principally rice and cattle farmers, while some grew fruit trees and others 
gathered jungle produce. Pattani, which for the most part is a coastal province, is 
generally known as hilir, while inland Yala is known as darat and parts of Narathiwat 
fall under kawasan darat and the section close to the coast is called hilir.  
Geography and environment largely determined the habits of the people. The 
hilir-darat division shaped and influenced all aspects of the culture of the local people. 
Certain characteristics of the people, up to the present day, are associated with their hilir 
or darat origins. The hilir people, whose life depends on (and is determined by) the 
unpredictable sea, as the source of their livelihood, have developed as a result a more 
fluid and tolerant or perhaps less rigid culture. As a consequence, the people’s attitude to 
life is more relaxed, living by the adage “cari pagi make petang” (Patani dialect: 
meaning seek in the morning to eat in the evening), with little anxiety or concern for the 
future. The hilir hardly invest in business to reap more profits for the future and are less 
serious with education as an investment for a brighter future. They seem to lack plans for 
the future. They live for today, tomorrow is as unpredictable as the tides and the waves in 
the sea. Their ideas of a “home” are less permanent, because when fishermen leave for 
the sea, home seems remote and far away and there is no guarantee that they would be 
back at home at the end of the fishing trip (some spend days at sea). 161   
Unlike the more predictable environment in the hinterland where people’s lives are 
scheduled according to rice-cycles (planting-harvesting period) and the dry and monsoon 
period (Thai: radu ron kab radu marasom/fon), the sea brings with it “a life of 
uncertainty”. The notion of home becomes impermanent to those going out to the sea, 
                                                 
161 Information on the attitude or culture of fishermen and the phrase “cari pagi make petang” was obtained 
from an interview with Encik Husin, a government official attached to the Office for the Administration of 
the Southern Border Provinces (So. Bo. To) in the province of Yala, 27 April 2000.    
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whereas those in the darat whose homes are surrounded by trees and farms and animal 
grazing patches are provided with a “firm grounding” for a sense of belonging to their mu 
baan (village). This may have led also to protective and rigid or conservative ways 
whereas people of the hilir are more trusting of foreign elements.162       
 
Social and Economic Hierarchy  
Pattani society, like other Peninsular Malay societies, was inherently hierarchical. 
The ruling class in Pattani occupied the highest rank in the society.  Next came a middle 
group of religious teachers and scholars (Malay: orang alim/tok guru)- the learned in the 
society- and the traders (Malay: orang kaya/nakhoda). These two groups had 
opportunities for social mobility. Those of exceptional ability among the learned and 
merchant class could be absorbed into the ruling elite class. At the bottom of the social 
pyramid were the subjects (Malay: rakyat), which included village-elders and villagers as 
well as debtors and slaves (Malay: orang berhutang dan hamba).163           
Rulers represented the interest of their subjects. The masses or the Malay people 
of Pattani who had traditional (primordial) ties with the Rajas gave him their loyalty in 
return for his patronage. The Raja was also the focal point for the Islamic religion and 
Malay culture. Visiting ulama (clerics) were guests of the King and the religious or cleric 
group enjoyed the support and patronage of the Raja and the following of the people. In 
other words, the people’s loyalty was first to the Raja followed by the ulama.   
The divide between the ruling class and the subjects can also be viewed from the 
perspective of hilir and darat. Nelson Annadale observed that “in Patani, orang darat 
                                                 
162 Based on observations and interviews with university professors, pondok (religious) school owners and 
teachers in Pattani.  Laila Arkip-Urai, owner and manager of the rongrien satri satsana (or all-girls 
religious school) in Krisek and Maryam Samoh, Manager of the Ban Na orphanage, near Krisek were the 
main informants.        
163 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros Of Southern Philippines And The Malays Of Southern 
Thailand, p. 39.   
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means “countrymen” as opposed to men of the towns and larger villages”.164 This 
observation supports the contention that the darat represented the rural community i.e. 
countrymen or village people in the inland as opposed to those in the towns and cities, 
the urban sector of the negeri which was mostly located close to coasts, ports or 
estuaries. The ruling elite, the scholars and the traders were all found in the urban areas 
(hilir) whereas the subjects were mostly concentrated in the darat areas.165            
Land, in general, belonged to the ruling class and people worked these lands and 
paid taxes on the land or their produce. Malays in the Pattani region worked on their 
Rajas’ rice fields and contributed too towards the bunga mas tribute payment to 
Bangkok. They also paid taxes to the Raja for the salt they collected from the salt fields 
(Malay: bendang garam) found close to the coast of Pattani.166   
While the Thai state used records of registered able-bodied men in the provinces 
to facilitate tax collection and corvee (taxation in the form of unpaid labour) demands, 
the Malay Rajas appear to have collected taxes not from individuals but from each family 
in the village. Taxes in kind rather than cash were collected from the villagers based on 
the economic activity of the families. People in the hilir may have contributed salt and 
dried fish as annual taxes to the King while those in the darat contributed jungle produce 
such as beeswax, resin and tin to the King. It is not known how and when these taxes 
were collected. Political scientist Dr. Pirayot Rahimmula, a native of Pattani, remarked 
that the people must have sent their produce to the Tok Imam’s (religious teacher’s) 
house in the village once every year, and later some portion of the collected amount was 
                                                 
164 Nelson Annandale, and Herbert C. Robinson, Fasciculi Malayenses, Anthropological and Zoological 
Results Of An Expedition, p. 30. 
165 Surin Pitsuwan refers to government bureaucrats and Chinese traders as part of the urban setting while 
the masses are described as rural society. This study uses the Malay term hilir to denote the palace and 
market/trading areas and darat to refer to the inland. In other words, similar to Pitsuwan’s categorization, 
the hilir in this study represents urban society and the darat represents rural society. See Surin Pitsuwan, 
Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of The Malay Muslims Of Southern Thailand, Bangkok: Thai 
Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1985, pp. 22-23.  
166 C.A. Gibson-Hill (ed.), The Cambridge University Expedition, pp. 25-26.  
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sent to the court.167 This may have been the annual tithe (zakat) payment that is 
obligatory on all Muslims with the means to contribute. A portion of the tithe in kind 
must have been commuted to the royal granaries. These taxes were separate from the 
taxes collected from traders and Chinese tin miners.     
 
Concluding Remarks 
Patani was well known to the international world as a trading port and centre even 
before the fourteenth century. Its rulers engaged in trade and held absolute control over 
taxation and revenue matters. The trading activities in Patani and the importance placed 
on this trade established Patani primarily as a coastal polity. The presence of Chinese 
traders in Patani and their relations with the Malay Raja was of special significance, and 
serves to underline the fact that, while Patani was chiefly a Malay-Islamic polity, its 
maritime trade attracted merchants of all races and gave its coastal area  (hilir or pasisir) 
a cosmopolitan character. Patani was a port of call for Sino-Siamese junk trade, and some 
of the Chinese who came to Patani chose to remain there.168 Their numbers grew in 
course of time and some of these families played a vital role in the commerce of Patani.  
The socio-cultural aspects of Patani society become clearer when seen from the 
perspective of what may be categorized as the hilir-darat division of the local 
inhabitants. In general, it may be said that the people of the hilir were more tolerant of 
foreign or non-local ideas as they were more exposed to foreigners, for example, traders. 
                                                 
167 Interview with Dr. Pirayot Rahimmula, Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), Pattani, June 2000.  
168 The most famous Chinese resident of Patani was the seventeenth century Teochiu pirate-cum trader, 
Lim Toh Khiem, who lured by Patani’s prosperous trade, visited the kingdom in c. 1580. In Patani, he was 
attracted to the Islamic religion and therefore converted to Islam and chose to remain there. The sister who 
came in search of her lost brother hanged herself from a cashew tree (Malay:janggus) when she failed to 
dissuade her brother to return to China. The Lim Ko Niow shrine in Krisek, Pattani, today was erected in 
memory of this lady and has a cult following among the Chinese in the region. See A. Teeuw and D.K. 
Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 13. Ibrahim Syukri, SKMP, pp. 30-31.  It can be argued that the presence of the 
Lim Ko Niow shrine just miles away from the Krisek mosque is testimony of the cosmopolitan character of 
pasisir Patani in former times.  
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In this case, familiarity certainly did not breed contempt. On the contrary, it helped to 
reduce the tendency to develop intense ethnocentrism. The darat people, on the other 
hand, being less exposed to foreign influences, were also less receptive to alien ideas. 
Their priorities too were less aligned to economic needs of the market because they were 
able to subsist on the land. As such, they were more concerned with aspects of religious 
and cultural purity. Subsequent discussions will provide a closer view of the economy of 
the region and the changes taking place in the negeri (territories) of Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat.     


















THE ECONOMY OF PATTANI: 1880s-1900s 
Pattani, as mentioned previously, is a land of hills, mountains, deltas and valleys; 
each in the past supported a different kind of economic activity.169 The river valleys and 
hills were tin-bearing territories while the alluvial land, within the delta system of the 
Pattani River, was suitable for rice farming. In the uplands, dry rice cultivation 
(swidden), cattle breeding and fruit growing were common occupations. The flat and 
sandy stretches behind the beaches of the east and north coasts of the region were 
appropriate for coconut cultivation.170 The areas closest to the coast also supported salt 
farming activities (the collection of salt through evaporation).171 Fishing was another 
traditional occupation of importance.      
The basic division in the economy of the Pattani region was between the hilir 
(estuary) and the darat (inland).  Indeed this division persists to the present day. 
Although the hilir-darat dichotomy in Pattani is essentially geographic- economic in 
nature, it permeates all aspects of the society creating even a cultural divide within the 
greater Pattani society. Much of the discussion here will highlight what may be termed 
the hilir-darat economic culture of Pattani.  This is an aspect of the greater Pattani 
society often overlooked by outsiders but exists indelibly in the minds of the locals.   
 
An Early Trading Centre: Pre- 1880s 
The early history of Patani, as recorded in the HP, provides ample evidence that 
trade was once Patani’s economic mainstay. The prominent role of the Malay Raja and 
                                                 
169 For a study of the topographical structure of the southern region see Wolf Donner, The Five Faces of 
Thailand: An Economic Geography, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982.  
170 Ibid., p. 411. See also, Thomas M. Fraser, Jr. Fishermen of South Thailand, The Malay Villagers, 
Illinois: Waveland Press, 1984 (reprint), p.3.   
171 C.A. Gibson-Hill (ed.), The Cambridge University Expedition, pp. 25-26.  
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the Orang Kaya in the trade of Patani is revealed in the HP.172 Patani is described mostly 
as a port polity throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was involved in two 
systems of trade: the long distance trade conducted with China on Chinese junks, and a 
more regional trade with Siam and other Malay and Indonesian ports.173 Pepper collected 
from the surrounding regions of Patani was a primary product in Patani’s trade with 
China. In return for pepper, Chinese traders sold luxury textiles and porcelain. Patani also 
imported textiles from India and exchanged gold and foodstuffs with Indian traders. 
According to van Leur, the foodstuffs came primarily from Java and included items such 
as salt, coarse sugar, coconut oil, garlic and onions. 174   
Meilink-Roelofz observed that Malay merchants of Patani marketed Chinese and 
Indian goods in Siam, and throughout the Indonesian archipelago, reaching the north 
coastal ports of Java and Sumatra, and extending to Makasar.175  In return, traders from 
the Archipelago came to Patani in search of prized commodities, such as pepper.   
Pepper or piper nigrum was a particularly important item of Patani’s trade in the 
16th and 17th centuries.  Patani very likely was an important collection and distribution 
centre for pepper on the east coast of the Isthmus rather than a big producer of the crop. 
176 It has been identified as a source of pepper for the Asian markets in the 16th century.  
For instance, Javanese traders, according to John Bastin, traded in the pepper of Sumatra 
(Sunda, Indrapura, Jambi) and Patani at a time when the Portuguese were trying to gain 
                                                 
172 The Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (SKMP) makes similar observations. The author uses the term 
saudagar raja to refer to merchants who traded on behalf of the Queen of Patani. See Ibrahim Syukri, 
SKMP, p. 35.    
173 A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, The Story of Patani, p.7.  
174 Apart from Patani, the ports of Nakhon Sithammarat (Ligor) and Songkhla also marketed pepper 
collected from the Malay Peninsula. See J.C. van leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague: W. van 
Hoeve Publishers Ltd., 1967, p. 125.  
175 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, pp. 163, 165, 
258, 272, 289. See also, Ibrahim Syukri, SKMP, p. 39. 
176 See L.Y. Andaya, “A History of Trade in the Sea of Melayu”, in Itinerario, 24 (1), 2000, p. 98.   
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control of the Southeast Asian pepper trade in the Sunda region.177  It is likely that the 
pepper in Patani was in fact collected from various places in the Isthmian and the 
northern regions of the Malay Peninsula.178 The northern Malay states of Kedah, 
Kelantan and Trengganu were important pepper producers in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.179 Kedah, in particular, was “the chief centre for the production of pepper in 
these parts [Malay Peninsula] though far from the only one”.180Although less significant 
compared to pepper producing centres in Sumatra which, by the nineteenth century, was 
producing more than 50 percent of total pepper produced in the East, the Malayan pepper 
producing states were nonetheless part of the pepper network of the Archipelago which 
drew traders from the West as well as China and India.181 It was the high demand for 
pepper for the international market which induced Patani, located ideally on the east-west 
Isthmian trade route, and being also an important port of call for Chinese and Indian 
traders, to trade in pepper collected from producers in the region.                 
Apart from pepper, Patani produced too gold, tin and forest products, such as 
aromatic wood (e.g. sandalwood), the last-mentioned was a highly prized commodity in 
the trade with China.182 Equally valuable was edible birds’ nests, prized for its nutritional 
                                                 
177 John Bastin, The Changing Balance Of The Early Southeast Asian Pepper Trade, Papers on Southeast 
Asian Subjects, No. 1, Kuala Lumpur: Department of History, University of Malaya, 1960, p. 20.     
178 The muang of Trang, located on the west coast of the isthmus region, was a significant pepper-growing 
centre in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The large Chinese population there was likely involved in 
pepper growing long before the 19th century. See DCR, Siam (Monthon Puket), 1909/1910, p. 6.   
179 According to Andaya, the state of Pahang too supplied pepper to Patani. See L.Y. Andaya, “A History 
of Trade”, p. 98. On Trengganu as pepper a producer, see Shaharil Talib, “The Port and Polity of 
Trengganu During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Realizing its Potential”, in J. Kathirithamby 
Wells and John Villiers (eds.), The Southeast Asian Port and Polity, pp. 214-217. Kelantan, according to 
T.J Newbold’s estimate of 1838, exported about 12, 000 piculs of pepper annually. See T.J. Newbold, 
Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits Settlements, London, 1839, Vol. 2, 
p. 65.            
180 As quoted in John Bastin, The Changing Balance of Southeast Asian Pepper Trade, p. 26. See footnote 
(84).    
181 By the early 19th century, the island of Sumatra replaced the Malabar coast in India as a major pepper 
supplier for the European market. See estimates of world pepper production c. 1826 in J. Crawfurd, 
Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints, Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 423.      
182 David J. Welch and Judith R. McNeill, “Archaeological Investigations of Pattani History”, p. 27.   See 
also, J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, p. 125  
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(or medicinal) value, collected in the region. The collection of birds’ nests was farmed 
out to Chinese, which was, in addition, collected as tribute tax (suai rangnok). A Chinese 
settler in south Siam by the name of Hao Yiang was likely a pioneer tax farmer dealing in 
birds’ nests in the Kingdom of Siam. Recognising the value and potential for profits 
resulting from increasing demands for birds’ nests in China, Hao Yiang presented the 
Siamese King with a variety of offerings (which included his wife, children, and slaves) 
in return for a lease to collect birds’ nests in the nearby islands in south Siam. The King 
returned Hao Yiang’s “property” but granted him the rights to collect the nests in return 
for an annual payment (c.1770).183  
The Chinese involved in the collection of birds’ nests or as tax farmers dealing in 
birds’ nests became prosperous and their contribution to the state coffers soon earned 
them “privileged” positions in the political and social hierarchy in the south. Hao Yiang 
and his descendents, for instance, were the ruling elites of muang Songkhla for most of 
the 18th and 19th centuries.184
Patani’s history, particularly its position and role in the commerce of the 
peninsula, is generally well known. Historians and archaeologists, who have worked on 
the Malay Archipelago of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, describe Patani as an 
important entrepot for the trade of the region.185  
The eighteenth century may be said to mark the decline of Patani. English 
mariner, Alexander Hamilton, who visited Patani in c. 1718, lamented the chaotic state of 
                                                 
183 Eric Valli and Diane Summers, Shadow Hunters: The Nest Gatherers of Tiger Cave, Singapore: Sun 
Tree Publishing Limited, 1990.  
184 See Chapter 4 for details. 
185 Apart from works by J.C. van Leur and Meilink Roelofz mentioned above, other studies on the subject 
include Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Volumes 1 and 2, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988 and 1993. The most recent addition to the body of knowledge on Pattani is a book 
by Krongchai Hatta, a Thai scholar. Entitled, Pattani: Trade, Politics and Administration in The Past, the 
book is probably the only one written in Thai on the trade of Pattani in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Krongchai Hatta, Pattani: kan ka lae kan muang kan pokrong nai adit (Pattani: Trade, Politics and 
Administration in the Past), Pattani: Project for Pattani Studies, Department of Humanities and Liberal 
Arts, Prince of Songkhla University, 1998.      
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affairs resulting from succession disputes and internal strife in the court of Patani. It 
contributed to its declining importance as a trading centre on the peninsula. Hamilton 
wrote: 
[Patani] was the staple port for Surat shipping, and from Goa, Malabar and 
Chormondel [Coromandel] they had a good trade, and so they had from China, 
Tunquin [Tonkin], Cambodia and Siam; but the merchants finding no restraint on 
robbers and murderers, were obliged to give their trade turn into another Chanel 
[sic], which was a great advantage to Batavia, Siam and Malacca, where they 
were kindly used, and in those Ports it has continued ever since.186    
 
D.K. Wyatt adds that, apart from internal conflicts in the court of Patani, Dutch naval 
predominance in the Straits of Melaka and the decline in the demand for the products of 
the Malay Peninsula may have also led to Patani’s decline.187
Little is known or has been written on Patani’s economy or commerce of the 19th 
century. Following the subjugation of Patani by King Rama I (1795), the territory 
remained a tributary under succeeding Chakri Kings, thus its history for the most part of 
the nineteenth century has been largely focused on its political relations with Bangkok, 
the political centre of the Chakri Dynasty.  As a tributary, Patani sent gold, tin and 
aromatic and resinous wood as tribute. British officials in the Straits Settlements 
observed that tin was one of the primary produce from Patani.188 Indeed tin was the most 
valuable article of trade in the peninsular Malay states in the nineteenth century.189  
For Patani, its contribution of various tribute taxes - i.e. suai dibuk (tin tax), suai 
kradan (timber tax) and suai rangnok (birds nests’ tax) - to Bangkok enhanced its own 
economic and political position vis-à-vis the Siamese state. These suai were potent 
economic forces which earned Patani high regard from the Bangkok government for they 
                                                 
186As quoted in A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt, Hikayat Patani, p. 20.  
187 Ibid.  
188 See T.J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements In The Straits of Malacca, 
Vol. 2.  See also Table 3.2 in this chapter for tin exports from monthon Pattani.  
189 D.J. Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 51.   
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nourished the state coffers while, at the same time, they served to give the impression 
that Patani, with its rich resources, was politically powerful too.  
But by the early 19th century, important changes were taking place in Southeast 
Asia.  Western powers were clearly attempting to make inroads into the local kingdoms. 
Siam chose to be conciliatory rather than to resist.  First, the Burney Treaty of 1826 
paved the way for the end of royal monopolies and the beginnings of “more liberal” 
(open) economy in Siam. This was then followed by the Bowring Treaty of 1855 that 
resulted in Bangkok granting “extra-territorial rights” to foreigners and the enforcement 
of fixed import and export duties. The tariff clauses in the treaty, in particular the ceiling 
rate of 3 percent on import duties, reduced drastically Siamese state resources and to a 
large extent overhauled the public revenue system, hitherto, practiced in Siam.190        
Finally, the thesaphiban administrative reforms of the 1880/1890s also required 
changes made to the system of fiscal management. With the increase in centralization, 
tribute taxes were replaced by more direct taxes. The local ruling elites in turn had to 
employ other means of taxing their subjects in order to meet their tax obligations to the 
Siamese state.191 The majority of the people meanwhile were involved in other forms of 
economic pursuits, agriculture and fishing being the most important among them.  
Agriculture and Other Economic Activities: 1880s-1900s 
Rice farming, the main occupation of the rakyat, was both a hilir and a darat 
activity. People grew wet-rice (padi sawah) in the hilir areas and dry-rice (padi huma) in 
                                                 
190 On the Bowring Treaty see, James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, pp. 33-35, passim; Hong 
Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution Of The Economy and Society, Singapore: ISEAS, 
1984, Chapter 5.  
191 Between 1892 and 1902, ten years after the thesaphiban was introduced, Siam’s revenues increased 
more than two-fold (from 15.38 to 39.15 million Baht). The increase was achieved despite Siam’s treaty 
obligations and the restrictions on its financial autonomy since the Bowring Treaty of 1855 which had 
fixed Siam’s import and export duties as well as land tax at a general rate of 3 %, consequently limiting 
drastically Siam’s earnings through customs duties.  However, other sources of revenue contributed 
towards Siam’s earnings during this period. These were from opium monopoly and gambling farms (40%), 
royalties from mining and forestry (5%) and commercial services: chiefly railways (5 %). See James 
Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, p. 177.   
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the mountainous darat areas.192  The people produced enough for their own consumption. 
It is also very likely that rice farmers contributed one-tenth of their produce for the 
annual zakat (tithe).  Although rice farming in the Pattani region was considered 
subsistent in nature, and therefore lacked a surplus, British Trade Reports indicate that 
paddy (unhusked rice) was exported from the Pattani region. As with most other exports 
from this region, paddy too was largely exported to Singapore.193 The value of paddy 
exports from Pattani was nonetheless small: from 1908 to 1912, paddy exports were in 
the range of 7.5 % to 13.5 % of the total export value from monthon Patani (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Paddy export from monthon Pattani, 1908-1914
Year 1908-09 1909-10 1910-11 1911-12 1912-13 1913-14 
Total Export  (£) 47,814 73,169 121,511 130,700 123,046 112,766 
Paddy (£) 
(% of Total 
Export) 
  3,620 
 (7.57) 
  8,390 
(11.46) 
  13,754 
 (11.31) 
 
  17,582 
  (13.45)
    1,676 
    (1.36) 
    2,772 
    (2.45)
 
Source: 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1910/1911, p. 11 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1911/1912, p. 8 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1912/1913, p. 10 
 
There was a sharp decrease in paddy exports from the region between 1912 and 1914. 
This might have been the result of a low-yield crop, an unexpected shortage of rainfall or 
an extended period of drought. Over time, a steady increase in population led to a 
decrease in the size of land holding among the villagers. This coupled with the lack of 
                                                 
192 The cultivation of dry-rice may be of more recent origin, whereas wet-rice cultivation was common 
since the days when Patani began as a small settlement called Kampung Pak Tani along the Patani River. In 
the SKMP, the author refers only to wet-rice fields “within the area of the high and level land” (i.e. valley 
or delta) of Kampung Pak Tani. See Ibrahim Syukri, SKMP, p. 14. For a description and contrast between 
sawah (wet-rice) and huma (swidden) farming methods see Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The 
Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, University of California Press: Berkeley, Association of Asian 
Studies, 1963, pp. 15-37.        
193 Acting Consul for Senggora [Songkhla], W.N Dunn reported that, “the trade of the eastern monthons is 
almost entirely with Singapore”. See DCR, Siam (Senggora), 1912/1913, p. 1. Apart from Singapore, 
paddy from Pattani may have also been exported to states on the west coast i.e. Phuket, where rice was 
scarce.    
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irrigation systems to support farming work contributed to the gradual decline in 
production.  
The export of paddy instead of milled-rice indicates also the lack of rice mills in the 
area. Unlike the central region of Siam, i.e. the Chao Phraya valley, where rice mills 
owned mostly by Chinese traders could be found in relative abundance, the southernmost 
region lacked such facilities. The small paddy output from the Pattani region may be one 
reason for the lack of rice mill, it would have made more business sense to operate rice 
mills in other major rice-producing provinces in the south such as Phattalung and Nakhon 
Sithammarat.  
According to Fraser, there was only one rice mill in the village of Rusembilan in 
Pattani in 1959. Interestingly, the Tok Imam (religious teacher) owned the only rice mill 
in the village, and Fraser notes that the women from the village would rather send their 
baskets of unhusked rice to the rice mill in the city citing that the Tok Imam’s rice mill 
was small.194
A surplus rice production in the Pattani region was an exception rather than a 
norm. Apart from the few good years when harvest was bountiful, rice produced in the 
Pattani region was generally not sufficient for local consumption. Malay villagers 
purchased rice in the markets mostly from Chinese or Thai traders.195 In the1900s, 
                                                 
194Thomas M. Fraser, Fishermen of South Thailand, p. 15. Fraser conducted field research in Rusembilan 
in 1959/60. In a conversation with Dr. Pirayot Rahimmula of the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani, 
during my field trip there in 2000, I gathered that villagers are generally unhappy with the “business-
inclined ventures” of the Tok Imam. Apparently, at the end of the harvest season, the Tok Imam always 
shows up in his truck to claim his portion of the unhusked rice. While, having his own rice mill to process 
the paddy that he gathers makes practical sense, Dr. Rahimmula adds, that villagers are increasingly 
frustrated with the “entrepreneur” attitude and wealth of the Tok Imam while they remain relatively poor.  
Conversation with Dr. Pirayot Rahimmula, 27 April 2000. The appointment of local Imam as tax collectors 
is not unique to Pattani. During the early years of tax collection in Kelantan (1890s-1900s), the Tok Imam, 
as the most educated person in the village, played the role of tax collector. He ensured correct assessment 
of total amount of paddy produced because it also determined the zakat payment that was due to him. On 
Kelantan see, Shahril Talib, “Nineteenth Century Kelantan: A Malay Tributary State”, in Jurnal 
Antropologi dan Sosiologi, UKM, Malaysia, 9, 1981, p. 52.           
195 W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern 
Thailand, p. 37.     
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Phattalung and Nakhon Sithammarat were the chief rice producers in the south, and 
surplus rice from here was sent to most of the other provinces in the south, including 
Pattani and those on the west coast such as Phuket and Trang.196
Fishing was a hilir activity, involving Malays of the coastal provinces of Pattani 
and Narathiwat.197 Malay fishermen organized themselves into groups and went out to 
sea during the fishing season from late December through mid-February. Prawns were 
the main catch during this period followed by a second phase (March/April) when 
mackerel (kembong) was found in abundance.198
Fishing was done using boats and large nets. Most of the fishermen either owned 
or shared co-owned small fishing boats called perahu kolek. Their traditional means of 
fishing did not permit them to go very far into the deep-sea. The catch from the sea was 
either sold in the local markets or bought wholesale by “middlemen” for retail in 
neighbouring provinces or in the Peninsular Malay states. The income derived from 
fishing, however, was not regular. Apart from the seasonal nature of fishing, 
“middlemen” determined the price of the catch, contributing to irregular income.  The 
lack of modern fishing equipment and the reluctance of Malay fishermen to be out in the 
sea for long periods of time prevented them from gaining big profits compared to the 
Chinese, who owned large boats such as trawlers. 199
Industries associated with fishing such as the making of fish sauce (nam pla), fish 
paste (kapi) and salted-fish (pla khaem) also provided villagers with supplementary 
                                                 
196 NA, R. 5, Y. Th. 5.5/25, Mr. Gittins to Phraya Sukhumnaivinit, 24 Aug 1906, pp. 2, 17. The rail route 
between Nakhon Sithammarat (on the east) and Trang (on the west coast) when completed by 1914 
facilitated further rice exports from rice producing provinces to places where rice was scarce.     
197 W.K. Che Man, Muslims Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern 
Thailand, p. 37.  
198 I have relied largely on Thomas Fraser’s case study of Rusembilan, a fishing village in south Thailand. 
Although the period covered under this study predates the information found in Fraser’s work (1950s-60s), 
the general information on fishermen of Pattani is still applicable and therefore relevant to this study. See 
Thomas M. Fraser, Jr., Fishermen of South Thailand, Chapter 2.   
199 Being out in the sea for an extended period disrupted Muslim fishermen from performing their ibadah 
(prayer), as such Malay Muslim fishermen preferred short fishing trips. Interview with Encik Husin. Office 
of the Administration of the Southern Border Provinces, Yala, 27 April 2000.    
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income.200 Salt is an essential ingredient for making these products. Salt making is yet 
another economic activity of the people of this region that is still practiced in some places 
up to the present day. 201    
Salt production for local consumption and sale was a hilir activity of importance 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. British Consuls reporting on the trade 
of Pattani described the province as a “great salt producing country” and as having 
“extensive salt fields”.202     
Salt collection through evaporation methods along the Gulf of Pattani was a 
traditional occupation, particularly, among villagers in the area of Sabarang (or 
Seberang) in the province of Pattani. Salt was produced during the annual dry season 
(February to May). Salt water was essential in the making of salt. The right amount 
determined the quality of the salt produced. Water from the sea was channelled into the 
salt fields along the coast and embankments were built to contain the water within the 
designated area. Water-pumps were also used to control the level of water in the fields.203  
Crystallized salt was gathered in piles following the period of evaporation. Two 
types of salt were produced: (i) white salt (kleua khao) - fine grains and of better quality 
and (ii) yellow salt- (Kleua luang) - coarse grains and of inferior quality. The amount of 
sea-water channeled into the salt fields determined the type and quality of the salt; lower 
levels of water produced finer grains and vice-versa.204
                                                 
200 Although small in value, Kapi (or blachan in Malay) and salted fish were among the exports from the 
port of Pattani. See list of exports from the port of Pattani from 1 April 1909 to 31 March 1909 in DCR 
(Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), 1909, p. 26 (Annex F).   
201 See Rohana Mohamed Nor, ‘Perusahaan membuat Garam Secara Tradisional Di Selatan Thai: Kajian 
kes Di kampung Tanjung Lulok, Pattani, Thailand’ (‘Traditional Salt Making Industry in South Thailand: 
A Case Study of Tanjung Lulok Village, Pattani, Thailand’), BA Academic Exercise, Department of 
Southeast Asian Studies, University of Malaya, 2000. Rohana’s work demonstrates that the people of 
Tanjung Lulok in Pattani continue to make and trade salt up to the present day.      
202 DCR (Nakon Sithamarat and Patani), 1908, p. 13. DCR (Nakon Sithamarat and Patani), 1909, p. 17. 
203 Sawang Lertrit, “kan tham kleah lae kan ka kleah nai kab samut pak tai kong prathet thai” (Salt farming 
and Trading in Southern Thailand), Muang Boran, Vol. 18, No.1, Jan-March 1992, pp. 61-62.  
204 Ibid., pp. 63-64.  
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Salt produced in the dry season was not sold immediately; instead it was kept 
until the rainy season when salt prices usually rose. Salt was considered an asset. 
Villagers who had salt in stock felt a sense of economic stability, comparable to a kind of 
“saving”. When in need of money, the salt in the “saving” could be sold for cash.  
Apart from domestic consumption and sale, salt produced in this area was sold to 
nearby districts such as Takbai and Tanjung Mas in Narathiwat province and Betong in 
Yala. Salt was also exported to the Peninsular Malay states.205 Barges laden with salt 
along the Pattani River were a common sight in the past. Reports by British officials 
claimed that “a good deal of the salt [from Pattani] was exported to other Siamese 
peninsular ports”.  In the early decade of the twentieth century, salt was indeed an 
important item of export from monthon Pattani. (See table 3.2). Malay elites used to own 
salt fields and farmed them to local people, who paid taxes on the salt produced. Today, 
the villagers in Sabarang continue to produce salt, but more as a supplementary activity 
during the dry season.  
 In addition to the above, the range of economic activities in Pattani in more 
modern times also included trade by sea and overland, collecting jungle produce for sale, 
and the sale of labour for cash wages. The last category involved people who travelled 
from Pattani to harvest rice in Kedah and Krian on the west coast because of the different 
rice-planting seasons on both coasts. The southwest monsoon (June-September) brings 
rain to the west coast region, whereas the rainy season, on the east coast, is during the 
period of the northeast monsoon (Oct-Jan). During the rainy season on the east coast, 
when fishing operations came to a halt, the people from this side travelled to the west 
coast in search of employment in the fishing industry there. This provided the people on 
either side of the coast with an income throughout the year.206
                                                 
205 Ibid., p. 66.  
206 Thomas M. Fraser M., Fishermen of South Thailand, p. 13.  
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Malays and Overland Trade  
There were both regular and seasonal traders among the Malays. Both groups of 
traders used an overland route connecting the east coast to places on the west coast, 
through which goods such as forest produce and salt were transported on elephants and 
oxen for trade.207   
The seasonal traders engaged in small-scale trade in the periods after the rice 
harvest with the intention of gaining a little extra money to spend. The people who 
travelled from the east coast to work in the rice fields on the west coast too may have 
purchased goods on their return journey to be sold in their villages or hometowns.  
Seasonal traders were less profit-motivated compared to regular traders. This latter group 
may have largely been Jawi Peranakan (of Malay and Indian parentage). Cloth and 
gemstones were the important items traded. 208    
During the period under study, much of the trading activity in Pattani was handled 
by non-Malays, including Chinese, Chulia (Indian Muslim) merchants and, to lesser 
extent, other foreigners. The trans-peninsular (overland) route that linked Pattani with 
ports such as Kedah and Penang facilitated the transportation of goods and the collection 
of local produce from the hinterland. The products from the hinterland were then 
supplied to traders who engaged in seaborne trade.209  
Some of the places located along the route became important distributing centres 
and feeder points. In Pattani, for example, Pu Yut (Malay: Pujut), an inland market town 
located about 6 km from the river, was a meeting point for traders from the coast and the 
                                                 
207 See for example, C.A. Gibson Hill (ed.), The Cambridge University Expedition to the North-Eastern 
Malay States, and to Upper Perak; W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey On Foot To the Patani Frontier in 1876”, 
being a journal kept during an expedition undertaken to capture Datoh Maharaja Lela of Perak”, JSBRAS, 
No. 9, June 1882; William Cameron, “ On The Patani”.  
208 Interview with Mr. Abdullah Abru. PSU (Pattani), 19 June 2000. Abdullah Abru, himself a Jawi 
Peranakan claims that his family were involved in the gemstones business.  
209 See Chapter 6 for details.  
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villagers of the hinterlands.210 Pu Yut could also have been a distributing centre for goods 
arriving from the port at Krisek on the estuary of the Pattani River.        
 
Malay Elites and Revenue Farming  
Revenue farms appear to be an important source of income to the elite class. 
Although there is very little information on the types and duration of the farms or the 
revenue earned, the reaction of the Raja and the elite class to Bangkok’s financial 
reforms which included the merger of the opium farms of all the seven muang into one 
large farm indicated the relative importance of revenue farms as a source of income to 
each individual Raja of the seven khaek muang. 211
In the south, the government controlled the trade in birds’ nests through grants of 
tax-farm monopolies.212 There may have been numerous persons with the right to birds’ 
nests collection throughout the southern region. British reports in the 1900s, however, 
claimed that “the trade in birds’ nests for the whole Siamese portion of the peninsula 
[was] being farmed out to one man”213. It is difficult to ascertain the volume of export or 
the returns from birds’ nests, as the figures did not appear in the customs reports.214    
There were also tin revenue farms. This must have been a very lucrative sector. 
While revenue from tin may not have been very much, mining areas populated by 
Chinese miners and mine workers contributed other forms of revenue. Opium, spirit and 
gambling farms operating in these areas generated income. In addition to these, the Rajas 
also made extra profits from selling provisions to the Chinese miners.215  
                                                 
210 David J. Welch and Judith R. McNeill, “Archaeological Investigations of Pattani History”, pp. 39-40.   
211 See Margaret L. Koch, “Patani and the Development of a Thai State”, p. 71. See also, CO 717/156, 
Morris to D.C. Watherson Esq, Office of the Commissioner General, Singapore, “The Malays of Siam”, 
1949, p. 122-123. 
212 For a study on birds’ nests in south Thailand see Ratchadaporn Sripiban, ‘The importance of Birds’ 
Nests in the economy of southern Thailand (1767-1939)’, Masters thesis, Thammasat University, 1999.   
213 DCR (Nakon Sithamarat and Patani), 1908, p. 9.  
214 Ibid.  
215 See Chapter 4. 
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Another valuable property of the Malay Raja was salt wells. The raja and a select 
number of private owners (mostly from among the ruling elite class) who owned these 
salt wells leased them out to salt producers/manufacturers based on a system similar to 
revenue farming, known as pawah in Malay society. The system entailed the tenant or a 
lessee to provide a fixed amount of the harvest from the land as the share due to the 
landlord.216 In 1900, for every 1000 gantang produced, half the amount went to the 
owner as rent and the other half to the producer after deductions for taxes and payment of 
labour. The revenue earned from rent on salt wells was indeed substantial, ranging from 
6000 to 7000 Straits Dollars annually.217           
Requests for the transfer of the share of salt tax revenue among members of the 
Pattani royal family further indicates the lucrative nature of salt farms. During the period 
of Siam’s administrative reforms, Bangkok attempted to take possession of these rich 
farms and it became one of the grievances of the Malay elites against the Bangkok 
government. Still, not all salt farms were immediately transferred to the government, a 
case in 1936 involving the Pattani royal family indicates that some salt farms continued 
to be inherited royal (Malay) property until the 1930s. In 1936, the government rejected a 
request by Tengku Sulong, daughter of Phraya Pattani to transfer her share of salt tax, 
amounting to 433.8 Baht per year, to her niece, Tengku Yam. It appears that the 
government strictly disallowed the transfer of ancestral rights on salt farms thereafter. 218
 
 
                                                 
216 Sharom Ahmat, Kedah, Tradition and Change in a Malay State, p. 35. Those who owned rubber small-
holdings also practiced the pawah system by engaging people to tap rubber on their land in return for a 
certain amount of the produce as rent. According to Abdullah Abru, at present a substantial number of rent-
tappers from neighbouring Kelantan and Trengganu work in the rubber estates in Narathiwat province. 
Personal communication. Abdullah Abru.      
217 Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, “The Truth About Patani”, 22 Sept and 2 Oct 1903. (Reprinted 
from the Singapore Free Press).  
218 NA, R.7, SR.0201.38 /3 (Krom lekatikan kana rathamontri), “reang ngoen swan beng bo kleah kong 
nang twanku sulong butri praya muang pattani” (Share of salt revenue of Tengku Sulong, daughter of Raja 
of Pattani), 30 Sept 1936. 
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The Tin - Cattle Economic Zones 
Pattani’s principal commodities and those of importance in the context of national 
economy in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries were, as mentioned previously, 
tin and cattle. In the nineteenth century, tin was also an important (traditional) item of 
tribute from the khaek muang to Bangkok.219 Reports by British officials and findings of 
surveys and expeditions in the Malay Peninsula such as the Cambridge Expedition of 
1900 refer to tin fields and mining activity in the Pattani region.220 Local ruling elites 
controlled the tin industry, either by direct ownership (as was the case in muang Raman) 
or by collecting tribute on production from mines leased out to local entrepreneurs or 
Chinese miners. Like the Raja of the Malay states of Kedah, Perak and Selangor, the 
rulers of Pattani were the ones primarily engaged in the trade of tin.221   
The tin production area of the Pattani region was an extension of the Malayan tin-
belt, which included the tin producing states on the west coast of Peninsular Malaya. 
From the Malayan states such as Selangor and Perak, the tin zone extended northwards to 
the states on the west coast of Siam such as Phuket and eastwards into the interior of 
Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani. The Pattani tin area in fact stretched further down to 
join the Upper Perak region, adjacent to Raman and Betong. 
 The markets for tin produced in this area as well as the ports of export included 
Phuket and Penang. Supply of Chinese labour for work in the mines, as well as supply of 
machineries and foodstuff to the interior tin producing regions came primarily through 
the port of Penang.  The rivers in the region too were the main arteries for transporting tin 
                                                 
219 NA, R.5, M. 2. 12 K/1, p. 39.   
220 Although, the expedition by Skeat and Laidlaw coincided with the period of intense political changes in 
the Pattani region, their report makes no reference to the political environment prevailing in the region at 
that time. The report, however, provides plenty of details on the economy, people, river and land routes in 
this area. It remains one of the few rare reports on the economic activities in the Upper Perak and Pattani 
regions. See C.A. Gibson-Hill (ed.), The Cambridge University Expedition to the Northeastern Malay 
States and Upper Perak.        
221 Information on the Malay states of Perak and Selangor from Khoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States, 
1850-1873: The Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1972, passim.     
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as well as the source of water for mining work. The principal river in the Pattani region, 
the Patani River begins from the Upper Perak region, both the regions therefore were 
connected through river routes. The overland routes complemented the river routes in 
areas where the rapids in the river hindered passage. 
Meanwhile the value of cattle, the second most important export from the region, 
lay in the multiple functions of these animals. Useful as work animal, mode of 
transporting goods, a source of meat and dairy products as well as leather-hide, the cattle 
was indispensable to the farmer. 
A cattle zone incorporated the northern part of Peninsular Malaya, including the 
states of Kedah and Province Wellesley and extended into the regions of Nakhon 
Sithammarat, Songkhla and Pattani in south Siam. Like tin, the main market for cattle on 
the west coast was Penang. On the east coast, cattle from the Pattani region were also 
exported to Singapore. 
 In sum, both the tin and cattle trade established a trade network that included 
Pattani, Penang and Singapore. Pattani’s trade connections, as with other south Siamese 
provinces were clearly connected southwards to the Malayan peninsula rather than with 
the Siamese state centered far north in Bangkok. Most of the people involved in these 
two sectors either had family-connections or business investments in Penang and their 
business activities extending to south Siam were part of a “natural” economic zone, 
which included both southern Siamese region and the northern Malay states.222    
 
                                                 
222 A similar trend was observed in the para-rubber industry of south Siam. Apart from a southern rubber 
zone, a specific Chinese speech group dominated the industry. The rubber industry of Trang in south Siam 
is synonymous with a Hokkien-zone. See Michael J. Montesano, ‘The Commerce of Trang, 1930s-1990s: 
Thailand’s National Integration in Social-Historical Perspective’, Ph. D thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
New York, 1998, pp. 380-381. 
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Ports- Trade Routes –Resources  
Three natural factors promoted the economy and trade in the Pattani region in the 
past. These were the existence of ports along the coast as well as along the rivers to 
facilitate trade. Secondly, apart from entrepot ports, trans-peninsular trade routes on the 
isthmus complemented the role of Malay Peninsula as a major trading centre. Thirdly, the 
availability of natural resources such as gold, tin and forest produce found in the 
hinterland encouraged trade. In addition, different modes of transportation overland and 
sea facilitated commerce. 
(i) Transportation 
Bullock carriages and river boats were the main modes of goods transportation. 
Haulage work was mostly done by buffaloes, and in the more remote areas, elephants 
were used. Elephants, however, were traditionally used to travel long distances and over 
night journeys. Apart from being a mode of conveyance, elephants were also symbols of 
power and status.223 The animal was the preserve of the upper class; they alone owned 
this beast of burden. Unlike elephants, buffaloes were more easily available and 
accessible to the majority of the people, as such buffalo and ox-carts appealed to the 
masses as the preferred mode of transportation.      
 
 
                                                 
223 Interview with Ahmad Somboon @ Bualuang. Lecturer, Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), Pattani, 
14 September 2002. See also, Ryoko Nishii, “The Emergence And Transformation Of Peripheral Ethnicity 
– Sam-Sam On The Thai-Malaysian Border”, paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Thai 
Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, 1993, p. 9.   
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Map 3.1: Tin Zone incorporating Northern Malaya and Southern Siamese states   
 
 Map 3.2: Cattle Zone incorporating Northern Malaya and Southern Siamese states 
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In the south, motor-trucks began to be introduced first in Phuket and Trang but 
elsewhere in the region, bullock carts were indispensable in the haulage of tin. Even in 
Bangkok, bullock carts remained in vogue in the mid-1910s. In the interest of trade, a law 
for the measurement of bullock carts was enacted in 1916; a standard size was introduced 
to facilitate its use on newly constructed roads and footpaths in Bangkok.224      
Steamers carrying goods on well-established sea-routes on both the coasts also 
facilitated transportation of both tin and cattle. The southern rail-line when completed 
traversed both sides of the isthmian region allowing for direct passenger and freight 
traffic from south Siam to Penang and the Federated Malay States on the west coast as 
well as Singapore on the east coast.  
Although the railway was built partly to facilitate the transportation of tin, hardly 
any tin was carried on rail, when the railway had been completed.225 However, it made 
the tin-rich areas in the interior of the east coast provinces more accessible to tin 
prospectors and mining companies.226 The lack of roads to complement the railway, 
however, was the biggest setback to the rail transport industry.227 Roads were important 
both as feeders to the railways and to facilitate greater movement of men and 
merchandise throughout the kingdom. When the Public Works Ministry began to 
construct roads, its policy was that “roads should not parallel the railroads but be built to 
                                                 
224 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 4 Jan 1916, p. 12.  
225 The link between mining industry and railway development is clearly seen in the case of the Malayan 
railway on the west coast. The rail system was established primarily to transport tin as well as to connect 
the major mining areas to port towns. See Amarjit Kaur, Bridge and Barrier: Transport and 
Communications in Colonial Malaya 1870-1957, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.     
226 DCR, (Senggora), 1912/1913, p. 7. Indeed, the rationale for the construction of the railways, according 
to Damrong, was to open up mining areas and make them more accessible to prospectors, yet when the 
southern railway project was finalized, Damrong announced a prohibition on the issue of new mining 
licences in the southern border provinces, wary of the arrival of large numbers of foreign concessionaires to 
the area. On Damrong’s rationale for the railways see NA, R.5, Y. Th. 5.5/24, “bantuek kwam hayn reang 
sang rotfai pay huamuang laem Malayu”, (Report on the construction of the railway to the provinces in the 
Malay peninsula) in Report of The Cabinet Meeting, 17 Dec 1907 (RS. 125).           
227 The subject of the lack of roads is discussed on various occasions. See, Bangkok Times Weekly Mail; 14 
June 1916, pp. 10-11; 5 Aug 1916, p.23; 16 Jan 1922, p. 4.    
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feed them”228 Constructing roads to serve only as feeders to the railways meant that the 
larger parts of the country, not connected by the railways, were left without any mode of 
transportation except by boats which transported goods from places not within the route 
of the north-south railway. As such, the railways lost out on freight revenue. This 
explains the continued presence of the numerous rice boats along Siam’s rivers despite 
the onset of the railway and the latter’s inability to rival coastal shipping.   
While the supply of gold and forest produce dwindled in later years, the rich tin 
deposits, the overland routes and the port of Pattani continued to play a major role in the 
economy of Pattani. Its rich resources not only attracted foreign concessionaires, both 
individuals and firms, but also captured the attention of the Siamese state in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, especially after the implementation of the 
administrative reforms of 1892. 
 
Contest for Land and Resources (c.1880-1900)   
One of the features of the economy of Pattani between 1880s and 1900 was the 
prominence and value attached to land, in particular, land rich in mineral resources. The 
period was marked by ownership and territorial disputes over tin fields, which 
increasingly attracted the attention of foreign concessionaires and private companies.  
Meanwhile, rivers flowing from the same source but with different names added 
confusion in the matter of land ownership in the Pattani region. This was most evident 
when rivers were used to demarcate boundaries between muangs, a loose concept 
adopted generally in Southeast Asia. Europeans, however, came to regard the concept of 
rivers as de facto boundary markers in most South East Asian countries. Conflicting ideas 
of boundaries soon led to territorial claims by traditional and foreign powers.   
                                                 
228 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941, p. 502. 
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The subject of land ownership in traditional Pattani society is difficult to deal 
with, as there is a paucity of contemporary documents. In general, land in a Malay negeri 
was never alienated. Members of the ruling class who were loyal supporters or favourites 
of the King may have been bestowed grants of land. Occasionally, members of the rakyat 
(subject) who performed a service or personal favour for the King might also be given a 
share of the state land.229 These grants were called anugerah. The land received as 
anugerah, however, could not be inherited or transferable. The Raja retained ownership 
right to the land.230 Land in a Malay negeri, therefore, was the preserve of the ruling elite 
and when disputes arose over ownership, the elites were most affected.     
A case in point is the Anglo-Siamese dispute in the nineteenth century over the 
territory of Raman. The case provides useful information on the ideas regarding land 
ownership, natural resources and boundary demarcation. It also points to the flaws in the 
system of demarcating physical territories between neighbouring territories based on 
rivers and common watershed.231
Land in the kingdom of Siam belonged to the Phra Chao Phaendin (Lord of the 
land) that is, the King. In practice, however, the rights to oversee the management of the 
King’s land were left in the hands of the local (provincial) governors. Ownership of land 
also meant that the King/state had the absolute right to all the mineral deposits in the 
kingdom and the vassal territories under his suzerainty. The local governors and rulers of 
the Malay vassal states were vested with the authority to act as representatives of the 
                                                 
229 I have used information on land system in the oldest Malay kingdom that is Kedah as a model to 
understand land systems in Malay negeri.  See Sharom Ahmat, Kedah, Tradition and Change In A Malay 
State, p. 35.   
230 Personal Communication. Professor Khoo Kay Kim, Professor of Malaysian History, University 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.  
231 According to Professor Khoo, if the situation in Pattani was similar to that of the Malay states (Malay 
Peninsula), then the river was never a de facto boundary in Malay society and it was never clear where the 
boundary was between two river basins. The Perak-Raman boundary issue therefore, illustrates specifically 
Siamese and not Malay ideas of land ownership. Siamese ideas of land ownership at this point were likely 
influenced by European (western) ideas.          
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government to manage or develop mining deposits.232 These men were also given the 
right to determine the mining royalty; in other words, there were no standard rates and 
prospective miners were left to the whims and fancies of the local governors. 
   The muang of Raman was one of the more tin-rich muang in the Pattani region. 
The Raja and the royal family of Raman actively engaged in the tin mining business. 
Prior to the presence of the British in Perak, some 50 years before the dispute in 1882, 
the Raja of Raman occupied the territories adjacent to Raman in the upper Perak region. 
This territory was also rich in tin. When the British in Perak began the process of 
demarcating Perak’s boundary, they tried to repossess territory, which they claimed 
Perak had lost to Raman. Between 1882 and 1899, Perak (British) negotiated with Raman 
(Siam) in long deliberations over the repossession of Perak’s territories from Raman.  
One of the arguments put forward in Perak’s (Britain’s) claim was the fact that 
the Perak River ran through sections of Raman, adjacent to Upper Perak and as such the 
“contested” territories should naturally belong to Perak. Using the case of the Pattani 
river, which waters three different provinces namely Pattani, parts of Yala and upper 
Raman, Prince Devawongse rebutted this claim by saying that “the argument based on 
the name of the river Perak as if it were an inference that the whole river must belong to 
the state which bears the same name” cannot be accepted. He cited the examples of the 
Rangae River that watered the provinces of Saiburi and Rangae and the Teluban River, 
which passed through the lower parts of Saiburi and Raman.233                  
Perak’s claim to the part of territory under the possession of Raman was first 
communicated to the Siamese government in 1883. Newman, the British Acting Consul 
in Siam, presented the memorandum on behalf of the British in Perak. A Memorandum 
                                                 
232NA, R.5, KS. 6.1/8, Report by Phraya Wichiankiri to the Government, October 7 1894 (RS. 113).   
233 FO 69/204, Devawongse to George Greville (British Minister in Bangkok), on “Disputed territory of 
Perak and Reman, 1898”, 13 April 1898.  
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written by Sir Hugh Low in 1884 followed this. The “Memorandum on the question of 
ratification of Boundary between Perak and the Siamese province of Raman” dated 20 
October 1884 attempted to prove that the entire area, above the watershed of Jeram 
Panjang (Long Rapid), long in the possession of Siamese Raman, belonged in actual fact 
to Perak. Hugh Low advanced a few arguments in support of the claim by Perak. These 
were inter alia the claim that the disputed territory was a former settlement in the 
possession of Perak. Between 1826 and 1834, Raman occupied these territories but the 
occupation of the area did not receive the assent of the government of the kingdom of 
Perak.234 Most importantly, Hugh Low pointed to the fact that:  
The district is situated within the watershed of the Perak river, and upon the 
“undisputable position” that in all the Malay states in which European influence 
has not intervened, the watershed is coincident with, and permanently marks the 
boundaries of states or provinces.235    
 
In a point-by-point rebuttal, Prince Devawongse referred to the Memorandum 
dismissing Hugh Low’s allegations and claimed that Perak had no evidence to show that 
the possession by Raman was defective. The allegation that the disputed territory was 
“first settled at some unknown time by Perak” was dismissed as lacking documentary 
proof. The upper part of the Perak River, according to Devawongse, was in the past a 
constantly disputed territory among the Rajas of Pattani, Perak, Raman and Kedah. Each 
of these Rajas claimed possession of this area at intervals based on the might of their 
arms and men. In about 1834, Raman managed to outwit the others and seized the Upper 
Perak valley. Since then the disputed territories were in the possession of Raman and, for 
the subsequent 50 years, it continued to rule over this area peacefully.  
                                                 
234 Ibid. Hugh Low’s Memorandum is referred and discussed in the same letter.  
235 Ibid.  
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During this 50-year period, there were no formal protests or complaints from 
either the Raja of Perak, or the British in Perak or the East India Company (EIC). 
Beginning from 1882, however, using the pretext of boundary demarcation, the British in 
Perak indicated a wish to “re-enter in possession of a territory which they long ago had 
occupied at intervals and during indefinite periods”. In short, Devawongse wrote, “ all 
that the state of Perak can allege is a previous de facto possession resting on no better 
title than that of the other states which successively occupied the territory” and went 
further to state that “the absence during at least fifty years of any formal protest by the 
government of Perak, or by one of its protectors, the British government or the East India 
Company, may as well be interpreted in the sense of a tacit consent as of a tacit 
dissent”.236                
There were further exchanges of correspondence on the matter between Lord 
Salisbury (FO) and Prince Naret (Siamese Minister in London). Prince Naret wrote on 30 
September 1885, stating that the claims were unfounded and asked “if the mere fact of 
such undisturbed possession [of the disputed territories by Raman] during half a century 
or more is not sufficient in itself to debar Perak from its claim and to give to Raman a 
prescriptive right of acquisition”.237
There was a long interval of further deliberations on the matter. Between 
September 1885 and December 1897, there was no correspondence on the subject. At the 
heart of the negotiations was Siam’s claim that the Upper Perak territories were contested 
because of their economic potential. Devawongse said succinctly:  
What was claimed by the Perak government in 1885 was not mere rectification 
of frontiers but the cession of 2300 square miles of a territory full of mineral 
resources which before the claim was made… was in the clear and undisputed 
                                                 
236 Ibid.  
237 Ibid.    
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possession of His Majesty’s government through their vassal, the Rajah of 
Raman.238    
 
Britain, through its representatives in the Malay states, denied that this was the 
basis for Perak’s claim over the disputed territory. Nonetheless, the issue of the economic 
potential of the area was without doubt one of the factors that received due consideration 
from the British government. Frank Swettenham, Resident-General of the FMS, was sent 
to Bangkok to settle the matter with the Siamese government. Swettenham was one of 
those who rejected the “economic potential theory” by saying that the states of Kelantan 
and Trengganu had more to offer to the British government and accordingly proposed 
that Britain should take steps to reduce Siamese influence in these states. To him the 
rectification of the Perak-Raman boundary was “of small importance as compared with 
the loss of British influence in Tringanu [sic] and Kelantan”.239  
Swettenham had been entertaining thoughts of extending British influence into 
the northern Siamese controlled states of Kelantan and Trengganu for some time, but 
Britain was cautious of making a move on these states for fear of upsetting Siam’s 
friendship and good relations with the British. Thus, when the opportunity presented 
itself, Swettenham suggested that Britain “arm-twist” Siam into giving up Kelantan and 
Trengganu if it wanted to keep the disputed territory in the Upper Perak valley.  
The issue of the economic potential of the disputed territory vis-à-vis Kelantan 
and Trengganu was certainly something that the British deliberated upon. In other words, 
economic considerations were a necessary precondition before decisions on rectification 
of borders or acquisition of territories were made. In Swettenham’s opinion, the disputed 
territory had less economic potential than Kelantan and Trengganu, the former was 
                                                 
238 Ibid.  
239 FO 69/204, Swettenham (Resident General of the FMS) to C. Mitchell (High Commissioner of the 
FMS), 26 April 1899, p. 155.  
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smaller in area and less accessible, but its mineral potential remained attractive to the 
British in Perak. In the end, Swettenham proposed a new boundary demarcated by 
Gunung Bintang. Siam lost about 1000 square miles of its territory under the jurisdiction 
of Raman as a result of the rectified border. 240   
The New Boundary agreement signed on 29 November 1899 clearly delineated 
the boundaries between Raman and Perak, Perak and Kedah, Perak and Pahang and 
Pahang and Trengganu. The agreement was followed by a Joint British-Siam 
Commission to mark out the boundaries as agreed by the November 1899 agreement.241                         
The Raman issue indicates that Siam itself had no clear laws relating to land 
administration and therefore found it necessary to be prepared to respond more positively 
to similar problems, which may arise. Contests over land found to be rich in mineral 
resources or those with high agricultural value, therefore, forced a change in Siam’s 
perception of the importance of land.   Beginning from the early years of the 20th century, 
Siam through its Survey Department started the process of surveying and registering land 
ownership. By 1901, the government had created a system of land titling based on the 
Torrens system and title deeds (chanot thidin) to individual land holdings began to be 
issued in the kingdom.242       
                                                 
240 Ibid., pp. 155-158.   
241 A map defining the ratified boundary between Raman and Perak is available in the Royal Asiatic 
Society’s Map (Straits Branch) 1898.   
242 Gershon Feder, “The Economics of Land and Titling in Thailand”, in Karla Hoff, Avishay Braverman, 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 261. Frederica M. Bunge (ed.), Thailand: a country study, 




Table 3.2: Exports from the Monthon of Pattani during the Siamese Years 1908-
1909 to 1913-14 
 
Articles. April 1, 1908 – 
March 31, 1909 
April 1, 1909 
- March 31, 
1910 
April 1, 1910 – 
March 31, 1911 
April 1, 1911 – 
March 31, 1912 
April 1, 1912 – 
March 31, 1913 
April 1, 1913 – 









6,073 £29,986 9,351 £21,873 13,676 £30,861 9,754 £23,054 12,571 £36,265 6,300 £20,435 
Paddy 
(Tons) 
1,551 £3,620 3,021 £8,390 6,124 £13,754 7,204 £17,582 553 £1,676 944 £2,772 
Salt - £5,713 - £6,731 - £1,738 - £8,423 - £3,711 - £2,831 
Rubber  
(Piculs) 
- - - - 138 £1,786 109 £1,295 58 £824 - - 
Copra 
(Piculs) 
- £21 132 £106 22,200 £17,589 - £14,638 - £14,935 - £25,583 
Other 
articles 
- £2,863 - £2,735 - £7,823 - £5,080 - £4,413 - £1,799 
Total - £47,814 - £73,169     -    
 
Sources:  
DCR, Siam, (Senggora), Report for the year 1910/1911, p.11 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1911/1912, p. 8. 

































Local elites comprising members of the Malay ruling class and Chinese of 
influence dominated the hilir economy of tin mining. Tin was an important item of trade 
in Pattani in the nineteenth century and therefore the tribute that Bangkok was able to 
extract from the area was substantial. Tin produced in the Pattani region (on the east 
coast), however, was small compared to the rate of production on the west coast (i.e. 
Phuket and Phangnga). Most of the Chinese and foreign mining companies were 
concentrated on the west coast. Towards the late nineteenth century, however, there was 
a gradual shift of mining interests from the west coast to the east coast.  
The main mining areas on the east coast were largely concentrated in the 
province of Yala, in particular, the areas of Raman, Bannang Sata and Betong. The 
mines in Raman were owned by Malay elites while those in the district of Bannang Sata 
and Betong were in the hands of Chinese miners. One prominent Chinese family from 
Pattani, namely the Tan-Kannanurak family, played a big part in the development of tin 
mining in the Pattani region.243  
Siam’s increasing role from the 1890s to the 1900s in terms of regulating mining 
activity by controlling the number of licences granted, prohibiting the issue of new 
licences, and reviewing royalties and tax rates shows, on the one hand, increasing 
Bangkok control over provincial economic matters and, on the other, the waning control 
of the traditional elites over the economy of the provinces. Revenue collected from 
licence fees, export taxes, royalties and taxes on Chinese workers employed in the mines 
                                                 
243 The story of tin mining in this area would not be clear without a reference to the Tan-Kannanurak 
family. This will be discussed subsequently. 
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was remitted to the central government coffers which allowed Siam to maintain the cost 
of provincial administration.       
It is also important to explain here the trade link between Pattani and Penang 
through the economic activities of the Malay and Chinese traders. The link with Penang 
and indeed Singapore too, was enhanced when foreigners, particularly British miners and 
traders, began to play an active part in tin mining in south Siam. The trade links were 
crucial to the survival of Siam’s tin sector throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This regional commercial network continued to exist despite Siam’s efforts at 
bringing the southern provinces into closer contact with and under the tighter control of 
Bangkok.    
 
Tin as an item of tribute and trade   
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tin ore was one of the three 
important exports from Pattani.244 Even prior to this date, as mentioned previously, tin 
was a prized item of trade, sought by the Chinese and Indian traders who called at the 
port of Pattani. Tin also constituted an important part of Pattani’s tribute to the Siamese 
King.245 Tin output from the Pattani area in the nineteenth century, was mentioned in a 
book entitled Political and Statistical Account of The British Settlements in the Straits Of 
Malacca by T. J. Newbold, an officer in the Straits administrative service. Under tin 
production in the Malay Peninsula for the year 1835, the figures for Pattani appear under 
the heading “east coast states” along with other Malay east coast states such as Pahang, 
Terengganu and Kelantan. The output of tin from Pattani for that year was 58 tons; the 
same figure appeared for tin output from Pahang. Kemaman and Terengganu produced 
much more- 417 tons. Sungai Ujong (the principal mining area in Negeri Sembilan) on 
                                                 
244 DCR, Siam (Senggora) 1910/1911, p. 4, p. 7. DCR, Siam (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), 1908, p. 13, 
19.   
245 NA, R.5, M.2. 12 K/1, p. 39. 
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the west coast produced the same amount while Kelantan’s total tin output was 174 tons. 
Ujong Salang (otherwise known as Phuket) was listed among the west coast states and 
the total tin output from here was 88 tons.246 Newbold’s account indicates a small 
difference between the total tin output for Pattani and for Ujong Salang for the year 
1835. But the figures changed drastically in the following decades. Tin production in the 
west coast states rose rapidly throughout the mid- and later part of the 19th century while 
nothing much was known of or said about tin production in the east coast states.     
Tin production in the east coast states was a secondary economic activity 
compared to that of the west coast states. The reason offered for this was a lack of 
interest and entrepreneurship on the part of the Malays (not the lack of mineral deposits) 
to take up mining work seriously. Malays on the east coast of peninsular Siam, quite 
unlike the Malays in British Malaya, were principally engaged in agriculture, although 
some worked in the mining sector to gain supplementary income, especially after the rice 
harvest. Rice farming was the prime and essential economic activity.247  
But like their counterparts in the western peninsular states, Malay rulers and 
aristocrats in Pattani who owned land rich in mineral deposits operated tin and gold 
mines employing Chinese workers. Tin mining operations at the mining sites were leased 
out to Chinese workers who in turn paid the Raja rent on the mining land. The contracted 
Chinese was then responsible for the extraction of tin from the area, earning his share 
from the venture by selling part of the tin produced. Apart from the revenue from tin 
output and rentals, members of the ruling class earned additional income by selling 
                                                 
246 See Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry To 1914: with special reference to the states of Perak, 
Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1965, p. 20. See also, 
T.J. Newbold , Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, viz. 
Pinang, Malacca, and Singapore; with a History of the Malayan States on the Peninsula of Malacca, 
London, 1839, Vol. II, pp. 424-5.      
247 Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry, p. 21. See also, J. Anderson, Political and Commercial 
Considerations Relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, 
Penang, 1824, p. 196.  
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provisions, at fixed rates, and opium, at “extortionate” prices, to the Chinese workers.248 
This kind of subcontracting was part of a general pattern associated with revenue 
farming. Mining land was farmed out to the highest bidders who, in return for the right to 
extract tin from the mining land, paid taxes in cash or based on a portion of the tin 
produced or a stipulated fee, to the owners. This system was practised throughout the 
mining states in the Pattani region. In the gold mines of Raman, for instance, the Raja 
who “farmed” the mines to agents of mining companies from as far away as Gopeng in 
the state of Perak, earned at least one-tenth (based on Islamic doctrine) of the gold 
produced from the mines.249              
W.E. Maxwell, a British official writing in 1876, claimed that the mines in Kroh, 
Intan, Galian Mas and Ampat Ayer (areas bordering Upper Perak and the Siamese Malay 
muang of Raman in the administrative circle of Pattani) were “the principal tin-mines in 
the Patani country”.250 Chinese mine operators in these areas, in complying with the 
terms of their mining concessions, sold their tin output to the Malay chiefs at rates fixed 
by the latter. In 1876, the rate was $ 24 per bahara (170 kg).251 The tin was then 
transported on elephants to Baling in Kedah, where the market price for tin was lower 
than the prices in Penang.  The tin exported to Penang was carried via the Muda River, 
where the Raja of Kedah charged a tax of $ 20 per bahara on all tin transported down the 
river. So, the price of tin was higher in Penang because the tax accrued to the market 
price. Whereas in 1876, tin was sold at $ 40 a bahara in Baling, in Penang the price was 
$ 62 a bahara.252 The Malay chiefs of Raman were quite contented with the $ 16 profit 
                                                 
248 W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey On Foot To The Patani Frontier in 1876, being a journal kept during an 
expedition undertaken to capture Datoh Maharaja Lela of Perak”, JSBRAS, No. 9, June 1882, pp. 56-58. 
249 High Commissioners Office (HCO), Ancestral claims of the Raja and the Raja Muda of Reman to 
mines in the territory recently restored to Perak, copy of a translated letter from the Datoh Sri Adika Raja, 
Kampong Gret [Grik], Upper Perak to the Secretary to the Government of Perak, 10 Aug 1900.     
250 W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey on Foot To the Patani Frontier” p. 58.    
251 Bahara is usually used to weigh gold and tin.  
252 W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey on Foot to the Patani Frontier’, p. 59. 
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they made from sale at Baling compared to the $ 18 that they would have made from sale 
at Penang. One possible reason for this was that the overland elephant route, although 
limited in terms of total weight conveyed, considering that an elephant’s load was only 
one bahara (about six slabs), was less arduous and perhaps faster than the river route to 
Penang. The river journey was comparatively difficult because of the rapids along the 
way and the change in water levels caused delays.253  
Based on this account, it can be said that the area bordering Upper Perak, namely 
the state of Raman in the southeastern part of Siam, produced most of the tin that was 
exported from this region. The Raja of Raman and his officers were the principal traders 
of the tin produced from this area. They had the sole authority to grant mining 
concessions to Chinese miners. However, the scenario changed in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, following border agreements between 
Raman (Siam) and Perak (under British administration) in 1899/1900, some of these 
mining areas became part of British territory under the state of Perak. Then in 1901, after 
the Mining Act of Siam was introduced, individual rulers no longer granted mining 
concessions. Instead, the Department of Mines became solely responsible for issuing 
mining licences. Soon after, in 1906, as a result of the Siamese administrative 
reorganization, the muang of Raman was absorbed into the province of Yala, one of the 
three provinces in monthon Pattani (Pattani administrative circle).              
British Trade and Consular Reports in the 1900s tended to concur with earlier 
accounts stating that, of the three southeastern provinces, tin was found mostly in Yala 
followed by the province of Narathiwat. In Yala, the districts of Bannang Sata and 
                                                 
253 Barbara W. Andaya has pointed out that jungle paths (tracks over land) provided easier and faster routes 
than rivers for transport between exchange centres. See Barbara Watson Andaya, “Cash Cropping and 
Upstream –Downstream Tensions: The case of Jambi in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in 
Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era, p. 92.       
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Betong and in Narathiwat, the district of Tanjung Mas, were rich in tin deposits. A report 
dated 1908 referred to the three principal mining areas in the Pattani region. These were 
situated in the areas around the Pattani River, the rivers Telubin and Tanjong Mas and 
the Perak River.254 The area around the source of the Perak River had the largest number 
of mines in operation- 25 in 1908. Some British companies were reported to have held 
mining leases on some of these mines. Beginning from 1909, however, following the 
Anglo-Siamese Treaty, this tin-rich area fell under British jurisdiction. Seventeen mining 
concessions were granted around the source of the Pattani River for the year 1908. Two 
concessions were given to Dutch companies while the remaining fifteen were in the 
hands of the Chinese.  In the areas around the rivers Telubin and Tanjong Mas, there 
were seven mines, leases for which were mostly held by the Chinese and some Malays. 
Although reference is made to Chinese and Malay tin lessees, no information is provided 
as to the nationality and place of origin of these people. It is not certain whether these 
were local people or foreigners. Similarly, no names were given for the British and 
Dutch companies.  
 The rivers Pattani, Telubin and Tanjong Mas were navigable to a considerable 
extent and formed the principal means of transport for tin and other produce (see Map 
4.1).255 Water from rivers or other sources located close to mining areas was a crucial 
factor in mining operations. Water was used to separate tin ore from the river sediments 
in indigenous (Malay) methods such as dulang  (ronrae in Thai i.e. tin panned from 
streams) and lampan (muang laen in Thai i.e. ground sluicing). Water was equally 
important in the Chinese methods of producing tin, namely open-cast mining (muangyai 
or muanghab) and chain pump (muang plong or muang chit). Water wheels were used to 
                                                 
254 DCR, Siam, (Nakorn Sritamarat and Patani), 1908, p. 11.     
255 DCR, Siam, (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), 1908, p. 10. 
DCR, Siam, (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), 1909, p. 13.     
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generate power for working the chain pump.256 Besides this, rivers were used to transport 
tin ore from the mines to trading depots or markets at the river mouth.    
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the tin mines in the southeastern 
provinces were generally worked by foreigners, mostly Chinese, followed by some 
European companies. It is probable that the majority of the Chinese miners came from 
Penang or had other investments in the tin industry of the west coast states. Tin mining 
activity in the peninsula of Siam had long been concentrated in the alluvial tin-rich areas 
of Phuket and adjacent areas such as Ranong and Phangnga. Whereas in the mid-1870s, 
the average annual tin output in Siam, which came mostly from the west coast states, 
totalled 6450 tons, by the early 1890s, this figure had declined to 4250 tons.257 The fast 
depletion of the rich alluvial deposits of tin in Phuket by the closing years of the 
nineteenth century258 prompted individual miners and mining companies to move to 
more remote and untapped areas, viz. the east of Phuket. Chinese and, to a lesser extent, 
Europeans were attracted to invest in the mining industry of the east coast states of the 
peninsula of Siam, i.e. Pattani and Yala, following this movement away from Phuket. 
British and Thai records tend to indicate this because little mention is made in these 
records of mining activity in the east coast states prior to the 1900s.  
                                                 
256 For details on Malay and Chinese mining methods, see Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry, pp. 
43-49, 126-127. 
257 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c. 1890-1920, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1988, p. 95. 
258NA, R.5, KS 6. 2/2, H. Warington Smyth to Phraya Surasakmontri, 15 Sept 1896, as quoted by Ian 





Map 4. 1: The Three Main Rivers In Monthon Pattani.  
 
Source: HCO 1169/13, Report by Acting Consul Dunn on his tour of Pattani, July 
1913.  
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Malay elites in tin mining: The royal family of Raman   
(i) Raman Mines 
  Compared to the west coast states, such as Phuket, tin mining and production on 
the east coast of the peninsula was on a smaller scale.259 Perhaps the most widely known 
tin mining areas on the east coast were those located at the frontier districts bordering 
British Malaya, namely Raman and Betong, both in the province of Yala.    
The royal family of muang Raman had long been involved in the tin mining 
business. The mines in this district were owned by the Raja of Raman but managed and 
worked by Chinese using traditional methods. The old mining sites, according to John 
Heal, Inspector of the Royal Department of Mines, were located on the side of a hill 
known as Bukit Paku. Alluvial deposits in the valley of the hill were collected and sieved 
for tin ore. Occasionally, Chinese workers gathered the richest parts of the soil 
containing lumps of tin from the top of the hill and carried them down to the valley for 
processing.260
 After the establishment of the Department of Mines, the Siamese government 
began to regulate ownership rights to mining areas through legislation. Title deeds were 
issued to owners. Part of the Bukit Paku area, excluding the tin-rich crown of the hill, 
was leased to the Raja Perempuan, widow of the late Raja of Raman.261 In 1900, 
problems of ownership of mines and mining areas arose following boundary demarcation 
between the British Protectorate of Perak and the Siamese Malay state of Raman. 
                                                 
259 John H. Heal, “Mines and Mining Administration” in Arnold Wright and Oliver T. Breakspear, (eds.), 
Twentieth Century Impression of Siam: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources as 
reproduced in Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset, The Political Economy Of Siam, 1851-1910, 
Bangkok: The Social Science Association Of Thailand, 1981, p. 211.   
260 John H. Heal, “Mines and Mining Administration”, p. 212. 
261 John H. Heal, “Mines and Mining Administration” p. 213. 
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(ii) Ancestral claims to mining areas in Raman under British jurisdiction  
In 1900, two mining sites, namely a gold and a tin mining site in Raman, gave 
rise to ownership disputes. Work at both the mines had begun long before the boundary 
agreement was signed on 29th November 1899.  The gold mine, ancient and rich, was 
called the Klian Berusong mine. Located in the mukim (division) of Temengoh, it used to 
belong to the Raman royal family. About 4-5 acres of the land had been, by 1900, 
worked out by the Chinese who had obtained permission from the Raja of Raman to 
work the mine in 1897.262        
The tin mine, located near the Ulu Kendrong River in the mukim of Gret (Grik) 
was leased out by the Raja to a Malay by the name of Mohamad Jusoh. Work on the 
mine - carried out mostly by Chinese workers - started sometime in 1898.263 After the 
boundary demarcation, it was not clear if the mines between the Bintang and Kendrong 
Mountains fell within the boundaries of the state of Perak or remained in the territory of 
Raman. In October 1900, the Acting Resident-General of the FMS reported that the 
Sultan of Perak asserted that “all mines in the restored territory are government 
property”, thus dismissing claims made by the Raja Muda of Raman to ownership of 
mining areas formerly belonging to his ancestors.264  
The claimants, namely the Raja Muda of Raman and Mengkong Wan Kechil bin 
Mengkong Wan Jamal,265 a former inhabitant of Pattani and heir to some of the mines in 
                                                 
262 High Commissioners Office (HCO), Perak 1466/1900, Ancestral Claims of the Raja and Raja Muda of 
Raman to mines in the territory recently restored to Perak, copy of a translated document from the Datoh 
Sri Adika Raja, Kampung Gret, Upper Perak to the Secretary to Government, Perak, 10 Aug 1900.     
263 HCO, Perak 1466/1900, copy of a translated document from the Datoh Sri Adika Raja, 10 Aug 1900.  
264 HCO, Perak 1466/1900, Acting Resident General of the FMS to Acting High Commissioner of the 
FMS, “Ancestral claims of the Raja and Raja Muda of Reman to mines in the territory recently restored to 
Perak”, 5 Oct 1900.   
265Mengkong according to W.E Maxwell, in his report of a tour to the Patani frontier in 1876, was a 
Siamese title commonly used by Malays of noble class in the southern Malay states of Siam. The term, I 
suspect, was derived from the Malay title Temenggong and used widely by Siamese to refer to Malay 
nobility. 
See W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey On Foot To The Patani Frontier In 1876, being a journal kept during an 
expedition undertaken to capture Datoh Maharaja Lela of Perak”, JSBRAS, No. 9, June 1882, p. 21.            
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the Temengoh division, alleged that the mines rightfully belonged to their ancestors and 
that work on the mines should continue. The Datoh Sri Adika Raja, chief of Upper 
Perak, proposed to the British in Perak to stop big-scale mining operations should the 
mines belong to the state because tailings from the mining area were falling into the 
“bendang” (rice fields) along the Kendrong River, causing irreparable damage to the 
land and hence disrupting paddy cultivation.266 At the suggestion of the Sultan of Perak, 
who claimed that the disputed land was rich in mineral deposits, the British agreed that, 
“no ancestral claims should be recognized”.267 It is not clear if the Raja of Raman was 
compensated for his loss.268
Soon after the border demarcation talks, the tin mines in Raman began to attract 
western capital. In 1904, applications for the rights to prospect for tin were received from 
Europeans. Western mining enterprise in Raman began when the Rahman Tin Company 
and Rahman Hydraulic Tin Company obtained concessions in the resource-rich sections 
of Bukit Paku. The concessions were granted on the understanding that these companies 
had the means, mechanical and financial, to channel water from a farther distance below 
the hill in order to work the area successfully. The Rahman Tin Company had in fact 
invested in the construction of a 12-mile long road connecting Raman to Baling in Kedah 
to facilitate transportation of tin ore from its mining site.269               
 
Chinese elites in tin mining: The Tan family  
(i) Tamtalu and Lampaya Mines in Yala 
                                                 
266HCO, Perak 1466/1900, copy of a translated document from Datoh Sri Adika Raja, 10 Aug 1900. The 
estuary of the Kendrong River (Kuala Kendrong), according to W.E. Maxwell’s report, was on the other 
side of the Patani frontier. See W.E. Maxwell, “A Journey On Foot To The Patani Frontier”, p. 27.   
267 HCO, Perak 1466/1900, Acting Resident General of the FMS to Acting High Commissioner of the 
FMS, “Ancestral claims”, 5 Oct 1900.   
268 There were talks of compensation either in cash or a grant of land. The outcome, however, is not 
known.  
269 John H. Heal, “Mines and Mining Administration” pp. 213-214.   
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The history of tin mining in the Pattani region is synonymous with the Tan family 
of muang Pattani. The Tans appear to have concentrated on tin mining in the Tamtalu 
and Lampraya areas since the 1870s.  While Tamtalu was located in the interior of the 
Bannang Sata district, the Lampaya mines were in the vicinity of the town centre 
(amphoe muang) of Yala. The Governor of Songkhla and his family controlled most of 
the tin deposits in Tamtalu from the time of Rama III. They held a virtual monopoly over 
the tin mining areas until Tan Pui, an early Chinese migrant to Songkhla, had become a 
trusted (business) associate of the Governor there, and subsequently acquired mining 
concessions from him.270      
 
(ii) Method and Capital for mining activity 
The method of mining used at the Tamtalu mines was ground sluicing (muang laen) 
which was popular among small mine owners. It was less labour intensive and could be 
undertaken with little capital. Ditches or dikes made out of planks were placed in running 
water to entrap the heavier soil mixed with tin ore. The heavier soil trapped at the bottom 
of the ditches was loosened by moving the soil along the ditches using wooden spades. 
The soil was then moved into another channel where the ore was picked up or removed 
using spades (Malay: cangkul) or wooden trays (Malay: lampan). This method was used 
only where there were streams and hilly land found together providing the necessary 
water-power, and the source of batu karang (rock with grains of ore).271            
                                                 
270 NA, R.5, KS. 6.5/9, Luang Cjin Kannanurak ko tam bo rae tambon Tamtalu muang Yala (Luang Cjin 
Kannanurak asks for permission to mine in tambon Tamtalu, Yala), Minister of War, 5 Dec 1893 AD. 
(RS.112). See also Phuwadol Songprasert, ‘The development of Chinese capital in southern Siam 1868-
1932’, Ph. D dissertation, Monash University, 1986, p. 85. Phuwadol claims that Tan Pui was the 
Governor’s business partner from Singapore. I have not been able to verify this information, however.        
271 Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, pp. 43-44.  See also, “Memoir by Tan Phaik Chae” 
in Prayundech Kannanurak, payana cheur luang samretkitjakornjangwang, (The genealogy of the Luang 
samretkitjakornjangwang Clan), Bangkok: Maryprint Co., 1995, p. 65. See subsection, “kan tam muang 
rae” (mining methods) on the same page.   
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In the mines close to the limestone ranges, where abundant tin was found in the 
granite hills and slopes, the method of hill-mining or muang khra was also common. 
William Cameron, in his article on Pattani, observed that the Chinese “[worked] with 
considerable vigor, almost always on the hills”.272   
The provincial ruling families were the chief moneylenders to prospective tin miners, 
earning a profitable return by charging interest on the loans. It was common practice for 
the family to loan the initial capital needed to start mining works. In the initial period of 
their tin mining business in the south, Tan Pui and later his sons – Tan Joo Lai and Tan 
Joo Beng- received loans and paid interest on these to the Songkhla ruling family. 
Interest payments were made in kind: The Tans paid 120 piculs (7200 kg) of smelted ore 
every year to the Songkhla family. Apart from interest in kind, the Tans were compelled 
to sell all of the tin produced to the Governor who, in turn, exported it to Singapore.273  
Indeed, the primary source of capital needed for mining work came from the central 
government, and the local governors were their designated “representatives”. Capital 
loans with interest were profitable ventures embarked by the Chakri Kings. Rama IV, for 
instance, noted the high returns he obtained from money lending compared to any other 
form of investment. In 1866, interest rates in Siam were about 15% compared to 9% per 
annum in Singapore. Yet, despite the higher rates, there was never a shortage of clients 
for loans from the Siamese government. Numerous investors from the Straits 
Settlements, Chinese and Europeans alike, availed themselves of these loans.274       
                                                 
272 William Cameron, “On the Patani”, Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 11, 
June 1883, p. 139.  
273 NA, R.5, KH. C.S. 1238-1239 No. 17, Letter from Chaophraya Surawongwaiwat to Mr. Knox, the 
British Consul General, 6 November C.S. 1239 (1877) as cited by Phuwadol Songprasert, ‘The 
development of Chinese capital in southern Siam’, p. 97.     
274 Natthawut Sutthisongkhram, Chiwit lae ngan kongsun Thai Phraya Anukunsayamkit (Life and Work of 
Phraya Anukunsayamkit, the Siamese Consul), Bangkok: Rungruang San, 1982, p.20, as cited in Phuwadol 
Songprasert, ‘The development of Chinese capital in southern Siam’, p. 91.     
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Although the source of capital funds came from the government, the provincial 
governors were assigned to administer or manage the loans. Local governors, often with 
a business interest, tended to give loans to their preferred business associates, who in 
most instances were Chinese residing in Siam or the Straits Settlements. It may be 
surmised that those who succeeded in securing a mining concession from the governor 
were obliged to return the favour by taking a loan from the latter to ensure that the 
concession granted was not revoked. Conversely, it could also imply that those who 
asked for a loan had a better chance of securing a mining concession from the governors, 
the terms of business being one that was based on the concept of mutual-benefit. This 
may account for the high number of Chinese from the Straits Settlements seeking loans 
from the government, the high interest notwithstanding.  
Traditionally, the central government allowed provincial governors to use provincial 
revenue as the source of the loans, with the proviso that the government would be duly 
reimbursed with the annual royalty revenue and income from the Chinese tax farmers.275 
In later years, the Tans had accumulated sufficient capital to make loans to other mining 
investors. The Tans also became trusted allies of the Governor of Songkhla. Tan Pui, for 
instance, fought in the army of the Governor of Songkhla, during the Kedah (Saiburi) 
uprisings against Siam between 1831 and 1838. As an acknowledgement of Tan Pui’s 
services, he was awarded the title Luang and in 1838 was given a piece of land in Pattani 
for his use. This land was ideally located (near the mouth of the river) for the purpose of 
commerce. Today this place in Pattani is called hua talad cjin and continues to be a place 
of trade and market activity.276
 
                                                 
275 Very often, provincial governors tended to take advantage of their privileged position and amassed 
personal wealth by engaging in money lending to the extent of misappropriating provincial revenue.         
276 Suleemarn Wongsuphap, Trakun Kannanurak” in Cjin Taksin: witti lae Plang (Southern Chinese: 
Method and Dynamics), Bangkok: Samnakngan Kong tun sanab sanun kan witchai (The Thailand 
Research Fund), 2001 (BE. 2544), p. 188. 
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The Tans: Miners, Tax Farmers and Kapitan Cjin 
The most prominent member of the Tan family was Tan Joo Lai. In 1888, during 
King Chulalongkorn’s tour of the Pattani region, Joo Lai was bestowed the title Luang 
cjin Kannanurak and designated the Kapitan Cjin (leader of the Chinese people) in 
Pattani. The Kapitan Cjin was the chief of the commerce of Pattani- he held the positions 
of shipping master (controlled the shipping business), collector of inland duties (nai 
akorn bonbia) and a magistrate with the authority to arbitrate disputes among the 
Chinese.277   
Tan Joo Lai must have inherited the Tamtalu mines from his father Tan Pui, after 
the latter died in 1877. He continued extracting tin from these mines. In her memoir, Tan 
Phaik Chae (grand daughter of Tan Joo Lai and daughter of Tan Ban Hock) reminisces 
on a trip to her family-owned tin mine in Tamtalu in the year 1906. The journey started 
with a boat ride from Pattani along the Pattani River to Tasab- the river port of entrance 
and the market centre of the province of Yala. She disembarked here and continued her 
journey on land riding on the back of an elephant. The Chao muang of Yala, provided 
the elephant and the mahouts for the overnight journey to the Tamtalu mines which were 
located in a mountainous region. The granite rocks surrounding the area were the 
principal source of tin ore.  278
If the trip to Tamtalu in 1906 was as arduous as to necessitate an overnight trip, by 
boat and on elephants, this place must have been harder to reach in the 1880s when Tan 
Pui applied to work the mines here. There is no information on the profits that Tan Pui 
and his sons made but based on their willingness to endure the hardship involved in 
working the Tamtalu mines, one may hazard a guess that the mines were indeed very 
profitable. It generated income for more than three generations of the Tan clan in Pattani. 
                                                 
277 William Cameron, “On the Pattani”, p. 125.  
278 “Memoir by Tan Phaik Chae” in Prayundech Kannanurak, payana cheur luang 
samretkitjakornjangwang, (The genealogy of the Luang samretkitjakornjangwang Clan), pp. 63-67.  
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It is pertinent to observe that these developments were taking place before the European 
companies paid any attention to the tin mines of the east coast, their mining investments 
being then predominantly concentrated on the west coast. It may not be an exaggeration 
then to say that the Tans were the pioneers of tin mining on a commercial scale in 
Pattani.         
 
Government prohibition on the granting of new mining licences (1909-1912) 
Although the scale of tin mining activity in the east coast states was relatively small, 
a prohibition on the issue of prospecting licences and mining concessions came into 
effect beginning from August 1909. Prince Damrong, then Minister of Interior, under 
whose control was placed the Department of Mines (1896-July 1909), suggested the 
restriction, citing fears that concession hunters would flood the east coast states 
following the government’s decision to proceed with the extension of the southern 
peninsular railway. The development of the railway joining Siam with the peninsular 
Malay states was an important event in the history of Anglo-Siamese relations during the 
turn of the 20th century. Thus, at the end of August 1909, it was decided that “for an 
appropriate period no further prospecting licences or mining leases be issued for 
monthon Chumpon, Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani”.279  
Damrong’s rationale for the restriction did not go down well with the European 
officers of the Department of Mines. Stating that “mining should be permitted only in 
those places where effective (riab roey) local administration and good communications 
(pay ma saduak) had been established”, Damrong was of the opinion that the provinces 
                                                 
279 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy, p. 106. 
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in the south, namely those affected by the prohibition, lacked a secure provincial 
government.280  
Taking some European companies to task, Damrong cautioned against individuals or 
consortiums, which upon obtaining licences, set-up “flimsy” companies but did not 
embark on the mining operations themselves and instead attempted to sell mining rights 
acquired by them to other “unsuspecting” persons. Some companies could not remain 
long in the business owing to a lack of knowledge of the mining sites, leading to limited 
profit and subsequent bankruptcy. There were also companies looking for short-term and 
immediate gains, by hiring local people to look for tin and buying the produce from them 
for subsequent resale. Damrong cited the activities of these “shady” individuals and their 
respective business concerns i.e. the fraudulent elements in the mining sector as a reason 
for introducing more stringent policies of awarding mining concessions to foreigners. 
Stressing that sufficient capital, labour and availability of transport facilities were crucial 
requirements for big mining operations to succeed, Damrong suggested that only 
applicants who could fulfil these conditions be issued licences.   
While acknowledging the importance of the railway to develop inaccessible resource- 
rich areas, Damrong added that two other factors of equal importance had to be 
considered: the construction of roads and availability of waterways. The construction of 
a railway without a network of roads connecting mining areas to the railway station, 
according to Damrong, would not benefit the mining sector. But since undertaking road 
construction could prove too burdensome for the state, he promptly suggested that 
mining companies should play a part in the development of public works. Rivers or 
                                                 
280 NA, R. 5, KS 16/786, “Memorandum On Mining”. Damrong to Phraya Wongsanupraphat , 27 August, 
1909.  
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waterways were crucial in the tin ore processing methods such as dulang washing, hill 
mining, open cast and hydraulic pumps mining. 281                    
 While the Europeans in the Department of Mines held that the raison d’etre for 
the department and the mining legislation was to “open up every district in the kingdom 
where there are mineral deposits to people of every nationality and language to benefit”, 
Damrong, on the other hand, argued that “tin mining in the peninsula had acquired 
serious political and administrative associations”.282  It was obvious to the Europeans 
that Damrong was reluctant to open the mining industry of the south to western 
enterprise, and to possible British intervention in peninsular Siam. Similar restrictions on 
British subjects intending to apply for mining licences or to purchase land elsewhere in 
the southern peninsula were reported. In Trang, the government discouraged any 
prospecting for minerals because “it is intended to reserve that province for agriculture”. 
Citing this as a reason, the Director of the Agriculture and Mining Department in Phuket, 
Luang Abhiraks conveyed in subtle language, the government’s intention to stop 
granting mining licences to foreigners.283
 The intention to reserve Trang for agriculture was dismissed as “ridiculous” by   
W.A.R. Wood, the Acting British Consul in Songkhla. Referring to a letter in the 
possession of F.P. Clark, then Inspector of the Royal Siamese Mining Department at 
Pattani, which stated that the Siamese government intended to close the state of Pattani 
not only to mining, but also to all other forms of foreign enterprise, Wood pointed out 
that the contents of the letter clearly indicated the true policy that the Siamese 
government intended to pursue in the peninsula.284 The letter further proposed the 
termination of Clark’s services in view of this new closed-door policy. To Wood, this 
                                                 
281 Ibid.  
282 Ibid. See also, Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy, pp. 106-107.      
283 FO 422/65 (Part XXII), Further Correspondence respecting the affairs of Siam, 1910. Enclosure in  
No. 51. Acting British Consul Senggora, WAR Wood to Mr. Peel, 11 October 1910.  
284 FO 422/65 (Part XXII), Further Correspondence respecting the affairs of Siam, 1910.    
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clearly signalled Siam’s intention of purging foreigners from all business ventures in the 
south and denying them any access into the mining industry. The tin mines of south Siam 
would then become exclusive reserves for Siamese subjects, notably the Siamese 
Chinese subjects. In 1911, the Siamese Consul in Songkhla reported to the British 
Minister in Bangkok the difficulties faced by the British company, Messrs Pearson, in 
obtaining a licence to prospect for minerals in the province of Nakhon Sithammarat. The 
firm had obtained a licence from the Department of Mines in December 1910 for this 
purpose but with a clause attached forbidding “prospecting for a distance of 5 miles on 
each side of the southern railway”. Numerous attempts by the company to persuade Siam 
to remove the clause failed. On the other hand, the company claimed  “that local Chinese 
[were] permitted to pursue operations within the reserved zone” arousing much agitation 
and confirming Siam’s policy of preferential treatment for Chinese subjects at the 
expense of British or other foreign subjects.285   
 
Exception-to-the rule: Chinese elites and the prohibition (1909-1912)   
In principle, prohibiting new mining licences must have slowed down mining activity 
in the east coast states. But there are indications that requests for applications for new 
licences were made prior to the removal of the prohibition. In a letter dated 4th March 
1911, applications were received from 5 Siamese Chinese requesting licences for tin 
mining in the province of Yala. The five Chinese, viz. Ngau Niaw, Tan Ban Hock, Yok 
Pae, Ki (or Kee) and Ngau Nai Bhoo, applied for licences to mine in tambons (sub 
districts) Tamtalu, Lampraya (also pronounced Lampaya) and Dhida in the province of 
                                                 
285 FO 422/66 (Part XXIII), No. 30, Mr. Peel to Sir Edward Grey, 22 Nov 1911  
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Yala. There were two applicants each in Tamtalu (Ngau Niaw and Tan Ban Hock) and 
Lampraya (Ki and Yok Pae) and one applicant in Dhida (Ngau Nai Bhoo).286  
The name Ngau Niaw as it appears in this document should be Yee Niaw, the 
nickname used to refer to Tan Meng Joo, first born and daughter of Tan Pui of Pattani.287 
Meng Joo’s brother was Tan Joo Lai, a prominent member of the Tan family who was 
made the leader of the Chinese or the Phra Cjin in Pattani during the reign of Rama V. 
Both Tan Meng Joo and Tan Joo Lai belonged to the second generation of the Tan 
family. Their father Tan Pui, who migrated from China to Songkhla was the pioneer 
member of this clan in south Siam.288 Meng Joo was the eldest child from Tan Pui’s 
second wife, while Joo Lai was the third oldest child. (Refer to Figure 4.1 or see 
Appendix 2 for a genealogy of the Tan Pui family).   
Tan Ban Hock (or Jamroen Pakdi), another of the applicants, was the son of Tan Joo 
Lai. Ki (Kee) in the list most likely referred to Tan Ju Ki, son of Tan Pui from his third 
wife and half-brother of both Meng Joo and Joo Lai. Ki could also refer to Ki Liang, 
eldest child and daughter of Tan Joo Meng, the second child of Tan Pui, born to his 
second wife after the birth of Tan Meng Joo and before Tan Joo Lai (see Figure 4.1). 
These three siblings held important business positions in the Tan family. Joo Meng (also 
spelt Chew Beng) is known in western accounts as Datoh of the mines (datoh muang 
raeh). He was also an opium farmer and was generally known to be the most powerful 
man in Pattani, rivalled by only his older brother, the Phra Cjin (Tan Joo Lai).289
 
 
                                                 
286 NA, R. 5, KS 16/209, 4 March 1911. 
287 I am grateful to Khun Prayundech Kannanurak , a sixth generation male member of the 
Tan/Kannanurak family currently living in Pattani for this information. For a detailed genealogy of the 
Tan/Kannanurak family see Prayundech Kannanurak, Payana cheur luang samret Kitjakornjangwang.            
288 Suleemarn Wongsuphap, “Trakun Kannanurak” in Cjin Taksin, p. 187   
289 William Cameron, “On the Pattani”, , p. 125. 
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1. Tan Meng Joo 2. Tan Joo Meng  3. Tan Joo Lai 
         (Chew Beng) 
       
 
 
     
    1.Ki Liang      Tan Ban Hock 








      
     Tan Ju Ki 
     (Ki/ Kee) 
 
Figure 4.1: Children and Grandchildren of Tan Pui (as mentioned in the text above)    
 
It is clear from this list that all the applicants comprised Chinese of economic 
influence or members of an elite Chinese family in Pattani- notably from Tan Joo Lai’s 
family line- who had a provincial power base endorsed by the King himself. While the 
older sons in the Tan family became men-of-power, the daughters were no less 
significant. The oldest child, irrespective of gender, was accorded a position of 
importance contrary to the normal Chinese practice of favouring sons over daughters. 
Both Tan Meng Joo and Ki Liang were first-borns. It is possible that in order to acquire 
as many concessions as possible, the Tan family applied for concessions under the names 
of both sons and daughters, nick-names may in fact have been used for the same purpose, 
i.e. separate applications by the same person may have been made using both the formal 
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and informal names as may have been the case with Tan Meng Joo alias Ngau Niaw or 
Yee Niaw. 290
Thus, these members of a “privileged” class appear to have been the exceptions to 
the official “closed-door” policy of Damrong and the Department of Mines.  Even prior 
to the 1909 ban, mining licences to the tin rich areas of Yala appears to have been 
granted exclusively to Siamese Chinese of influence; people whom Damrong referred to 
as ‘pu mi cheur” (people of name and influence).291 The Tans for example were the main 
recipients of grants to mining areas in the tin rich areas in Yala.  In 1900, for instance, 
three members of the Tan family held concessions in three different sub-districts 
(tambon) in Yala. These were the influential father-and-son teams comprising Luang 
Cjin Kannanurak (in tambon Tamtalu) and sons Tan Ban Hock (in tambon Mae Bulan) 
and Tan Ban Siew or Pitak Raya (in tambon Baiyobon).292  
Damrong’s preferential treatment for the Chinese led to allegations by the foreigners 
in Siam that Bangkok pursued a pro-native, particularly pro-Chinese, and anti-foreigner 
policy. The allegation by Consul Wood, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, therefore, 
was not unfounded.  
Cordial relations with the power centre (Bangkok) helped to promote the Tan 
family’s business expansion in the south. There were other prominent Chinese families 
enjoying similar relations and privileges from the Bangkok government. The Khaw 
family of Ranong and Penang on the west coast, for example, was successful in the tin 
mining industry there. Their success can be attributed to the friendly relations and 
                                                 
290 In later times, some of the “business survival” methods practised by overseas Chinese in Siam included 
adopting Thai names, having Thai citizens as business partners or registering their businesses under the 
names of their wives or children if they held Thai citizenship. See Phuwadol Songprasert, “The Economic 
Roles, Positions and Problems of the Chinese and the Malay Muslims in the Thai Polity: A Comparative 
Study”, in S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict, 
London: Pinter Publishers, International Centre for Ethnic Studies Series, 1991, p. 124.         
291 NA. R. 5. Ks. 6.5/12, “pu mi cheur kor anuyard pratan bat khao tham muang rae dibuk kweng muang 
Yala 5 tambon”, 2 Jan 1900 (RS 118).  
292 NA. R.5. Ks. 6.5/12, “pu mi cheur kor anuyard pratan bat khao tham muang rae dibuk kweng muang 
Yala 5 tambon”, 1900 (RS 118).   
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goodwill they had with the Chulalongkorn government in particular with Prince 
Damrong.293  At the same time, Siam adopted a policy of appointing men “experienced 
in business” to positions of authority as “an attempt to blunt the forward drive of British 
economic incursions”.294 In other words, by promoting members from the business 
families such as the Khaws in Ranong and the Tans in Pattani, thereby securing the 
control of the economy of the respective areas in their hands, Siam was hoping to 
forestall British economic penetration into the peninsula provinces of the western and 
eastern coasts of southern Siam. This policy inadvertently brought changes to the 
traditional methods of resource management in the area, which included the 
administration of mining land.     
The business and administrative power that the Tans held at the provincial level 
enabled their active and successful participation in the mining industry of the Pattani 
region. The marble hills in Tamtalu today known among local people as the location of 
the Borisat V.S. Marben or The V.S. Marble Company used to be the former location of 
the tin mines belonging to the Tan family of Pattani. Today the tin fields have been 
depleted and the hills surrounding the area are the source of marble.295 While marble has 
replaced tin production, the ownership of the “hills and mines” has not changed hands. 
The owners of the marble company are descendents of the Tan family thus providing 




                                                 
293 For a study on the Khaw family see Jennifer Cushman, Family and State: The Formation of a Sino-Thai 
Tin-mining Dynasty 1797-1932, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991.   
294 Jennifer Cushman, Family and State, p. 48. The phrase men “experienced in business” is taken from 
Chatthip Nartsupha et.al, The Political Economy of Siam, 1910-1932, Bangkok: Social Science 
Association of Thailand, 1978 (1981 reprint), p. 105.   






Figure 4.2:  Tan Joo Lai or Phra Cjin (Kannanurak) 
Source: Prayundech Kannanurak. Payana cheur luang samretkitjakornjangwang (The 








Figure 4.3: Tan Meng Joo (Thai: Nang Meng Joo, later Nang Meng Joo Kovithya) 
Source: Prayundech Kannanurak. Payana cheur luang samretkitjakornjangwang (The 












Figure 4.4: Ms. Ki Liang (or Nang Phiphitpasi) and Mr. Ban Li (or Khun Phiphitpasi) 
Source: Prayundech Kannanurak. Payana cheur luang samretkitjakornjangwang (The 












Figure 4.5: Tan Joo Lai as Luang Cjin Kannanurak (seen here in traditional Chinese 
dressing) 
 
Source: Prayundech Kannanurak. Payana cheur luang samretkitjakornjangwang (The 






 End of Prohibition: 1912  
(i) Tin exports before and after prohibition (1908-1914)   
The percentage of tin and tin ore exports for the period 1908 to 1914 ranged 
between 12 and 53 % of total value of exports from monthon Pattani.  
 
Table 4.1: Tin exports from monthon Pattani (1908-1914) 
Year Tin and tin ore (£ ) 
/(Tons) 
Tin exports 
as (%) of 




April 1, 1908 – 
March 31, 1909 
£5,611 (20) 11.73 £47,814 
April 1, 1909 - 
March 31, 1910 
£33,334 (287) 45.55 £73,169 
April 1, 1910 – 
March 31, 1911 
£47,960 (370) 39.46 £121,511 
April 1, 1911 – 
March 31, 1912 
£60,628 (426) 46.38 £130,700 
April 1, 1912 – 
March 31, 1913 
£61,222 (333) 49.75 £123,046 
April 1, 1913 – 
March 31, 1914 
£59,346 (310) 52.62 £112,766 
 
Source:  
DCR, Siam, (Senggora), Report for the year 1910/1911, p.11 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1911/1912, p. 8. 
DCR, Siam (Senggora), Report for the year 1912/1913, p. 10.   
 
 
Table 4.1 provides the figures for tin exports (in tons) and the corresponding 
percentage of tin exports vis-à-vis total exports for monthon Pattani between 1908 and 
1914. The lowest percentage of tin export for the period 1908-1914 was recorded in the 
year that ended March 31 1909, that is before the prohibition came into effect in August 
1909. Ironically, for the period immediately after the prohibition, tin exports from 
monthon Pattani showed a huge increase of about four-fold from the preceding year. 
British Consul Wood offered two reasons for the increase.  A large quantity of tin held 
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up in the previous years in anticipation of a rise in the price of tin contributed to the 
increase in 1910. He also claimed that “a certain amount of tin from the Betong district 
(now British) was exported through Patani instead of through Perak, as in former years, 
owing to the fact that a lower export duty is charged in Patani”.296 Indeed it is possible 
that the exports for the year 1909/10 included tin accumulated in the preceding years, for 
it was common practice among tin producers to stock up and sell when market prices 
were favourable. 
However, it is doubtful if export taxes on the Siamese (i.e. Pattani) side were 
lower than British rates. A year after Wood’s report, tin ore traders on the Siamese side 
of Betong wrote to the Siamese Department of Mines requesting the government to adopt 
the lower tin duties on the British side as the standard rate.297 It is difficult to verify 
export duties or account for the increase in exports during this period because of the 
conflicting reports made by both Siam and the British especially in the wake of border 
rectifications. British reports tend to exaggerate the wealth and production capacity of 
territories acquired by them while the Siamese elites overstate the extent of their loss to 
rally popular support against external threats as well as to justify internal reforms.298  
Besides, later reports indicate that the tin mines in the British-acquired part of Betong did 
not immediately come into operation owing to the lack of roads, shortage of labour and 
the remoteness of the area from Penang, from where most of the machinery and foodstuff 
                                                 
296 DCR, Siam (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), 1909, p. 17. After the Anglo-Siam Treaty of 1909, parts of 
the district of Betong, which was formerly under Siamese rule, fell under British jurisdiction.   
297 NA, R.5, KS 16/207, 1911. See sub-section: Tin Duties on produce from Raman and Betong in this 
chapter.  
298 The loss of territory is portrayed as a trauma in Thai political history. The Thais never “recovered” from 
the loss of their territories to France in the 1893 Paknam incident. The loss is etched in the Thai memory, 
in particular among the elites. In the 1940s, a movement to recover the lost territories was initiated as part 
of Premier Phibun’s Thai nationalist propaganda. See Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped, pp. 141-150.     
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came.299 Conversely, it would have been easier to access this area from Pattani instead of 
Penang, therefore tin producers exported their produce through the port of Pattani.   
It is also very likely that the increase in tin exports from Pattani in 1909/10 
included tin produced in the Takbai area, which came under Siamese jurisdiction after 
the 1909 Treaty. From 1910/11 to 1913/14, tin exports from Pattani were more stable, 
ranging between 45 and 52 % of the total value of Pattani’s exports.          
 
(ii) New mining licences (1912-1918)    
After the prohibition was removed in 1912, following the orders of Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat, then Minister of Agriculture, there were a number of applications to 
prospect for tin in the east coast states. These included a request for a licence to mine tin 
in the district of Sadao, province of Songkhla, issued to Che Ngae, a Siamese Malay.300  
In 1918, according to an account listing names of applicants requesting mining 
licences in monthon Pattani, there were 16 applicants, 15 of whom had Chinese names. 
One of the 16 applicants was a Khoo Sin Hoe who was registered as a British subject, 
meaning he was of Penang origin, while the other applicants were all registered as 
Siamese subjects.301 Table 4.2 provides the names and the respective mining areas 








                                                 
299 The Straits Times, 9 May 1950, “Change-Over Under Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, Siam returned 
rich tin land to Malaya”.   
300 NA. R. 5. KS 16/427, 1 Nov 1915.The document refers to Che Ngae as “khaek”, the term commonly 
used to refer to Malays.  
301 NA. R.5. KS 16/646, “Banci rainam pu kho pratan bat tham muang rae nai monthon Pattani” (List of 




Table 4.2: List of Applicants For Mining Licence in monthon Pattani, 1918 
 
 
Name   Subject   Area applied: 
 tambon amphoe changwat  
     (subdistrict) (district) (province) 
 
Khoo Sin Hoe  British  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Khoo Sin Hoe  British  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Pring   Siam  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Pring   Siam  Weng  Betong  Yala 
Ma Lok Siew  Siam  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Dae Beng  Siam  Betong  Betong  Yala  
Chiang Taen  Siam  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Chiang Taen  Siam  Betong  Betong  Yala 
Loh Yu Tong  Siam  Yarom  Betong  Yala 
Loh Yu Tong  Siam  Weng  Betong  Yala 
Loh Yu Tong  Siam  Yarom  Betong  Yala 
Loh Yu Tong  Siam  Yarom  Betong  Yala 
Ah Iyiaw  Siam  Lampaya Sateng  Yala 
Chin Kaw  Siam  Mae Hwad Bannang Sata Yala 
Taen   Siam  Mare Botok Tanjong Mas Narathiwat  
Hooi Wong Yee  Siam  Riyang  Ruso  Narathiwat 
 
In general, names with two elements as they appear in the list above were likely 
those of Straits/Baba Chinese while three-element names belonged to other (non- Baba) 
Chinese of Malaya, but Khoo Sin Hoe would be an exception.303 In other words, 
although the list above indicates that all except one of the applicants were Siamese 
subjects, they were not necessarily Siamese Chinese who came direct from mainland 
China. Some were Straits Chinese, who moved to Siam and became Siamese subjects. 
Their immediate ancestors must have lived in either Penang, Melaka or Singapore at 
some point in time. Some of the Straits Chinese from Penang, taking into account the 
island’s close proximity to south Siam, moved into Siamese territories to take advantage 
of the economic opportunities there and some maintained households in both territories.    
 
                                                 
303 I am grateful to Dr. Uri Tadmor, a historical-linguist with the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology, Jakarta for the clarification on this subject.   
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The Chinese in south Siam had close ties with Penang. It will be shown below 
that the tin miners, in particular, depended on Penang for tin ore smelting facilities. 
Penang also provided the miners in south Siam with financial and shipping facilities. 
Chinese coolies employed for work on the mines in south Siam came either from Malaya 
(1870/80s) or direct from southern China (1890/1900s).304 In both cases, Penang was the 
ideal port of disembarkation before the coolies were sent to the respective mines in south 
Siam.  Some of the rich and affluent Chinese merchants in Penang also invested in tin 
mining in south Siam. Khoo Sin Hoe (from the list above), for example, was a rice 
merchant in the Straits Settlement of Penang. In 1919, when his application was made, 
Khoo was a member of a six-man committee appointed by the Straits government to deal 
with the matter of rice shortage in the island.305 In other words, Khoo not only had the 
financial means as a rice merchant to invest in mining ventures but also enjoyed 
sufficient recognition from the Straits government for him to be appointed to represent 
the government in handling its internal matters.  
The mines in Betong and Bannang Sata were popular choices among the Chinese 
miners. Khoo made two separate applications for two different plots of land in the same 
district of Betong. Similarly most other applicants applied for licences in the Betong 
area, some requesting up to four separate plots in this district. One of these was Loh Yu 
Tong. His application included a licence to mine in the sub-districts of Yarom and Weng, 
also part of the larger Betong district. There was one application for the area of Lampaya 
in the Sateng district (present day Yala province) while Bannang Sata, Tanjong Mas and 
Ruso, the last two-mentioned in the district of Narathiwat, each received one application.  
                                                 
304 Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development Of Thailand, 1850-1950, p. 146.    
305 Pinang Gazette, 19 Apr 1919, See also Straits Echo 19 Apr 1919.  
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   Bannang Sata in Yala was a traditional mining area. There is evidence to indicate 
that this area had long been an important centre of (Chinese) mining activity. The 
discovery of the Dreda furnace, a purely Chinese type furnace used for smelting tin ore 
in a Chinese village called Dreda in muang Raman, bordering Upper Perak in the early 
1890s, indicated the relative influence of the Chinese miners and their methods of 
mining and smelting in Bannang Sata in the nineteenth century.306  Thai documents refer 
to a place called Dhida in the district of Bannang Sata in the province of Yala where tin 
was found. A document from the Department of Mines dated 4th March 1911 indicates 
that the applicants for mining license there were Siamese Chinese.307 Perhaps the type of 
furnace used by the Chinese miners in this area (Dhida) began to be used elsewhere in 
the region and was in fact called the “Dreda” type furnace, a corruption of the word 
Dhida.     
Betong Mines 
Based on Table 4.2, the district of Betong was the most popular choice with most 
of the applicants. Betong is another frontier district in the province of Yala located close 
to the border of the Malay state of Perak. Tin mining in Betong was predominantly a 
Chinese activity.  The fast depletion of the tin mines on the west coast along with the 
price boom in 1918 must have attracted prospective miners to invest in the rich hitherto 
untapped areas in the hinterland closer to the eastern seaboard. By the end of WW I, 
Betong began to attract both Siamese and foreign mining investors.  
Rich tin deposits and easy transportation from Betong to Kroh thence to Penang 
attracted investors to this area. Betong was better connected than Pattani with Kroh and 
Penang. As late as 1918, communications with Pattani through Yala was possible only 
by a track that was suited for the passage of elephants and bullock carts but impassable 
                                                 
306 Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry To 1914, p. 51.     
307 NA, R.5, KS 16/209, 1911. The document refers to Dhida as a tambon (commune/subdistrict).   
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for motor (or motor-wheeled) traffic.308 During a visit to Betong in 1918, the British 
Consul at Songkhla, F.G. Gorton, observed that “practically the whole of Betawng’s [sic] 
trade is conducted with Kroh and thence with Penang”.309 Goods were transported from 
Betong to Kroh on pack bullocks or by Chinese carrying coolies. A good motor road, 
stretching for about 64 miles passing through Province Wellesley connected Kroh with 
Penang.    
 Mining in Betong was almost exclusively in the hands of local (Siamese) 
Chinese. In 1918, there were three Chinese firms in Betong who together controlled 
almost all the mines in the area. The Three Chinese viz. Tong Sang Cheng, Ban Nam 
Chang and Kong Ban Chong held about 30 permits to work in the mines of Malau, 
Malang and Cheruputtaye respectively.310 These places cannot be identified on a modern 
day map of Thailand. It is possible that Malau was located close to the borders of Kedah.  
Today there is a place in the northern part of Kedah, close to Jitra, called Malau. There 
was a Malau Tin Company belonging to British subjects operating in the Betong area in 
the 1890s as well but where precisely this was located cannot be verified.311 The name 
Cheruputtaye may have been derived from the Malay “cheruk putih” meaning “a white 






                                                 
308 HCO 3105/18, Visit made By His Majesty’s Consul at Senggora to the Betawng [sic] Division of the 
Jala District of Patani, 1918, p. 3.  
309 Ibid.  
310 Ibid., p. 4. 
311 NA, R.6, Ks. 6.2/31, reang hai borisat malau tin tun jamkad tam muang rae dibuk (Permission for tin 















Map 4. 2:  Mining Areas Of Betong And Bannang Sata In The Province Of Yala, c. 
1930. 
 








Apart from the Chinese, European and British companies too operated in the 
Betong area. The biggest European Company involved in tin mining in Betong was the 
Ayer Weng Company.312 Ayer Weng had its own smelting facility at the mining site, 
thus it exported tin slabs rather than tin ore. This Company also received a reduction of 
one percent on tin duties because they maintained the Weng- Betong Road, a stretch of 
20 miles at their own expense.   
 
Tin Duties on produce from Raman and Betong  
The onset of the thesaphiban system necessitated an evaluation of Siam’s 
revenues and expenditures. The tin industry of the southern provinces attracted Siamese 
attention in relation to its potential for increasing the state’s revenue. The potential 
revenue from tin duties and the losses from hitherto undeclared taxes from these 
provinces became a subject of much concern.       
Around 1896/97, tax collected on the tin produced in Pattani and Yala was 
between 3 to 4 percent.313 While these two provinces contributed towards the revenue of 
the state, however small the amount was, Bangkok alleged that the province of Raman 
comprising the three tin districts of Intan, Likae and Biho had not declared their 
production figures to the government. The governor of Raman was accused of having 
concealed the information and therefore avoided paying taxes. Upon investigation, 
Raman’s annual tin production from the three districts in 1897 was calculated to be 
between 500-600 hab (picul) (30,000 – 36,000kg). The government thus ordered the 
governor of Raman, Phraya Ratnapakdi, to collect taxes between 10 to 15 percent on tin 
                                                 
312 Blahat Mines, a Penang Company is one other European Company said to have had mining concessions 
in the Betong district. Apart from a reference to a Dutchman named Hoogerwerf who apparently managed 
work at this mining site, nothing else is known of this company.  
313 NA, R. 5, Kh. 14.2 K/17, “Akon dibuk huamuang tawantok” (Tax on tin from the west coast 
provinces),  
12 Feb 1896 (RS. 115). 
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produced in these areas. For tin exported from Raman via the Nongchik River to Pattani, 
Yaring, Saiburi and Songkhla, the tax was 10 percent and if the tin was sold elsewhere, 
apart from these muang, the tax recommended was 15 percent. This move was aimed at 
encouraging traders to visit these muang for buying and selling purposes and therefore 
contribute to the commercial development of these coastal states.314  
The higher tax proposed for tin exports from Raman via river ports outside the 
Pattani region can be seen as Siam’s attempt to stop the export of tin from Raman 
through the Perak River to neighbouring British Protectorates thence to the port of 
Penang, which would deprive Bangkok of tax payments. Raman was often viewed with 
suspicion by Bangkok. Avoiding taxes and concealing the exact figures of the amount 
produced were some of the charges against the governor of Raman. In early 1897, the 
Special Commissioner in charge of reforms in the Malay states (khaluang piset jad 
rathchakan prathet rat Malayu) reported that tin produced in Raman was not recorded in 
the official register (banci) and the amount that could be collected as suai (tax in kind) 
for Bangkok was not known. He proposed that an appropriate tax should be collected on 
tin exported from Raman, so that the money could be used as capital for further 
development of the country. 315 The suggestion was followed up when, in February 1897, 
it was decided that tin exports from Raman would be taxed between 10 to 15 percent. 
This decision was made while Siam was in the midst of the Raman-Perak border 
rectification talks with Britain in the 1890s. Raman’s exports to the port of Penang 
further accentuated its trade connections with the British port and this complicated, for 
Siam, its dealings with Raman. Siam lost part of its tin-rich areas of muang Raman to 
Britain as a result of the border rectification, which was finalized in 1899. Thereafter, 
                                                 
314 NA, R.5, Kh. 14.2 K/17, “Akon dibuk huamuang tawantok” (Tax on tin from the west coast provinces)  
2 Feb 1896 (RS. 115). 
315 NA, R.5, Kh.14.2 K/17 “ Akon dibuk huamuang tawantok” (Tax on tin from the west coast provinces),  
5 Jan 1897 (RS. 115).     
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matters related to tin mining in Raman like most other tin producing areas in the Pattani 
region came under the control of the Department of Mines and Ministry of Interior as 
stipulated in the Mining Act of 1901.                         
Tin ore collected from Betong was also exported to Penang. Siamese officials 
collected royalties on the ore based on Penang prices. This rate was comparatively higher 
than British rates (elsewhere in British Malaya). Calls were made to the Bangkok 
government to fix the rate similar to British rates in the Federated Malay States arguing 
that the rates collected in Penang were too high.316 The Mines Department also cited 
cases of traders attempting to avoid paying royalties on the Siamese side in Betong and 
instead smuggling the ore into British territory and paying the lower duties there. 
Consequently, the department argued, Siam lost huge amounts in royalty revenues 
derived from tin exports. Furthermore, the department stated that Betong’s close 
proximity to British territory must be taken into consideration. The Betong tin ore traders 
sent a petition to the Siamese government through the Department of Mines in 1911 
calling for lower tin duties. In 1912, the government agreed to fix royalty and tin duties 
based on rates in British Malaya. Effective from April 1912, royalty collected on 1 hab 
(60 kg) of refined tin (neah dibuk) was fixed at 10 Baht whereas 1 hab (60kg) of tin ore 
(raeh dibuk) was 7 baht. A reduction of rates may have in fact taken place. According to 
Damrong’s Memorandum on mining dated 1909, the rates were between 10 to 13 Baht 
depending on the quality and the ease or difficulty of obtaining these minerals; the ones 
closer to rivers and market points were relatively easier to be worked compared to the 
mines further inland.      
The revenue from taxes on tin and taxes collected from Chinese workers 
employed in the tin mines were indeed substantial. Sompop Manarungsan, a Thai 
                                                 
316 NA, R.5, KS 16/207, 1911. 
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economist, estimated that about 40 percent of the earnings of tin mine workers were 
taxed by the government (these included opium and gambling taxes), but little was 
returned by the government in terms of public utilities and services to the community. In 
addition to taxes collected from mine workers, mine owners too were subjected to 
numerous taxes and fees. In 1919, the Department of Mines had a budget allocation of 
545, 269 Baht for its operational costs but collected, in the same year, 4.6 million Baht in 
concession fees from tin mine owners. The amount spent on local government in the tin-
producing provinces was disproportionate to the amount collected from tin taxes from 
these provinces. In 1917, for example, revenue from tin taxes totalled 7.7 million Baht. 
Of these only 1.6 percent was allocated for local development in Phuket, the country’s 
largest contributor of tin revenues. 317    
 
Penang – South Siam Tin Network 
The Siamese government had decided to construct a railway line connecting south 
Siam with Singapore just a few months prior to the announcement prohibiting the issue 
of new mining licences in August 1909. The decision to proceed with the construction of 
the peninsular railway, aided by a loan from the FMS government in Malaya, was agreed 
upon in March 1909. Europeans with an interest in the mining business welcomed the 
decision to extend the railways to Singapore. Furthermore, the proposed southern line 
connecting the southeastern states, all the way down to Singapore, provided businessmen 
in Singapore with an opportunity for a share in the business of shipping tin for export, 
which until then was a monopoly held by Penang. In part an attempt to replace Penang’s 
role as the most important channel for tin ore exports from the south of Siam, the 
business community in Singapore “wanted the port of Singapore rather than Penang to 
                                                 
317 Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, p. 148.  
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benefit from the [southern railway] line”.318 The link between Penang and the south of 
Siam, however, was well established. Apart from logistics, the smelting and shipping 
facilities available in Penang sustained Penang’s primacy in the tin export sector.                
The availability of smelting facilities in Penang enhanced the role and importance of 
Penang as the number one port for tin ore exports from the south of Siam. While Phuket 
in the 1900s lacked modern smelting facilities, business people in Singapore took the 
lead in offering such facilities.319 In 1890, the Straits Trading Company set up a smelter 
in Pulau Brani, Singapore, followed by another in Butterworth, Penang, in 1901-1902.320 
Soon the Straits Trading Company enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the smelting works, 
replacing the less-advanced Chinese smelters in the peninsula. With modern smelting 
facilities available close to Phuket, an increasing amount of tin exports from Phuket were 
in the form of ore shipped to Penang for smelting.321   
Apart from smelting facilities, the Straits Steamship Company, an associate company 
owned by the Straits Trading Company, provided shipping services between south Siam 
(Phuket) and Penang, rivalling the services offered by the Penang based, Khaw- family- 
owned, Koe Guan Company.322 In 1907, the Koe Guan Company, whose monopoly of 
shipping on the west coast was broken by the Straits liners, joined a few other Penang 
shipping companies and formed the Eastern Shipping Company. Its vessels began to run 
between the ports in the Siamese Malay states, i.e. east coast states and Penang, and with 
                                                 
318 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy, p. 106. 
319 Hermann Muhlinghams and James Sword from Singapore founded the company. By 1892, Henri 
Huber, a long time resident in Singapore became a large shareholder in the company. Penang Gazette and 
Straits Chronicle, 13 Sept 1892, p. 3.      
320 Jennifer W. Cushman, Family and State: The Formation of a Sino-Thai Tin mining Dynasty 1797-1932, 
Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 51. See also The Straits Trading Company Limited: 100 
Years of Growth, 1887-1987, Singapore: Straits Trading, 1987, p. 5.       
321Between 1909 and 1910, for instance, over 60 % of tin exports from Phuket to Penang constituted tin 
ore. See Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy, p. 103.  
322 Jennifer Cushman, Family and State, p. 63. 
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a fleet of sixteen vessels in all, the Eastern Shipping proved a formidable rival to the 
Straits Steamship Company.323  
The Khaw group of companies also acted as financial intermediaries, securing and 
providing loans to its clients and group members who wished to undertake business 
operations.324 In other words, Penang through the Khaw group provided an integrated 
system of services ranging from smelting, shipping (including insurance) to banking for 
individual miners as well as companies. These services contributed to the steady growth 
of Penang as the main destination for the smelting of tin ore produced in south Siam as 
well as the principal port for the export of tin.  
 
Historical parallel(s)  
Efforts to standardize royalty and tax rates, promote tin output, extend the growth 
of the region based on the exploitation of tin resources seem to have a historical parallel. 
As early as 1830, the British in Penang had proposed a Tin Scheme with the view:  
… to encourage the formation at this island of an Emporium or Entrepot for the 
Tin Produce of Junkceylon Patani and Perah, to obtain some remission of the 
heavy duty levied on the exportation of that article to Junkceylon, … to open a 
free intercourse with the Tin Mines in the neighbourhood of Patani, whence 
large supplies were offered to the late Governor by the Penghulu at Kroh, and 
whence there is reason to believe almost any quantity may be derived through 
the Merbow [Merbau], Mooda [Muda] and Prye [Prai] Rivers….325      
 
The 1830 scheme was in many ways, a precursor to present day joint economic 
caucus or growth triangle schemes.326 By promoting Penang as the port for tin exports 
                                                 
323 Ibid., pp. 65- 69. 
324 Ibid., pp. 63-65.  
325 Series of documents from the manuscripts records of the East India Company, selected and edited in 
C.D. Cowan (ed.), Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore: 1805-1832, Journal of the Malayan Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 23/Part 2, March 1950, Singapore: Malaya Publishing House, Limited, 
1950, p. 123.   
326 This point was also put forward in a paper presented at a conference in Pattani. See, Phil King, “The 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle: a critical review of its progress and potential for the 
development of southern Thailand”, paper presented at the First International Conference on Southern 
Thailand, 13-15 June 2002, Pattani, Thailand.    
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and by linking the island with the source of this mineral commodity, the British in 
Penang indicated their intention to exploit (commercially) the rich tin deposits in the 
interior territories of Pattani and Perak. Apart from ensuring the supply of this 
commodity, they had hoped also, to work out a standardized tax and royalty rate that was 
agreeable to all parties. As a trade emporium, Penang would have all the infrastructure 
needed for commerce, in particular, shipping and finance, and to compensate for the lack 
of resources, Penang had to be linked with the hinterland which was crucial in providing 
the supply of commodities for the trade of Penang. To this end, the British sought to tap 
the sources of the rich inland territories surrounding the island.327
The preferences of the Governor of Songkhla, however, frustrated British efforts 
to reach into the tin rich interior of Pattani. The Governor of Songkhla, who had control 
over Pattani, preferred individual Chinese traders or his own business associates. The 
Governor, himself a Hokkien Chinese, sought to give concessions to fellow Hokkien 
business traders. This “Hokkien connection” too had a historic root.        
The ruling family of Songkhla at the time when Tan Pui arrived Songkhla was of 
Hokkien Chinese descent. Their ancestor, a man by the name of Hao Yiang, as 
mentioned previously, was a tax farmer of birds’ nest for the area of Songkhla, appointed 
by King Taksin in 1769. He was conferred the title Luang Inthakirisombat. His 
increasing wealth as a tax farmer and, consequently, his contribution and loyalty to the 
monarch earned him the position of Governor of Songkhla in 1775.328 It was a mutually 
beneficial relationship based on patron-clientage where both parties profited. It was also 
a relationship based on loyalty and trust. When King Rama I encountered problems with 
                                                 
327 Series of documents from the manuscript records of the East India Company, selected and edited in 
C.D.  Cowan, Early Penang and The Rise of Singapore, p. 123.    
328 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, Ithaca, New York: 
Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, July 1969, p. 163. See also Appendix N (p. 233) for 
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the southern ruling house of Nakhon Sithammarat, he placed Hao Yiang in power in the 
south, in a move to counter the excessive powers of the Nakhon Sithammarat ruling 
family.329 From this time on (1809), Pattani was placed under the rule of Songkhla, and 
Hao Yiang was given the authority to supervise (as an intermediary for Bangkok) the 
seven Malay vassal states of Pattani.  
Songkhla became a province directly under the control of Bangkok, and the 
previous position of Songkhla as subordinate to Nakhon was removed.  Later when 
Rama II came to power, he reinstated the position of the Nakhon ruling house and placed 
Songkhla under Nakhon again.  Rama III then revoked this and restored the Songkhla 
ruling house to its former position.  Hao Yiang was succeeded by his son (Hao Ban Hui) 
as Governor of Songkhla between 1784 and 1812. Three other sons of Hao Yiang 
became Governor of Songkhla consecutively before the governorship was passed down 
to his grandchildren.330 Throughout this time, the ruling house of Songkhla became close 
and trusted associates of the Chakri ruling house. Their relations with the government 
enhanced their social status and increased their wealth.                         
 Chinese families in southern Siam who had significant successes in acquiring 
wealth through business also used their economic strength to acquire political power. 
They were often classified as compradors. Jennifer Cushman’s work on the Khaw family 
of Ranong mentions the term “capitalist-bureaucrats” which was used by Thai political 
economists, such as Chatthip Nartsupha, to refer to this group of people.331 While it is 
true that the Chinese greatly benefited as a result of their patron-client relations with the 
“sakdina” Siamese state, their philanthropic and economic contribution towards the 
growth of the state (pattana baan muang) cannot be overlooked.   
                                                 
329 Phuwadol Songprasert,‘The Development of Chinese Capital in Southern Siam’, p. 39.  
330 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 233. Appendix N.  
331 See Editor’s foreword in Jennifer Cushman, Family and State, pp. xii-xiii.    
 137
Were the Tan/Kannanuraks of Pattani merely “comprador-capitalists” or were 
they equally conscious of promoting social developments apart from amassing wealth? 
What were their relations with the Malay Raja? Was the latter’s position undermined and 
eclipsed because of the rising power of the Chinese? It could be argued that it was a 
complementary relationship as the Malay Raja too engaged the services of the Phra Cjin 
to provide workers for his mines and to collect taxes. It was a cordial working 
relationship. It is important to note that Malay animosity towards the Chinese in the 
south was far less intense compared to their ill feelings towards the central Siamese 
Buddhists. What was the Chinese modus operandi that ensured their survival in both the 
Thai and Malay systems?  
The method of kan kha kong phraratcha (royal trade), inherited from China, as 
practised by most of these Chinese business people, was one reason for their success and 
survival in the Siamese system of trade. This system encouraged the fostering of close 
relations and goodwill with the Siamese court. Every trader with intentions to trade was 
required to approach the respective provincial chief or governor for permission to trade. 
Gifts were presented as a token of their appreciation to the respective rulers and often a 
certain amount of the profits were presented to the chiefs. By giving gifts and a small 
share of their earnings, the traders hoped to acquire the support and goodwill of the 
chiefs so that trade could be conducted without hassle or interruption.332 This method, 
not unlike the traditional Malay practice of presenting the Raja with token gifts and 
salutations, points to the fact that both the Chinese and Malay communities had a similar 
trading culture. And this method was not very different from the patron and client 
relations seen all over traditional Siam that contributed to the rise of wealthy Chinese to 
positions of governorship, for example, in Songkhla and Ranong in the south.    
                                                 
332 Suleemarn Wongsuphap, Cjin Taksin, p. 191. 
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The Siamese government too placed greater trust on Chinese traders compared to its 
attitude towards other foreigners. The Chinese were partners from whom loyalty could 
be expected and with whom a share of the profits could be negotiated. In fact the Chinese 
were well regarded even when compared with other Thai ruling elites such as the 
northern Chao muang, whose loyalty could be undermined by foreigners who resorted to 
enticing the Chaos with money in return for teak concessions.333 Besides, the Chao 
muang, unlike the Chinese, lacked funds (which explains their rampant corrupt practices) 
or financial support through kinship network, which were crucial for the success of 
Chinese business ventures.     
The other foreigners, on the other hand, were power-expansionists and a potential 
threat whose strategies and political manoeuvrings Siam was unaccustomed to. Thus 
Siam’s attitude towards and relations with foreign (primarily British) tin mining 
companies was very different. Granting licences to British companies, for instance, was a 
matter of security concern to Siam.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Tin mining in the Pattani region was of economic importance to Siam. In 
particular, the revenue from tin mining helped Siam to sustain the cost of provincial 
administration. The trade links with other Peninsular Malay States and the Straits 
Settlements of Penang and Singapore, meanwhile, promoted economic growth of the 
Pattani region and by implication contributed to Siam’s internal fiscal growth and its 
financial ability to implement administrative reforms in the region. At the same time, 
increased control over the economy of Pattani enabled Siam to extend greater political 
hold over the region.  
                                                 
333 On corrupt practices of the northern Chao muang vis-à-vis teak concessions in the north see, Mala Rajo 
Sathian, ‘Northern Siam, 1867-1910’, Chapter 5.   
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Legislation introduced by Siam drastically reduced the authority of the Malay 
elites. The Siamese Commissioner replaced the office of the Raja-governors and 
nullified the authority of the elites to grant mining concessions. This removed the threat 
of large mining concessions falling into wrong hands i.e. non-bona fide companies and 
private concessionaires.   
Encouraging the participation of Chinese in the economy of Pattani, in return for 
their support and loyalty to the central government helped Siam to forestall the 
penetration of foreign companies into the economy of the region. Chinese of economic 
standing were the means to Siam’s policy of blunting Britain’s forward strategies in the 
peninsula of Siam. Still, the modest capital, technology and infrastructure of Chinese 
mining companies threatened their survival in the face of the superior technology of the 
British mining companies. The latter quickly made forays into Chinese-held business 





























The Chinese miners in Pattani were not the only ones who were actively involved 
in the development of tin mining in the area. There were also important mining ventures 
by British concerns in the region.334 By the 1920s, the role of the Chinese miners 
decreased while British companies began gradually to penetrate into the mining sector of 
Pattani. The competitive position of Chinese companies weakened with the entry of 
foreign capital and superior technology in the tin mining industry. Better infrastructure 
and marketing networks as well as the use of the dredge by British companies allowed 
them to overhaul Chinese enterprise.          
A comparison between the Chinese and British mining methods and operations is 
necessary to understand the decline of the former and the success of the latter in the 
Pattani area. Reference here will be made specifically to one of the more prominent 
British mining companies in the area, namely the Pattani Consolidated Alluvial Tin 
Limited (1926-1939) together with an examination of Siam’s policies on tin mining in 
Pattani as a result of the involvement of British companies. Other local and wider 
international developments that took place at that time, in particular, the tin restriction 
scheme, and the general environment of tin production in southern Siam will also be 
discussed. In addition, attention will be given to the problems encountered in the 
administration of mining in peninsular Siam. The Siamese government, in fact, was 
aware of the progress in the tin mining states of Malaya and perhaps hoped to expand its 
                                                 
334 The role of the Chinese and Europeans in the tin mining industry of south Siam is also discussed in 
Panee Ouansakul, ‘Tin Mining and Economic Change in Southern Thailand 1868-1931’, Masters thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University, 1978, Chapter 3.      
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own mining sector by emulating British methods. Mining legislation, to Siam, was one 
way of realizing the potential for growth and revenue from the mining sector.   
 
Legislation on mining activities: The Mining Act of 1901  
 
The Mining Act of 1901 introduced by Prince Damrong was the first systematic 
attempt at regulating and monitoring the granting of mining concessions. The act was 
targeted at both local people and foreigners alike who intended to participate in the tin 
mining industry of Siam. The act clearly stated that land and minerals in the country 
belonged to the King.335 Only those with permission from the government could use or 
occupy the land for cultivation, mining and housing purposes. Those intending to apply 
had to seek permission from the Department of Mines or local authorities to inspect the 
area before applying for a prospecting licence. Once an application was approved, a fee 
for the licence had to be paid and a licence valid for a year would be issued. Mining 
could only be carried out in the areas specified by the licence and only the licensee 
(under whose name the licence was issued) was allowed to prospect for minerals. After a 
prospecting licence had been obtained, licensees who planned to cut wood for mining 
works had to follow the regulations set forth in the Forestry Act. Wood was used to 
construct bridges, transportation tracks and, most importantly, the structure used to wash 
and separate the tin ore from soil, stones and other sediments.336  
 Wood had always been more valuable than land in traditional Siamese society. 
In the past, a person intending to build a house or start cultivation would have to clear 
the land and pay for the timber that he cut down for this purpose. When one paid for the 
timber, and occupied the spot one cleared, the occupant indirectly became the “tenant-
owner” of that land (without having to pay for it). The value of land soared when 
                                                 
335 NA, R. 5, KS. 16/7, Rang praratchabanyat kan tham muang rae R.S. 120 (Draft of the Royal Mining 
Act A.D. 1901), p. 3.   
336 Ibid., pp. 5-14.   
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minerals became a sought-after commodity and the subsequent scramble for mining 
concessions from the foreigners. By the time foreigners began to penetrate the tin mining 
sector of the south, the Siamese government had had a bitter dose of dealing with the 
Europeans demanding a stake in the teak industry of north Siam. The Chiang Mai 
Treaties of 1874 and 1883 were signed partly in response to such demands.337 Since 
European participation in the teak business preceded their participation in the tin mining 
sector, Siam had become alert and wary of the possibility of similar developments in the 
south. Two cases involving the Siamese government and the provincial elite of muang 
Songkhla and Betong respectively, which took place prior to the Mining Act of 1901 and 
two years after the implementation of the Act, will be discussed here to illustrate Siam’s 
policies in relation to ownership of mining land.     
 
Mining land disputes: Siam versus provincial elites (1890s-1900s) 
A dispute between Phraya Wichiankiri, the Governor of Songkhla and Prince 
Damrong over ancestral rights to mining land in the south had direct relevance to a law 
distinguishing private from public property existing in Siam since 1874. In 1895, 
Wichiankiri contested the award of mining concessions to Tan Ban Hock in the province 
of Yala, claiming that he was the rightful owner of that land, a fairly large area 
comprising seven tambon (villages). According to Wichiankiri, he had inherited the land 
from his forefathers, therefore he had inviolable rights to mining for tin on that property 
and refused to permit others with licences issued by the Ministry of Agriculture from 
                                                 
337 For details on the teak industry of north Siam and the Chiang Mai Treaties of 1874 and 1883 see, Mala 
Rajo Sathian, ‘Missionaries and Teak Traders in Northern Siam: 1867-1910’ MA thesis, University of 
Malaya, 1995, pp. 183-213. See also Ratanaporn Sethakul, ‘Political, Social and Economic Changes In 
The Northern States Of Thailand resulting from the Chiang Mai Treaties of 1874 and 1883’, Ph.D. thesis, 
Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois, 1989, pp. 181-229.           
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mining in what he claimed was “official property of Songkhla” (payn sombat phuwa 
ratchakan muang Songkhla).338  
Addressing the matter, Minister of Agriculture, Phraya Surasakmontri, writing in 
defence of Wichiankiri explained that the Public-Private Act (phraratchabanyat pablik 
praiwet) introduced in the year 1236 CS (1874 AD) was still applicable in the country 
when this case was brought to his attention in 1894/5, suggesting that the contested 
property could be private property after all. The Minister explained that, based on this 
act, the Governor of Songkhla’s ownership claim on the land could be valid.339 The 
choice of words used by the Minister, viz. public and private (in English) while the word 
preceding these two - the Thai word for legislation or act, viz. phraratchabanyat - 
indicated that the idea of public versus private property was borrowed most likely from 
the British and that this law (act) was not widely known in Siam.  
It does not appear that there is any other reference to this act applied elsewhere in 
the kingdom of Siam. It is possible that it was used exclusively in the south, and was 
used particularly in relation to the mining of tin in the kingdom.340 The dating of this 
document (i.e. 1895) provides a reminder of other related events in the kingdom relevant 
to tin mining. At about the same time, the British in neighbouring Malaya were already 
in the process of forming a collective administrative unit called the Federated Malay 
States (FMS) comprising mainly the tin rich Malay states of Perak, Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan and Pahang. A letter from the Siamese Consul in Penang to the Private 
Secretary of the King of Siam in Bangkok, dated 1896, clearly shows Siam’s attempts to 
                                                 
338 NA, R.5, Ks. 6.1/6, reang Praya Surasakmontri chijeng reang pratanbat tam kan rae muang Yala, Tepa, 
Raman”, 22 March 1895 AD (RS 113), p. 7.  
339 NA. R. 5, Ks. 6.1/6, p. 10. 
340 Dr. Tamara Loos of the Department of History Cornell University, a specialist on laws in Thailand, 
with whom I have corresponded over the subject of mining laws and in particular the Public-Private Act of 
1874 concurs that the law must have referred specifically to tin mining activity in the south. I have not 
been able to locate any work on the subject of laws on natural resources in Siam.             
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learn and emulate British mining methods and administrative systems in the state of 
Perak. The Siamese Consul wrote to inform the King’s secretary that the Resident of 
Perak was willing to host an official from Siam to study the mining sector of Perak.341 
By this time, the concepts of public and private properties were clearly delineated in the 
British territories in Malaya, and Siam, faced with increasing foreign demand for a stake 
in its mining lands, particularly in the last years of the 20th century, began to review the 
rights over mining lands, the awards of mining concessions and the administration of the 
mining sector by learning from the British. English terms such as public and private, 
with no corresponding Thai equivalents began to appear in official correspondence with 
regard to tin mining in the south.  Lessons learnt from this and similar cases served as a 
catalyst and a precedent to the introduction of the Mining Act in 1901, emphasizing and 
invoking the rule that all land in Siam belonged to the King.342  
 
Land Ownership (Mining)  
The concept of private or individual ownership of land in Siam was absent until 
the reign of Rama V. Beginning from 1901, a formal title to individual land could be 
obtained.343 The Mining Act of 1901 made no direct reference to land title deeds (chanod 
thidin). But a paragraph in this Act referred to the subject of unoccupied land. According 
to this Act, uncultivated or unoccupied land also belonged to the government and those 
who wanted to occupy such land must seek prior approval and wait for the official 
                                                 
341 NA, R.5, Ks. 6.1/3, Letter from His Siamese Majesty’s Consul in Penang to Prince Souwanot, Private 
Secretary to His Majesty the King of Siam in Bangkok, 28 Oct 1896.   
342 In Malaya, the Mining Code of 1895 which was enforced beginning from 1896 vested the government 
with the authority to “ensure the economic working and the proper and effectual control of all mining lands 
and minerals, together with the authority to direct the conduct of all persons occupying or mining the 
same”. See Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry, p. 55.     
343 Frederica M. Bunge (ed.), Thailand, a country study, Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, 
1981 (5th edition), p. 131.   
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announcement from the government.344 This rule was a departure from the previous 
“generous” rule that land in the Kingdom that was unoccupied could be used for 
cultivation, and if the tenant continued to cultivate the land for three consecutive years, 
then he or she was deemed to have established informal title rights over the land.345 The 
change was indicative of the new-found importance and value of land, thus the 
implementation of strict control over land ownership for fear that Siamese land might fall 
into the wrong hands.  
The unlimited power given to the Governors and the Malay Raja, throughout the 
early Bangkok period, to administer mining matters- licences, royalties, taxes - led to the 
misassumption that these men were in fact the owners of the mining lands.  Two years 
after the introduction of the Mining Act (i.e. 1904), a quarrel over rights to a mining area 
in muang Itam in the district of Betong, Yala, broke out between the widow of Phraya 
Ratsadin, the Governor of Betong, and the managers of the mining works there - a 
Chinese by the name of Ah Kui and a Malay called Tok Sa. After the death of the 
Governor, the two men claimed rights over the mining land hitherto under their care. Che 
Ning who survived her husband, the late Governor, claimed that the land indeed 
belonged to her husband who acquired the rights to the land from the owner- the Phraya 
of Raman. She in turn was the lawful owner of the disputed land, inheriting the property 
from her late husband.  
In a reply to Phraya Sukhumwinit, the Commissioner (khaluang thesaphiban) of 
monthon Nakhon Sithammarat, Damrong, representing both the Department of Mines 
and his Ministry of Interior, wrote succinctly dismissing all claims that the disputed 
mining land was ancestral property of the family of the Governor of Betong. Damrong 
                                                 
344 NA. R 5. KS. 16/7, Draft of the Mining Act 1901, p. 2.  
345 According to Ingram, the tenant had usufructuary rights. He could also sell or mortgage his land. At the 
same time, the King could claim his land for public purposes or if the land was uncultivated for three 
years. James Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, p. 12.   
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explained that Phraya Ratsadin had rights to the area while he was still in office as the 
Governor, and that this right ceased upon his death and was not transferable to his wife 
or next of kin. Damrong advised Che Ning to allow those who were able to obtain 
mining licences following the procedures stipulated in the Mining Act of 1901/2 to carry 
out mining works there.  
At the suggestion of the Commissioner of Nakhon Sithammarat, Damrong agreed 
to provide Che Ning with an annual 4000 Baht pension (biabamnan) to help her support 
herself.346 Like the case involving the Governor of Songkhla (1895), this case in 1904 
throws light on Siamese policies in relation to ownership of mining land in the last years 
of the 20th century. The decisions made at the end of the dispute were meant to serve as a 
reminder of the absolute rights of the King to mining land and minerals in the kingdom 
of Siam. No persons, common folk or those in power, could claim ownership rights to 
land. Siam for the first time used legislation, in the form of the Mining Act, to make 
clear this point. As mentioned previously, these developments were related to the 
increasing European interest in the tin mining industry of South Siam and the shift 
eastwards from Phuket to the Siamese hinterland surrounding the eastern seaboard of the 
Isthmus.  
 
The Shift from West to East Coast (1900-1919) 
Table 5.1 below indicates the number of licences issued to Chinese and 
foreigners in Phuket, Nakhon Sithammarat, and Pattani (incorporating Yala) at around 
the turn of the 20th century (1899), followed by the “restriction” period of 1909, the 
period after the price boom of 1918, and finally the year after the end of WW 1 (1919).    
                                                 
346 NA, R. 5, Ks. 6.5/14, Damrong, Minister of Interior to Praya Sukhumnaiwinit, Khaluang thesaphiban 
monthon Nakhon Sithammarat, “ko anuyard tam bo rae monthon Pattani” (requesting permission for 
mining  in monthon Pattani), 11 June RS. 122 (1904).  
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The total number of licences issued in 1909, after the prohibition order came into 
effect in August of that year, declined. Pattani was most affected by the 1909 order. The 
number of new licences issued was reduced from a total of 44 (1899) to 8 (1909). In 
1918, however, the total number of mining licences issued to both Siamese and foreign 
applicants to operate tin mines was higher in Pattani (147) than in Phuket (73) and 
Nakhon Sithammarat (89). 
 
Table 5.1:  Number Of New Licences Issued to Chinese (Siamese subjects) and  





PHUKET  N. SITHAMMARAT PATTANI 
 S F Total S F Total S F Total 
1899 458 87 545 15 6 21 21 23 44 
1909 246 63 309 10 5 15 4 4 8 
1918 63 10 73 82 7 89 123 24 147 
1919 55 8 63 42 17 59 41 17 58 
Note: S – Siamese (including Chinese), F – Foreigners  
 
The increase in licences issued in the second decade of the 20th century was likely 
owing to the improvements in transport infrastructure. On the east coast, some of the 
British mining companies undertook to develop road networks and as such contributed 
significantly to output growth. Sompop Manarungsan, observed that, “the expansion of 
transport networks led to a shift in regional distribution of tin production from the west 
to the east coast”. In the period before 1910, west coast states, particularly Phuket, 
contributed 86% of total tin output from Siam, while the remaining 14 % came from the 
east coast states. By 1930, total output from Phuket was about 68.6 %, while the output 
                                                 
347 NA, R.5, KS. 16/786, Attachment to “Memorandum On Mining”, Krom Luang Damrong to Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat, Minister of the Dept. of Mines, 27 Aug 1900. (for 1899 and 1909). 
NA, R.5, KS. 16/722, Annual Report of the Department Of Mines for B.E 2461 (AD. 1918), Director of 
Dept Of Mines to Phraya Manopakonnittida, Minister of Agriculture, 17 Sept 1919.   
NA, R.5, KS 16/779, Annual Report of the Department Of Mines for B.E. 2462 (AD. 1919), Director of 
Department Of Mines to Phraya Chaiyodhsombat, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 24 Jan, 1920.  
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percentage from the east coast increased to 31.4%. The principal centres of tin 
production on the east coast of the peninsula were Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani.348 
The extension of road networks also resulted in better communication between the east 
and west coast states and had a positive impact on the tin trade and the general commerce 
of the southern region.     
 
The Nature of Traditional (Chinese) and European Mining Activities (1900-1920s) 
It is said that the Chinese, as in the case of the FMS, were more successful in tin 
mining in the peninsula of Siam compared to the Europeans in the initial phase, i.e. 
during the late 1890s and early 1900s. Damrong’s report on tin mining dated 1909, 
providing details of Chinese and European enterprise offers some explanations.  
Following inspection tours taken to determine the location and availability of tin 
deposits, prospective Chinese miners started mining on a small scale, preferring to work 
in a small group (kongsi) on a particular area until the surface tin-deposits had been 
collected. If the mining area was rich in tin deposits, extra workers were hired and the 
use of mining equipment was increased for optimum profit. Thus the scale of the mining 
operations increased gradually (from surface mining to boring, etc) upon discovery of 
large and scattered areas of tin deposits, and the possibility of greater profits. The profits 
made from the initial phase of small-scale mining encouraged Chinese miners to expand 
their operations. In fact, the profits were re-invested in the subsequent phase of mining. 
More often than not, these miners were local Chinese, who, having lived in that area or 
districts nearby, had a sound knowledge of the geography and people of the place where 
they intended to work. 
                                                 
348 Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development Of Thailand, 1850-1950, p. 153.    
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Europeans, on the other hand, preferred to start operations on a big scale. Upon 
successful inspection tours, permission was sought for a mining monopoly in that 
particular tambon (a circle of villages: a few tambons formed an amphoe/district). Once 
the first sample of the tin was obtained, miners would invite their friends to invest in the 
venture by forming a company with numerous shareholders. After a mining concession 
had been secured, the fixed assets of the company were declared, followed by the 
appointment of a Chairman and members of the Board. Therefore, Europeans began 
mining activity with large capital, and thus were subject to big risks as well. Should the 
venture prove unprofitable, the company was liable to become bankrupt.                                                   
Referring to European-operated tin mines in muang Itam in Betong (owned by a 
certain Kemp) and those in the Phuket Bay on the west coast (owned by Capt. Miles) as 
the only two profitable mines belonging to Europeans, Damrong concluded that the 
Chinese were far more successful in the tin mining industry of the peninsula of Siam.349  
The Chinese method of operating tin mining appeared more appropriate to him, although 
this was not to remain so for long. The introduction of the dredging method in 1907 
reversed the situation. Chinese control gave way to a European stronghold on tin mining 
in the peninsula in the subsequent decades following the introduction of the dredge.  
 
European Mining Success and Decline of Chinese Enterprise (1920s)  
A related industry, associated with the mining sector, provided non-Chinese 
mining concerns the opportunity to make up for their dismal profits from operating tin 
mines or the lack of skills to operate mining activities profitably. As mentioned 
previously, the Straits Trading Company (1887), owned by Straits businessmen, took the 
lead by building smelters in Singapore and Penang. Then, the Straits Steamship 
                                                 
349 NA, R. 5, KS 16/786, “Memorandum on Mining”, Krom Luang Damrong Rajanuphab to Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat, 27 Aug 1909.  
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Company (1890) provided shipping services and transported almost all the tin ore from 
the peninsula to the smelters owned by the Straits Company. The effort was matched by 
Chinese attempts to provide smelting and shipping services. The Chinese-owned Eastern 
Smelting Company and its associate, the Eastern Shipping Company (1907), provided 
shipping, smelting and trade facilities.350 The company, however, was sold to a British 
concern in 1911, thus strengthening the western role in the smelting and shipping 
sectors.351     
Apart from western control over the smelting industry, there was an equally 
strong participation of western firms in tin production, especially after 1918.  
Meanwhile, the bucket dredge method of recovering tin introduced by Tongkah Harbour 
Tin Dredging Company proved to be most effective. It was high yielding and less labour 
intensive compared to all other methods. Deep and difficult areas below the earth’s 
surface could be reached by this method and it allowed for economies of scale 
production. The bucket-dredge, because of its expensive installation, was not popular 
with the Chinese. Most Chinese companies using old methods could not match the 
technically more superior bucket-dredge. Soon the Chinese monopoly of the tin economy 
was broken and European companies began to dominate the mining sector.  Only large 
companies namely the Khaw family mining concern continued to stay afloat in the 
business.  
This illustrious capitalist-bureaucrat family with businesses throughout the west 
coast, provided patronage to western enterprises, especially Australian concerns. Capt. 
Miles’ long and cordial association with the Khaws through his Tongkah Harbour 
Dredging Company was a pertinent factor for this support. Nonetheless, despite the 
family’s long history in the mining business, “their total role in Siam’s tin industry 
                                                 
350 Jennifer Cushman, Family and State, pp. 67-69.  
351 Ibid., pp. 96-97.  
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became proportionately smaller as more British firms began competing in the dredging 
of tin”.352        
There were an increasing number of British and Australian companies applying 
for mining concessions in the post-WW 1 period, especially after the tin price hikes in 
1918 and 1927. Between 1923 and 1927, there were more Australian than British 
companies on the west-coast tin-producing areas. The total tin output from the British 
companies, however, was between 22-28 % while the Australian companies produced 
20-22%. By 1930, tin output from the Australian companies increased to 58%.353  
Australian mining investments on the west coast were not, however, matched by similar 
investments on the east coast, in particular, in the southern-most provinces bordering 
British Malaya. In 1928, there were seven Australian companies operating on the east 
coast. Of these none were located in the Pattani administrative circle.354 From the late 
1920s to 1930s, more British companies invested in the mining business on the eastern 
side of the peninsula. This was partly because the east coast states were connected to 
Britain’s tin producing areas in Malaya. Moreover, there were road networks connecting 
the east with the British port of Penang. 
 
Significant British Investments: Lampaya and Pinyok Mines in Yala (1920s-1930s) 
British Consular reports in the 1930s refer to a British owned company – Pattani 
Tin Ltd. Co., operating a tin mine at Lampaya, Yala. The mine, as stated in the report, 
                                                 
352 Ibid., p. 100.  
353 Ibid., p. 101. 
354 Francis David Birch, ‘Tropical Milestones: Australian Gold and Tin Mining Investments in Malaya and 
Thailand 1880-1930’, Masters thesis, University of Melbourne, 1976, p. 215. See map of Australian 
companies in Siam on the same page.      
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was located not far from the Na Pradu railway station, about 25 to 35 miles from 
Pattani.355  
The Pattani Tin Limited was no longer in existence in the 1930s. It ceased to 
exist when in 1926 it was bought out by the new Pattani Consolidated Alluvial Tin Ltd. 
In December of that year, the former company went into agreement with Pattani 
Consolidated,  
 
… whereby the assets were transferred to the new company in consideration for 
which the new company undertook to discharge the old company’s liabilities and 
shareholders in the old company were entitled to an allotment of 1 share of 5/- 
and 3 ½ per share paid up in the new company for each share held in the old 
company.356  
 
Pattani Tin Limited was registered and based in Penang (Straits Settlements). The 
major shareholder of the company was an F.C. Dubois while the remaining shareholders 
were members of the public from Penang, most of whose addresses were stated as Beach 
Street, Penang; the rest were from Singapore.357 Mr. Arthur H. Miles, mining engineer 
and son of Capt. Edward Miles of Tongkah Harbour, was also one of the Directors and 
shareholders of Pattani Tin. Unlike Pattani Tin, the registered office of the Pattani 
Consolidated was in Salisbury House, London. All the Directors of the company were 
British citizens with other related businesses in the tin industry in British colonies. Of 
these, Ernest Bramwell Ridsdell was Chairman of Malayan and General Tin Trust, 
Limited, William Henry Corbould, Director of Mount Isa Mines Limited and John 
Gordon Brown, Director of Rahman Hydraulic Tin, Ltd. The last-mentioned resided at 
Beach Street, Penang, and was generally known as an eastern merchant. In sum, most of 
the founding members of Pattani Consolidated were experienced and knowledgeable in 
                                                 
355 FO 371/19381, “Report on a Consular Tour in The Provinces (Changwats) of Pattani, Yala and 
Naradhivas, South Siam”, 1935, p. 3. See also FO 371/18211, “Report on a tour of Naradhivas and Pattani 
by Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Smith in August, 1934”, p. 1.    
356 PRO, BT. 31/32793, Company No: 218125: Pattani Consolidated Alluvial Tin, Limited. 
357 Ibid. 
 153
mining matters and, at the same time, had other business investments in tin mining 
elsewhere in the world.         
The properties of Pattani Consolidated Ltd., as stated in the company prospectus, 
comprised an area of about 1195 acres in Lampaya, in the amphoe (district) of Sateng, 
province of Yala. The area was connected with the railway station (some 9 miles distant) 
at Na Pradu on the southern Siam railway line. Na Pradu was an important station 
servicing tin producers. It was well connected to the mining areas as well as to Prai and 
Penang. There was a government road stretching for about 7½ miles and a cart road of a 
mile and a half, connecting the 9-mile distance between the Lampaya mines and the Na 
Pradu railway station. From Na Pradu, the distance to Penang was about 181 miles.358   
Of the 1195 acres acquired by the company, 338 acres were held under the usual 
mining leases granted by the Siamese government, the remaining 857 acres were held 
under exclusive mining rights, a privilege given to companies operating over a large 
mining area and upon request by the company.359    
Work on the 338 acres began with the land divided into two sections: one suitable 
for extraction of tin using the method of dredging, and the other for hydraulicing. Based 
on boring results, the dredging section contained an estimated amount of 58, 500 piculs 
of tin or 3482 tons of tin oxide. At the hydraulicing section, an estimated 22, 000 piculs 
of tin or 1310 tons of tin oxide were discovered. The remaining 857 acres were workable 
by hydraulicing alone. This area was expected to extend the operations of the company 
for as much as ten years. Work on the Lampaya mines was staggered. Work on the larger 
section was scheduled to start after boring on the first hydraulicing section of the land 
                                                 
358 Ibid. 
359 Exclusive mining licences were given to those companies already holding an ordinary licence but 
whose work/mining area is large. In a report dated July 1912, Damrong is quoted as having preferred to 
give exclusive rights to selected bona fide companies only. Companies that published annual reports 
declaring their investments and profits were, according to him, examples of bona fide companies. It can be 
inferred thus that Pattani Tin Co. was indeed seen as a bona fide mining concern in the area.  
See NA, R. 6. KS 16/785, W.A. Graham to Prince Rachburi, 20 July 1912.       
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had been exhausted and thus could provide the necessary dumping ground for the tailings 
from the latter section.    
 There was little update on the progress the company made apart from the details 
and very promising returns estimated in the first company prospectus (published to 
announce the formation of the company). Nonetheless, a Consular report dated 1935 
indicates that the company, into its ninth year of existence, continued to work on two 
mines at the site using the method of dredging and hydraulicing.360 The method of 
extracting tin ore through the process of hydraulicing was comparatively economical. 
Water pressure instead of power generated by steam-mill was used. A dam at the foot of 
the hills above the mine provided sufficient water for mining work at the Lampaya 
mines.361  The company eventually wound up on the eve of the outbreak of WW II. It 
had gone into liquidation by 1939, and the winding up of Pattani Consolidated Alluvial 
Tin Limited was finalized on 12 July 1939.362
Another British-owned mine was located in the district of Bannang Sata in Yala. 
The mine, owned by Siamese Tin Mines Limited (1933-1957), was popularly called the 
Pinyok Mine. The operations of the Pinyok Mine were delegated to Yala Mines Limited, 
a subsidiary company of the Siamese Tin Mines. The major shareholders and owners of 
Yala Mines were the British American Tin Mines who operated until 1957 when the 
company was eventually liquidated.363
Tin from the Pinyok Mine was extracted by lode mining. The mine, according to 
Foreign Office records, was not in production until about 1935. Owing to the tin 
restriction scheme, the company until 1937 was producing on a temporary quota and was 
                                                 
360 FO 371/19381, “Report on a Consular Tour”, 1935, p. 4.  
361 Lampaya was in fact within the boundary of Yala but because it was more accessible from Pattani, there 
is a tendency to discuss the Lampaya mines under the subject heading of Pattani in the Consular reports.    
362 PRO, BT 31/32793/218125. 
363 PRO, BT 31/38482/274199, Siamese Tin Mines Ltd.  
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bargaining for a permanent quota of 2, 000 piculs (120,000kg) a month from the Siamese 
government. In 1937, an estimated quantity of 3.5 to 4 million tons of ground with a tin 
content of 3 to 4 percent was deemed possible for extraction. Initial reports of the 
company were indeed very promising. By the end of 1937, the company indicated to the 
Siamese government that it was willing to produce 8, 000 tons of the 18, 000 tons 
allowed to Siam under the Restriction Scheme. In other words, Siam Tin Mines alone 
had the capacity to produce almost half of Siam’s total tin quota.364 However, the 
difficulties of obtaining permanent quota and the outbreak of the War must have halted 
the operations at the Pinyok Mines because little is known of this mine in the 1940s or 
thereafter. 365  Table 5.2 provides names of British mining companies (with the exception 
of Yala Consolidated) operating in the Pattani region in the 1920s and 1930s.    
 
                                                 
364 FO 371 / 21050 / F 2238, “Report on a tour made to the Changwads of Pattani, Yala and Naradhivas” 
by Mr. Acting Consul Whittington, 8-21 Feb 1937, pp. 131-132.  
365 This mine may have been bought over by Tan Seng Hock (Nai Kawi Jitrakun) who owns Tamrong 
Wattana Limited in Pattani today. Interview with Acharn Pornpawee Sringam, Lecturer, Department of 
History, Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), Pattani, 13 September 2002.          
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Table 5. 2: British Companies in the Pattani circle 366







/Mining area  
 







Thomas John Salt 




PATTANI TIN LTD. 
 
 
Penang NA Arthur H. Miles (Dir) 
Gordon Marriot 





ALLUVIAL TIN LTD. 








John Gordon Brown 
(Dir. Of Rahman 
Hydraulic Tin Ltd) 
Graham Pratten  

































SIAMESE TIN MINES 
LTD.  
(Later known as 
Thailand Tin Mines Ltd. 





YALA MINES LTD.  






Mines Ltd.  
(Major shareholder) 
Tin mining 
 in Pinyok 
ANGLO-ORIENTAL 
MINES CORP LTD. 
(Its subsidiaries were: 
Talerng Tin Dredging 
and South Siam Tin 
Dredging Ltd.  
NA NA NA Tin Mining 
 in Ronphibon 
YALA 
CONSOLIDATED 
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366 PRO BT 31/32709/208547 (South Siam Tin Syndicate Ltd.) 
PRO BT 31/32793/218125 (Pattani Consolidated Alluvial Tin Ltd.) 
PRO BT 31/4026/25663 (Bentong “Straits Tin” Company Ltd.)  
PRO BT 31/38482/274199 (Siamese Tin Mines and Yala Mines Ltd.) 
PRO BT 31/35430/228073 (Anglo-Oriental Mines Corp Ltd.) 
FO 371/76048/17186, List of British business interests in Southeast Asia: Siam, Burma, Afghanistan (for 
Yala Consolidated Ltd.)  
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Economic Depression and the Tin Restriction Scheme (1930s) 
 
From the table above, it can be observed that most of the companies engaged in 
the tin mining industry, with the exception of Yala Mines Limited, did not remain in 
business for long. There were a few possible factors for the short life span of these 
companies. The biggest setback in the survival of a company occurred when the amount 
of mineral extracted from the mines was small compared to the extraction costs. 
Companies miscalculated the tin potential of a particular spot and at times the richer 
parts of the soil containing tin were located in less accessible corners of the mining area. 
Generally, tin deposits in Siam were more difficult to work compared to those in the 
Federated Malay States and thus the costs were higher. 367     
In some cases, the volume of tin production was big and profitable but other 
factors had adverse effects on the business. Some companies were in debt from the time 
of the founding of the company, and had to pay high interest rates to service the loan 
taken to start the company. A few of the companies formed in the 1930s were financed 
through debentures with obligations to meet payments on this debt.368 But returns from 
the companies’ investment, especially in the tin mining sector, took time. In the 
meantime, listed companies were required to pay dividends to shareholders. And some 
companies did this based on a projected profit, but unanticipated price slumps or related 
developments in the international tin market turned projected profits into huge losses.  
The high cost of administration incurred, such as payment of government taxes, 
licence fees, and the occasional restrictive government policies, such as the prohibition 
on new licences in 1909, affected profits. Royalties were increased when there was a 
price hike. For example, in 1934, the price hike in the tin market was followed by a 
                                                 
367 John Hillman, “The Freerider and the Cartel: Siam and the International Tin Restriction Agreements, 
1931-1941”, in Journal of Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24 (2), 1990, p. 301.   
368 Ibid., p. 305. See Footnote No.24.   
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corresponding increase in royalty payments to the Siamese government and, in the end, 
profits accrued as a result of the price hike proved to be marginal.369 Some companies 
tended to declare high dividends as a result of increased profits accruing from price hike.  
Following the 1934 price hike, a British tin company in Pattani was reported to have 
declared a dividend of 25% to its shareholders.370  
The cost of transporting tin was also high. Due to the lack of proper 
infrastructure, numerous modes of transportation were used – carriers, bullock carts, 
elephants, boats and trains. Additionally, these companies were expected to build and 
maintain some parts of the roads and railways.  Labour problems, for example, the 
inefficiency of workers and gang fights also posed hardship and a threat to foreign 
mining companies. In addition to these, the cost of buying foodstuff and transporting 
them to the mining areas was also borne by the company. Altogether, tin mining on a big 
scale was indeed a risky venture.  
 In November 1931, Siam joined the international tin restriction scheme as a 
member following the formation of an international tin cartel in 1930. The tin cartel 
comprised the four major tin producers of the world, viz. Bolivia, Malaya, Nigeria and 
the Dutch East Indies.  
The restrictions imposed by the cartel, while significantly reducing the exports of 
the four major tin producers, only marginally affected the production quota of medium 
sized producers such as Siam whose exports from 1st Sept 1931 was limited to 10, 000 
tons of metallic tin per annum, compared to its previous annual rate of 13, 200 tons, 
representing a reduction of 24%.371 This figure was a marginal restriction on Siam’s tin 
output and led subsequently to allegations of Siam being a freerider; that is Siam 
                                                 
369 Ibid., p. 302. See Footnote No. 14. 
370 FO 371/19380 (Siam) 1935, J. Cosby, British Legation Bangkok to Sir John Simon, FO, 28 March, 
1935, p. 41.  
371 FO 371/16260 (Siam), 1932. See also, John Hillman, “The Freerider and the Cartel”, p. 306.  
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benefited from the production control without contributing to its costs. Between 1930 
and 1942, Siam was engaged in a series of negotiations with the tin cartel. Siam was 
subjected to all the four agreements. The talks for the first were held between 1930-31, 
the second in 1933, the third between 1935 and 1936, and finally the fourth between 
1940 and 1942.  
At the core of the talks was the “moral issue” arising from cartel members’ 
resentment of Siam taking advantage of their sacrifices towards the success of the 
restriction policy. The Siamese government and the tin producers operating in Siam held 
different opinions on the matter. The government felt obligated (because of their cordial 
relations with cartel members such as Malaya and the British government) to review the 
role of Siam in the restriction policy while tin producers in Siam were happy to “benefit 
without cost” from that policy. Western corporations in Siam, especially those which had 
loan payments to fulfil, preferred that Siam should not participate in the restriction 
scheme at all. But the Siamese government realized that, while both the government and 
the private producers benefited from the material advantages of abstaining from a 
restriction scheme, the government alone bore the brunt of the moral stigma of a 
“parasite” associated with freeriders.372  
The first two agreements entailed a relatively lower level of restriction for Siam 
compared to other tin producing countries, enabling a continued expansion of tin 
production in Siam. But by the third agreement in 1935/6, overproduction forced the 
International Tin Committee (ITC) to impose bigger restrictions on Siamese tin 
production. Siam, recovering from a rice slump in 1934, chose, however, to compensate 
for the losses in the rice economy by requesting for redistribution of tin quotas. A long 
struggle ensued, and Siam using exaggerated production capacity figures was still 
                                                 
372 John Hillman, “The Freerider and the Cartel”, p. 305. 
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subjected to restriction of production but with a relatively lower level compared to other 
tin producing countries.       
The period when these talks were taking place also coincided with the formative 
period of some of the British companies engaged in tin mining in the Pattani region. The 
Siamese Tin Mines, and its subsidiary, the Yala Mines Limited, which operated tin 
mines in Pinyok, was one of these. To make matters worse, the depression that hit the tin 
market continued until 1933. Some of the Directors of the British tin mining companies 
in Pattani who operated from their parent companies in Penang or the Federated Malay 
States such as the Pattani Consolidated Alluvial must have been affected by the 
restrictions of production in their mines in Malaya, and their non-participation on the 
Siamese side was one way of recouping the losses incurred on the Malayan side. The 
Directors may have also been under pressure from the British in Malaya for a more 
active participation of Siam in the scheme. In sum, the 1930s was an uncertain period for 
tin mining companies. The survival of their mining ventures did not depend solely on tin 
outputs and profits but were subject to the overall developments in the international tin 
market.        
 
Problems with Mining Administration On the West and East Coasts  
Governors in the west coast states such as Phuket and Ranong owned tin mines, 
and were actively engaged in the trade and promotion of tin mining.  This power base 
gave the development of tin mining industry in the west an advantage that the east coast 
states lacked. Revenue generated from tin mining was partly used by the capitalists-
bureaucrats for the development of their provinces. In fact, some of these governors were 
conferred titles by the Siamese Kings for their contributions in developing the southern 
states. The Siamese had limited resources - financial and manpower - to embark on 
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development programmes. Even after the establishment of the Department of Mines, the 
main concern was to regulate the licence awarding procedures and to collect taxes for the 
central government. In fact, provincial governors in the west coast states found that they 
had little left for provincial development schemes, because a great portion of the revenue 
from taxes were sent to Bangkok. Reports by Bangkok administrators made after touring 
the southern states indicated that a large proportion of tin revenues from these states 
were, as instructed by the central government, sent to Bangkok, leaving very little fund 
for local (provincial) development.373      
In the Pattani administrative circle, provincial governors were appointed by the 
government to supervise the administration of the province. There was little initiative on 
the part of these officials personally to see to the growth of the tin mining industry there.    
On the contrary, reports suggest that the Siamese officers were indifferent to British 
mining interests. Some of the British mining companies operating in the Pattani circle 
claimed that they were subjected to official hostility.  For example, they were 
deliberately precluded from partaking in official investiture ceremonies or were not 
notified when a minister was touring the south. Their absence from such functions might 
have resulted in them losing certain concessions or subsequently they might have 
encountered difficulty when dealing with the state. They sought redress through the 
office of their representative, the British Consul. During a tour taken to Pattani in 1930, 
Consul Coultas raised the issue with the khaluang (provincial chief) and sought his 
assurance of equal and fair treatment.374    
                                                 
373 NA, R.5, M. 2.14/50, “Report on a journey through the Malay peninsula”, Phya Sri Sahadheb and Mr. 
Jens S. Westengard to King Rama V, December 1906, pp. 14-38, as reproduced in Chatthip Nartsupha and 
Suthy Prasartset, The Political economy of Siam, pp. 220-222.  
374 FO 371/14776, “Pattani Tour Report” by Acting British Consul W.W. Coultas, 26 May 1930.  
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      Moreover, cases of corrupt officers and business practices were rampant leading 
to bad faith and losses in government revenue. Officers found guilty of corruption upon 
investigation were removed from the civil service. Bad behaviour and administration by 
government officials in the provinces affected government income as well as its 
reputation among international and other ruling powers.  
 
Concluding remarks 
It has been shown that the presence of Chinese capitalists and workers was 
essential in ensuring the success of mining activity in southern Siam. European 
companies too, despite their more sophisticated technology, operated in mining areas 
where the Chinese were or had been working. Labour for European mining operation 
was almost entirely provided by Chinese workers.375     
In the case of tin mining in the east coast states of southern Siam, it was 
particularly successful in the border regions close to British Malaya. The presence of 
Chinese workers, those long resident or born in the area and those who moved from 
across the Malayan border, thus providing the labour needed in mining operations, was 
one factor. The other was the communication facility available on the British side of the 
border as opposed to the lack of such facilities in Siam.     
It must be acknowledged that Siam paled in comparison to the British in Malaya 
in terms of providing adequate transportation and communication facilities. While the 
British built cart tracks, road networks and railways to carry tin from the mines to the 
cities and provided harbour and port facilities for tin exports, the Siamese paid little 
attention to infrastructure development until at least the last decade of the nineteenth 
                                                 
375 Chris Dixon, The Thai Economy: Uneven development and internationalization, London: Routledge, 
1999, p. 52. See also Kenneth Perry Landon, The Chinese In Thailand, New York: Russell & Russell, 1973 
(reprint), p. 253.   
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century. Writing in the 1890s, King Chulalongkorn stated this very clearly. The lack of 
tracks and roads in Phuket, for instance, was a matter of great concern to the King.376  
Works to repair the acutely silted Phuket harbour was undertaken in 1906. Capt. Edward 
Miles of Tasmania was contracted to dredge an entrance to the harbour and build a dock 
at Phuket. But the harbour improvements proved to be financially burdensome to the 
state and the project was subsequently abandoned.     
Exorbitant tax and royalty rates further aggravated the matter. In fact, the Betong 
tin traders in Yala had to petition the Siamese government to lower tax and royalty rates 
for the tin ore exports from Betong.  
Better road communication with the Malay states partly explains the success of 
the Betong mines (see Map 5.1). Rubber plantations in the Betong area too were very 
successful.  The study of tin and rubber in Betong and Raman in Yala must be looked at 
as annexes to the tin and rubber trade of Malaya. The close geographical proximity and 
the road and railway communication between these places closely linked the rubber and 
tin industry of both the places, to the point that Betong producers became dependent on 
British facilities. A report by a British official, after a visit to Betong in 1937, highlights 
this condition:  
The whole of this district [Betong] turns to Malaya rather than Siam, for, apart from 
industrial and commercial considerations, it is joined to the outside world only by the road 
which leads to Perak and thence to Kedah and Penang.377
 
Throughout the early 1900s, Betong depended on Penang for the processing of its 
tin ore. Planting materials and provisions for workers were also transported from Penang 
via the northern Malay states of Perak and Kedah. And more importantly, the ports in 
British Malaya were the principal outlets for exports of tin and rubber from Betong. 
                                                 
376 NA, R. 5, KS 6.5/8, Phraya Surasakmontri to Prince Sommot, 19 October 1896. Also see Ian Brown, 
The Elite and the Economy, p. 95.     
377 FO 371/ 21050/ F 1491 “Report on a visit made by Mr. Acting Consul Whitthington to Betong in 
January 1937”, 25 Jan 1937, p. 115.   
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Trade statistics of exports from this area, up to at least the 1920s, were not included in 
the Bangkok commercial or customs registers.378 It was not uncommon to see exports 
from Betong or other provinces in the peninsula region listed under the export figures for 
monthon Phuket or included under exports from Penang. 379     
While this overseas tin trade caught on with traders of the region, there was 
another type of trade, one that was conducted mainly overland for decades involving 
mostly Malay and Indian Muslim traders from among the local people and those in the 
region. The cattle trade of Pattani, a darat (inland) economic activity, if not one that was 
established earlier than the tin trade, came along with it, and that further cemented the 
trade link involving Pattani, Songkhla, Penang on the one hand and Pattani, Singapore on 
the other.         
















                                                 
378 James C. Ingram, Economic Change In Thailand, 1850-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1971 
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Map 5. 1: Road And Railway Communication Between The Pattani Region And The 
Northern Malay States, c.1930  
 
 













CATTLE FARMING AND TRADE: 





While tin was the mainstay of the economy of segments of the hilir population of 
Pattani, cattle breeding and the trade in cattle, largely conducted overland, formed the 
principal occupation of the Pattani population in the hinterland (darat). Unlike tin 
mining, cattle farming was almost exclusively a Malay activity. The terrain and the 
culture of the Malays of the Pattani region proved suitable for cattle breeding activity. 
The close proximity of regional markets for cattle supplies from this area also promoted 
the trade in cattle. The main markets for Pattani cattle were Penang, Singapore, and the 
Federated Malay States (FMS). The agricultural and commercial growth in Singapore 
and the FMS created a huge demand for cattle as work animal (plough cattle), mode of 
transport (bullock-carts) and for consumption (dairy products and beef). Increasing 
external demand proved an incentive for increasing supply; Pattani soon became a major 
cattle supplier to these places.    
Bangkok too had a keen interest in the cattle economy. The survival of its rice 
farming sector depended on the availability of cattle as plough-animals. In times of 
shortage due to cattle epidemic in the central region, cattle from the Pattani region were 
probably used. Apart from ensuring sufficient supply of plough-cattle for work on the 
rice fields, Bangkok was also able to earn income through taxes on cattle (or livestock) 
as well as taxes on cattle exports.  Bangkok’s interests in the cattle sector were therefore 
two-fold: (i) contingency (ii) revenue.  In order to achieve both, Bangkok through its 
Department of Agriculture intervened in the management of cattle exports; imposing a 
minimum quarantine period as well as hygienic abattoirs for cattle slaughter. The 
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introduction of better infrastructure, education in cattle breeding techniques as well as 
the appointment of veterinarians brought positive advantages to the cattle farmers of the 
Pattani region.  
As mentioned earlier, unlike the trade in tin, which was traditionally a royal or 
elite monopoly, the trade in cattle involved the lower classes of the Pattani society. State 
intervention in this sector brought significant improvement to the livelihood as well as 
the general living standards of the farmer class in Pattani.       
 
Cattle as a Commodity: Demand and Supply 
The increase in the demand for cattle from Pattani in the early 1900s encouraged 
the darat people of Pattani to be involved in the commercial breeding of cattle. Two 
main factors led to the increase in the demand for cattle from Pattani. Firstly, there was a 
decline in the supply of cattle from the traditional sources, i.e. the central and northern 
parts of Siam, owing to cattle diseases.380 Secondly, the demand for cattle in the FMS 
and the Straits Settlements increased as a result of the intense agricultural development 
in these places between the 1890s and the 1910s.  The use of bullock carts for 
transporting agricultural produce, for instance, created a demand for oxen. Bullock or ox 
carts were ideal for short distance transportation of goods; carrying freight from 
production centres to towns and wharves.381 This factor, in addition to a rapidly 
increasing population in the Straits Settlements and the FMS, contributed to the larger 
demand for cattle for consumption and dairy produce.  The general development of 
commerce and agriculture worked in tandem to promote cattle as an important 
commodity in the early years of the 1900. The construction of the southern Thai railways 
                                                 
380 There was a steady growth in the export of cattle from Siam to Singapore between 1881 and 1896. The 
outbreak of cattle epidemic caused by rinderpest in 1896 ravaged most of central Siam’s cattle stock, 
reducing drastically cattle exports from central Siam thereafter. See H. Warrington Smyth, Five Years in 
Siam, From 1891-1896, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994 (reprint), Vol. 2, p. 285 (Appendix VI).          
381 Amarjit Kaur, Bridge and Barrier, p. 11  
 168
at about the same time provided yet another means of transporting cattle from south 
Siam to the Straits Settlements and the FMS.  
Specific trading communities and networks emerged in response to the growth in 
the cattle trade. Among the trading groups, the Indian Muslims (Kling) played a 
significant role as intermediaries in the cattle trade. The Malay cattle breeders and traders 
too showed increasing enterprise in response to these opportunities. The old portage 
route otherwise known as the penarekan route was the popular passage used for driving 
cattle from Pattani through the Malay states of Perak and Kedah enroute to Penang. 
Three other overland routes also connected the east coast states with ports on the west 
coast. Penang was the main port of trans-shipment on the western seaboard. On the 
eastern side of the peninsula, cattle were also transported direct on board ocean liners 
and steamers from Pattani to the port of Singapore.        
The emergence of new groups of traders and modes of trading, along with new 
markets in the last few decades of the nineteenth century, eroded the previous 
(traditional) trade monopoly held by the royal elites.  The saudagar raja or the royal 
representative who was appointed to trade on behalf of the Malay Raja held a trade 
monopoly on almost all items of trade particularly forest products.  The Bowring Treaty 
of 1855 however put an end to trade monopolies and prompted a more “open” economy, 
paving the way for the emergence of new independent/private groups of traders in place 
of the former saudagar raja.   
The extra-territoriality clause of the Bowring Treaty encouraged British subjects 
in Penang, particularly the Indian traders, to enter Siamese territories for trading 
purposes and avail themselves of the abundant trade opportunities there. The trade in 
cattle was one sector that attracted Chulia as well as Pathan traders. To facilitate trade 
conducted by British subjects, British Consuls or representatives stationed in the British 
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Consulates in the south, e.g. Songkhla, provided “immigration” services such as the 
issuing of registration certificates which endorsed the Indian traders’ status as British 
subjects and as persons legally registered with the respective Consulates or Consular 
offices in the south of Siam. Passports were also issued to facilitate travel to and fro 
between Siamese and British territories; for instance, for those regularly travelling 
between Betong (Siam) and Kroh (Perak).382 Complaints of cattle theft incurred by these 
traders (who enjoyed British protection status  because of  the certificates they held ) en 
route to cattle ports as well as other grouses of Siamese administrative irregularities were 
brought to the attention of the British Consuls or representatives  for redress  while they 
were on their official (routine) tours of the southern provinces.383
 European and Chinese traders in the SS and FMS too took advantage of the 
privilege of “extra-territoriality” conferred upon British subjects. Shipping services 
provided by Chinese and European firms (such as the Danish East Asiatic Company) 
transported goods such as cattle from ports in south Siam to Penang and Singapore.       
The period after the Bowring Treaty marked an obvious transition from the royal element 
in the trade of the 17th and 18th centuries - when trade was largely a royal privilege and 
the King had appointed agents viz. saudagar rajas to trade on his behalf - to the 
dominant role of European, Chinese and Chulia traders who, in the 19th century, replaced 
the saudagar raja and the royal trade monopolies.  
The growth of the cattle trade in the late 1890s and early 1900s also created 
opportunities for local enterprise. It is likely that the Malay traders who engaged in the 
                                                 
382 HCO 3105/18, Visit Made By His Majesty’s Consul at Senngora to the Betawng / Betarong [sic] 
Division of the Jala [Yala] District of Patani, p.1.    
383 Some Consuls considered the registration of Indians under British protection in south Siam an 
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informed of the Consul’s visit in specific locations. Yet it was almost a routine for British Consuls to 
report on Indians under British protection  (in other words, British Indian subjects) and their activities. See 
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breeding of and trade in cattle, also traded in other goods carried on the backs of the 
animals that were transported to cattle markets. Or conversely, in return for the sale of 
their herd of cattle, the farmers may have transacted not in cash but in goods that could 
be resold in their villages. These imported goods were likely foodstuff, clothing or 
essentials that were scarce or not available in the Pattani region.       
Meanwhile, Siamese policies from about the 1890s to 1930s brought changes to 
the cattle sector as well. Government initiatives such as the imposition of taxes and 
regulations relating to the export of cattle, disease preventive measures, quarantine 
requirements, and animal slaughter procedures illustrate both Siam’s interest in the cattle 
economy as well as the potential revenue from this sector for the state.  
 
Cattle as a Major Export of South Siam  
Cattle exports accounted for a large portion of the revenue earned by the southern 
states of Siam.384 The provinces of Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani were the principal 
areas for cattle rearing. Cattle were transported overland from these provinces to the west 
coast state of Trang or into the northern Malay state of Kedah and thence to Penang by 
sea. The supply of cattle for the Penang market came primarily from Songkhla and 
Nakhon Sithammarat via Trang.385 After the completion of the railway line connecting 
Nakhon Sithammarat, Songkhla and Trang by late 1914, buffaloes and oxen were 
regularly transported by trains to Trang and thence shipped to Penang. This mostly 
overland and partly sea route was the more popular passage for the transport of cattle to 
Penang; although, occasionally, some cattle were brought overland from Kedah to 
Province Wellesley and thence to Perak.386      
                                                 
384 See Table of Exports from Pattani in Chapter 3. 
385 NA, R. 6, KS 13/1371, Report On Southern Tour, G. Harvey, Govt. Vet. Surgeon to Phra Kasetra 
Raksha, Director of Agriculture, Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 24 July 1917.  
386 DCR, Siam (Saiburi and Puket), Report for the year 1906, pp. 4-5.   
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 Apart from the overland transportation of cattle westwards to Penang, cattle from 
monthon Pattani were exported directly to Singapore. In the early 1900s, Singapore 
obtained a large part of its beef supply from this province, which stimulated the 
commercial breeding of cattle for the Singapore market.387  In 1915, a total of 9, 465 
oxen and 1, 321 buffaloes, worth 358, 906 Baht and 62, 450 Baht respectively, were 
exported from monthon Pattani to Singapore. In addition, cow and buffalo hide weighing 
721.88 hab (about 43, 000 kg) amounting to 31, 371 Baht in value, were sold to 
Singapore.388        
 The export of cattle from the east coast states to Singapore became popular 
following the decline of the formerly lucrative cattle trade between Bangkok and 
Singapore prior to the early part of 1900. The east coast states became the alternative 
source of cattle supply to Indian cattle dealers because, firstly, stringent measures were 
adopted by Siam to control export following cattle diseases in the Archipelago in the 
1880s. Secondly, increased public outcry over the mistreatment of animals on board and 
in transit as well as frequent complaints of cattle theft (stolen cattle being one of the 
sources of supply for the cattle dealers) forced the Siamese government to introduce 
quarantine regulations and animal inspection checks at the ports of exit. The cattle 
dealers thus directed their attention to other places, in particular the eastern states of the 
Malay Peninsula, where they had free access to supply.      
The detention of animals at quarantine centres and ports meant extra expenses to 
the cattle dealers. The animals had to be fed while under quarantine. Besides, increased 
police checks to curtail cattle theft affected the main source of the cattle dealers’ supply, 
                                                 
387 DCR, Siam (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), Report for the year 1908, p. 10.   
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forcing the dealers to look for other less closely monitored ports.389 The southern east 
coast states, situated far from the capital area and, blessed with virtually untapped 
supplies of cattle, attracted the cattle dealers’ attention.      
The introduction of steamers replacing the old sailing vessels, by the last quarter 
of the 19th century, benefited the coastal trade involving Bangkok, Pattani and Singapore. 
Partly Siamese-owned steamers, belonging to the Siamese Steam Navigation Company 
and managed by Danish officers, began regularly to ply the Bangkok – Singapore route, 
stopping over at important ports on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.390 This 
company, which was established in 1905, carried rice as its chief cargo. The Straits 
Steamship Company, a Singapore-based shipping company, also provided regular 
service to the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.391 To the usual cargo, consisting of 
pepper, betel nut, copra and dried fish exported to Singapore in the late 1890s and early 
1900s, rice, paddy, livestock, tin and timber were added after 1907.392       
 
The Cattle Marketing System  
The development in infrastructure and communication promoted the growth of 
new markets especially those located strategically along transportation network. Towns 
located at railway halts, for example, soon became important market centres. Some of 
these towns or central places also functioned as administrative headquarters. Others were 
major market centres that subsequently assumed “artificial” administrative-centre 
status.393 Between two to three types of central places serviced the needs of the people 
                                                 
389 W.A. Graham, Siam, London: Alexander Moring Limited, The De la More Press, 1924, Vol. 2, pp. 110-
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390 K.G. Tregonning, Home Port Singapore, A History Of Straits Steamship Company Limited, 1890-1965, 
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393 For a study of markets and central places in rural economies see, G. William Skinner, “Marketing and 
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and the darat economy of the Pattani region. The marketing system of cattle in monthon 
Pattani will be further elaborated here to provide some insight into the types of markets, 
which operated in monthon Pattani.394    
The general pattern of marketing cattle involved driving the animals overland 
from the inland area to nearby river ports or intermediate markets en route to bigger main 
ports. A hierarchy of markets - intermediate, central and regional - operated to facilitate 
the cattle trade of monthon Pattani. Central market towns were normally located at 
strategic sites in the transportation network and had important wholesaling functions. 
The towns had facilities to receive imported items and distribute them within its 
dependent area and to collect local produce as well as to export them to other central 
markets or urban centres. Intermediate towns had an intermediary position in the 
incoming and outgoing flow of goods and services.395 Regional centres for trade such as 
Penang and Singapore, on the other hand, operated as regional markets for goods 
produced throughout the region, but in this case, primarily the Malay Peninsula.       
The Tanjung Mas River port and the border district of Takbai in the province of 
Narathiwat as well as the river ports of Pattani and Telubin in the province of Pattani 
operated as central port-markets for the export of cattle. Penang and Singapore operated 
as the regional markets for Siamese cattle. Smaller towns such as Rangae appear to have 
functioned as intermediate market towns.   
Three groups of people were involved in the system of marketing cattle.         
These were the sellers or the cattle farmers followed by the intermediaries and finally the 
buyers or importers. The first category comprised mostly Malay cattle farmers while the 
second group, the intermediaries, were mostly Indians. The buyers or importers were 
                                                 
394 The ideas of central place markets discussed by other scholars have been applied to the information on 
markets in Pattani that was obtained from archival sources.  
395 Definition of central and intermediate markets derived from Skinner’s article. See G. William Skinner, 
“Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China”, p. 7.  
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traders of various ethnic groups from as far away as the Peninsular Malay states and 
Singapore. The overland routes were the main means of transporting cattle from the 
inland areas and some of the market towns along the routes acted as intermediate or 
central markets while those located at the terminus of the route were regional markets.  
 
Overland Cattle Trade Route to Penang    
Local overland trade across the Siamese Malay states was in the hands of 
Siamese and Malay traders. There were four main routes (see Map 6.1). Beginning with 
the most southerly was the route connecting Kedah with Pattani, followed by another 
from Kedah to Songkhla.396 The third route, further north, connected Trang with Nakhon 
Sithammarat through a place marked as Kontani or Kwantani by Warington Smyth in his 
1893 map. Kwantani was the former site of muang Trang along the Trang River before it 
was moved to Kantang at the mouth of the same river. The fourth route crossed Paklao, a 
village situated abreast from Ponga (Pungah or Phangnga as it is known today) in the 
north–eastern part of Phuket cutting across the river Bandon to Chaiya.397 This last route 
became somewhat less popular with the increasing use of the ports on the west coast 
such as Phuket and Penang to export tin.            
Although the figures for cattle exported overland are not available, the scale of 
the cattle trade can be inferred from comments made in the Trade and Diplomatic 
reports, submitted by British Consuls in Siam. By 1906, large numbers of cattle were 
transported by land from the east coast of the peninsula to places such as Trang or Kedah 
“especially for export”398 Cattle brought into Trang must have come from Nakhon 
Sithammarat considering that the overland route from Trang was directly linked to 
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Nakhon Sithammarat. The cattle brought into Kedah, on the other hand, was likely from 
Pattani and Songkhla because both these places were connected directly overland with 
Kedah. In fact, Kedah was a transit point for the cattle and buffaloes coming from 
Songkhla and the east coast provinces before they were exported to Penang, which was 
the main market for the cattle supplied by Songkhla and other east coast provinces.399 
Trade reports also indicate that cattle from Trang were exported to Penang in ocean 
going vessels (steamers). In 1906, a total of 11, 336 heads of cattle worth $ 552,592 were 
exported from Trang to Penang.400    
Apart from cattle, traders travelling on the first route connecting Kedah with 
Pattani probably brought other merchandise such as tin, native rubber, gums and resin to 
be sold in either Kedah or Penang. Local Malays involved in the inter-state trade refer to 
an overland route called “penarekan”. The name was derived from the word “tarek” 
which loosely translated means “to pull”. The route was so called because it used to be a 
track cleared by elephants dragging logs and timber from the hilltops. Later the track 
became passable for carts, carriages and people. Some of the local people used the name 
“jalan gajah” or elephant route to refer to the penarekan track.401 The route was known 
as jalan gajah because in the past when Kedah was a Siamese tributary, elephants were 
used to carry the tribute from the Sultan of Kedah to the Siamese King via this route. 
One place name along this route - Changlon (presently in the northernmost part of 
Kedah) - derived its name from the Thai word for elephant “chang” and “long” which 
means “to fall”. Apparently, at this spot an elephant carrying the tribute to the Siamese 
King fell into the river, thus the word “chang long” referring to the elephant’s fall.402
                                                 
399 DCR, Siam (Saiburi and Phuket), 1908, p. 5.  
400 DCR, Siam (Saiburi and Puket), 1906, p. 5.  
401 Interview with Mr. Abdullah Abru. Lecturer, PSU (Pattani), 19 June 2000.     
402 Ryoko Nishii, “The Emergence And Transformation Of Peripheral Ethnicity – Sam Sam On The Thai-
Malaysian Border”, p. 20. See Footnote 12.   
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It is very likely that this same route used to transport cattle and other merchandise 
to Kedah was also the portage route referred to by early travellers and writers for the 
passage of both merchandise and people. Writing in the early 1920s, A.W. Hamilton 
referred to a direct route between Pattani and Kedah through a defile known as Genting 
Pahat403 (which was popular prior to the completion of the southern railways) for the 
passage of labourers from Pattani to Kedah to work in the rice fields there during the 
harvest season as well as for the driving of cattle to the markets and transit points in 
Kedah en route to Penang.404 An exploratory expedition embarked to discover the 
possibility of a route from Selama in Perak to Pong in Pattani in 1883, under the auspices 
of the British Resident of Perak, Sir Hugh Low, revealed the existence of the old Pattani- 
Kedah overland route. This route, referred to by the writer as the main “buffalo track”, 
joined the Perak territory above the river Rui (Sungai Rui) and its tributaries in upper 
Perak.405 Thus the main overland track connected Perak, Kedah and Pattani and this 
route was in use for the passage of cattle and human beings alike for the most part of the 
nineteenth century.    
                                                 
403 Genting Pahat was the boundary between Kedah and Siamese territories to the east. A boundary stone - 
No. 34- demarcated the division.       
404 A.W. Hamilton, “The old Kedah-Patani Trade-route”, JSBRAS, No.86, 1922, p. 389.   
405 Arthur T. Dew, “Exploring Expedition from Selama, Perak, over the mountains to Pong, Patani, in 





Map 6.1: Overland Trade Routes between the east and west coasts of southern 
Siam and northern Malaya, c. 1885. 
 
Source: Warington Smyth, “Notes On a Journey To Some of the South-Western 
Provinces of Siam, The Geographical Journal, No. 5, Vol. 6, Nov 1895.  
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Kling Traders in the Kedah- Penang Cattle Trade  
The presence of a substantial number of south Indian Muslim (or Kling) traders 
in Kedah enhanced the role of the state as a transit point for cattle en route to Penang. 
Working with cattle was an integral part of South Indian economic culture. Their work 
experience as well as their cultural practices inclined them towards cattle farming and 
trade. Travel reports and travelogues allude to the role of Indian Muslims as the primary 
dealers in the cattle trade.   
   The origins of the south Indian population in Kedah can be traced back to the 3rd 
century A.D. when Kedah, situated strategically between the India- China trade route, 
became an important port of call. Between the 4th and 11th centuries, it was the centre of 
the west-coast trade with South India, Borneo and Sumatra. In fact, Kedah was the centre 
of the first community of Indian Muslims in the peninsula.  
At the height of its power (11-12th century), the Chola Kings of the Coromandel 
Coast invaded Kedah (1023-1024 AD).406 The Cholas, however, did not destroy the 
place. Kedah continued as a major centre for the west coast trade and some of the 
descendents of the Chola Kingdom remained in the Malay Peninsula. These people were 
known as Chulia, a term used in reference to the natives of Coromandel, their geographic 
origin. It applied to both Hindus and Muslims alike.  
Kedah, however, declined after the rise of Melaka in 1400. By this time, the 
Indian Muslims had become a significant factor in the commerce of Kedah. Later their 
expertise in commerce was extended to Melaka and, several centuries later, Penang.  The 
south Indian Muslim traders in Penang, like their peers in Kedah and Melaka, were 
mostly natives of the Coromandel Coast. Their presence in Penang was largely as a result 
                                                 
406 George Coedes and Louis-Charles Damais, Sriwijaya: History, Religion and Language of an Early 
Malay Polity, Monograph of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society No.20, Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 
1992, p. 7.    
 179
of the long established south Indian commercial links with Kedah and Melaka. When 
Francis Light occupied Penang in 1786 for the purpose of establishing a port of call for 
vessels travelling between India and China, its administration was placed under the care 
of the English East India Company in Calcutta.  So Penang, once known as Fort 
Cornwallis, was essentially another outpost of the British Indian territories. This 
connection between Calcutta and Penang offered security to Indian traders and 
immigrants and encouraged the arrival of English and Indian country traders to 
Penang.407    
 A sizeable number of Indian immigrants also came as convicts sent from India to 
the Straits Settlement between 1796 and 1873.408 Penang, like Melaka and, later, 
Singapore became a regular penal colony for British India until 1867 when the 
administration of the Straits Settlements was transferred from India to London. While 
some of them returned to India, upon serving their prison term, others remained in 
Penang and Singapore. By about 1838, only about 60% of the convicts returned to India, 
while the remaining discharged prisoners sought residence and employment in the Straits 
Settlements. 409   
In Penang, the ex-convicts were employed as cowmen, cart-men, and 
shopkeepers.410 There were those who took up employment for wages as gardeners and 
planters while others became tailors, dairy and cattle farmers as well as wheelwrights, 
                                                 
407 Helen Fujimoto, The South Indian Muslim Community and the Evolution of the Jawi Peranakan in 
Penang up to 1948, Tokyo: Tokyo Gaikokugo Daigaku, 1998, pp 28-29. One such person, a Chulia trader 
who came from Kedah to Penang with Capt. Francis Light in 1786,  was Kader Mydin Merican, also 
known as Cauder Mohuddeen  (Kather Mydin). Prior to his departure to Penang, Kader Mydin was 
involved in trade between Nagore, Nagapatnam and Kedah and his ships used to sail to Acheh and East 
Sumatera to exchange Indian goods for Sumatran pepper. Kader Mydin was later appointed Kapitan Kling, 
or the leader of the Chulia/south Indian Muslims in Penang in 1801. See Historical Personalities of 
Penang, Penang: The Historical Personalities of Penang Committee, 1986, p. 34.        
408Helen Fujimoto, The South Indian Muslim Community, p. 33. See also C. M. Turnbull, “Convicts in the 
Straits Settlements 1826-1867”, JMBRAS, Vol. 43, Pt.1, July 1970.      
409 K.S. Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement (1786-1957), 
London: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.134.     
410 Helen Fujimoto, The South Indian Muslim Community, p. 33.  
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carts and furniture makers.411  These were the labouring class of the south Indian Muslim 
population. The middle class were, on the other hand, primarily involved in commercial 
activities as textile traders, general merchants and gemstones-dealers. Contemporary 
official reports of the Siamese government indicate that the Indian Muslim group in 
Penang (the word Kling was used in the reports) played a primary role as importers and 
middlemen in the cattle trade, buying cattle from the peasants and selling them to cattle 
exporters in markets and port cities.412   
These Indian Muslim traders, also referred to as Tamil traders by some scholars, 
were the middlemen in the cattle trade involving Penang, Kedah and Pattani.  They 
purchased and gathered large herds of cattle from all over the far south and drove them 
westwards before shipping them aboard lighters to Penang.413 The Kling cattle dealers 
made a sizeable income by playing the role of middlemen in the cattle trade. For 
instance, in 1917, cattle was purchased for 30-40 ticals per head from the villagers and 
sold in Penang for 60 to 80 dollars.414 While most of the Indians drove herds of cattle 
overland, to the ports on the west coast such as Trang and Penang, some of the ports on 
the east coast were also important for the purpose of trans-shipment. The cattle exported 
to Singapore were mostly sent from cattle ports on the east coast. 
Apart from Kling traders, the Pathan (of Afghanistan origin, now better known as 
Pashtuns) cattle traders too played an important role in the cattle trade. These, described 
at times as “nomad traders”, engaged primarily in cloth hawking and cattle trading.415 It 
                                                 
411 K.S. Sandhu, Indians in Malaya, p. 138. 
412 See for example, NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, “Report On Southern Tour”, G. Harvey, Govt. Veterinary to 
Phra Kasetra Raksha, Director of Agriculture, Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 24 July 1917.    
413 David F. Holm, ‘The Role of the State railways in Thai History, 1892-1932’, Ph. D dissertation, Yale 
University, 1977, p. 232. See Footnote No 14.  
414 NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, “Report on southern Tour”.   
415 The reference to Pathans as nomad traders is found in HCO; Kedah 609/1919, “Memorandum on Cattle 
Stealing in the Senggora District, signed by F.G. Gorton, dated 6 May 1919. (The memorandum is attached 
to a cover letter from the Acting British Adviser in Perlis, Eckhard to the British Adviser in Kedah, dated 
10 March 1919on the subject of “Cattle-Theft on the Perlis-Senggora Frontier”. On Pathans engaged in the 
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appears that the Pathan trader was more of an itinerant trader who purchased cattle from 
different villages in the south, driving them to the frontier for eventual sale in Penang. 
The Pathan trader may have brought cloth for sale to the interiors of the Pattani region 
and, on his way back, purchased cattle for resale in Penang. He may also have been a 
supplier to the Indian Muslim trader who in most instances was a dealer or middlemen in 
the export of cattle. The status of the Pathans vis-à-vis the British government then is 
somewhat ambiguous. While most of the Pathans assumed that their status was similar to 
that of their Indian counterparts (i.e. British subjects), British authorities appear to have 
made a distinction between the two. A report by Acting British Acting Consul of 
Songkhla, dated 1918, explains: 
A Pathan rarely seems to understand why he cannot be recognised as a British 
subject because he happens to be born just across the border. He is very often the 
holder of a Straits Settlements Indian Immigration Department Passport. In one 
or two cases the “independent” Pathan had served for many years in a British 
regiment and was the possessor of excellent discharge papers. It has been found 
practically impossible to make them understand why they can be given Passports 
but yet cannot be given Registration Certificates in Siam like their friends who 
are actually born within our border.416   
 
 Later reports dated c. 1934/35 refer to a sizeable Pathan community in Pattani. 
Perhaps more and more settled in Pattani in c. 1930s, but returned to India on the eve of   
World War II or during the Japanese occupation.  In fact, most of the cattle breeders or 
those involved in the cattle industry in Pattani today and, in Thailand generally, are of 
Pathan descent.417          
                                                                                                                                                
cloth and cattle trade see, HCO Bangkok 1561/17, Enclosure in Bangkok Despatch of Sept 1917, Acting 
Consul Gorton to His Majesty’s Charge d’ Affaires, Senggora , 5 Sept 1917.     
416 HCO 524/1918, Report of Acting Consul Senggora [F.G. Gorton] on visit to the Northern part of his 
Consular District [Senggora] in Feb 1918, p. 3 (report signed and dated 7 March 1918).   
417 The Pathans in Pattani are Indian looking and Urdu speaking, and most likely descended from Pathans 
or the Pasthun, the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan. Some of the Pathans from Afghanistan fled to 
Pakistan as a result of the Soviet invasion of their country in 1979. Incidentally, the main occupation of the 
Pathans/ Pashtuns of Afghanistan is animal husbandry. Information derived from http://www.afghan-
network.net/Ethnic-groups/pasthuns.html.           
 182
 Cattle Market-Ports on the East Coast  
 
(i) The Tanjung Mas River port  
   
 The port at the mouth of the Tanjung Mas River was an important destination for 
steamers from Singapore. The deep water at the river mouth enabled these steamers to 
enter and dock at the port. The Tanjung Mas River port was also an important collection 
point for goods from nearby states in the Pattani administrative circle. For example, it 
took only three hours for goods to be transported by boat from Rangae, otherwise known 
as Legeh, to the Tanjung Mas River port. Officials appointed by the Phraya Saiburi, who 
controlled the Tanjung Mas area, collected taxes on steamers arriving from Singapore. 
Each steamer was taxed $ 220 for a trip made to the port. For the month of March 1898, 
taxes collected from Singapore steamers calling at the port totalled $ 675, collected over 
a period of 25 days. In other words, at least three steamers arrived from Singapore at the 
Tanjung Mas River port over a 25-day period, indicating that at least one steamer from 
Singapore arrived every week at this port. Apart from steamers from Singapore, steamers 
and boats from the state of Kelantan used to call at the Tanjung Mas River port to 
purchase goods. The ruler of Kelantan, according to Thai records, was a frequent visitor. 
He purchased goods in large quantities from the river port. Other steamers from the 
region were also regularly seen arriving at the Tanjung Mas River port.418  
It appears that the Tanjung Mas port was a centre for obtaining goods of various 
types from all over the southern region of Siam. It seems very likely then that the port 
was also a centre for wholesale buying and warehouse facilities were available in the 
                                                 
418 NA, R.5, Kh.14.4/20, Phraya Sukhum, Commisioner for Nakhon Sithammarat (khaluang thesaphiban 
monthon Nakhon Sithammarat) to Phraya Damrong, Min. of Interior, 6 April, 1898 (RS.117). There are 
however, no details on the type of goods arriving/leaving for Singapore. Singapore steamers probably 
carried cattle from this port to meet the demand for beef in Singapore. The document only provides 
information on tax on arriving steamers, no mention of the merchandise carried. 
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area of the port. These were the several features associated with central market-ports 
such as Kantang (in Trang) and Kuala Kedah (in Kedah) on the west coast. Tanjung Mas, 
therefore, can be described as a central market town servicing steamers plying the east 
coast of the peninsular region, particularly those departing for and arriving from 
Singapore.  
 
(ii) The Pattani and Telubin River ports                   
 Indians under French protection (or with French protected status) apparently 
controlled the cattle trade between Pattani and Singapore. Cattle comprised the most 
important item of export from the port of Pattani so much so that by 1908 “hardly a 
steamer [left] for Singapore without taking a considerable number [of cattle]”419 Apart 
from the port of Pattani, cattle was also exported to Singapore from the much smaller 
port of Telubin, located at the mouth of the river Telubin in the former muang Saiburi. 
Both the ports of Pattani and Telubin operated as central market port-towns for the trade 
in cattle. These central port-towns also functioned as administrative centres for the 
respective muang. Apart from cattle, tin and tin ore were other major exports to 
Singapore from monthon Pattani.420 Table 6.1 shows cattle exports from the port of 












                                                 
419 DCR, Siam (Nakon Sritamarat and Patani), Report for the year 1908, p. 13.  
420 DCR, Siam (Senggora), 1911, p. 7.  
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Table 6. 1: Cattle exports from the port of Pattani, 1907-1913 
 




5023 6073 9351 8994∗ 
13676 
9754 12571 6300 
Value (£) 16970 29986 21873 21024∗ 
30861 
23051 36265 20435 
 
Source: 
DCR, Siam (Senggora) [Songkhla], 1910/1911, p. 11 
DCR, Siam (Senggora),[Songkhla], 1912/1913, p. 10   
Note: 
∗ Different figures are recorded in two separate trade reports. The first figure is from:  DCR, Siam 
(Senggora), 1910/1911, p. 11. The second is from: DCR, Siam (Consular District of Senggora), 1912/1913, 
p. 10. 
 # According to Siamese calendar year beginning April 1st to March 31st of the following year.  
 
 
With the exception of the years 1910 and 1913, cattle exports from the port of 
Pattani between 1907 and 1913 recorded an annual increase. However, between 1908 
and 1909, although there was an increase in the number of cattle exported, the value of 
cattle exports dropped significantly. This could have happened as a result of oversupply 
leading to a fall in the market price of cattle. Moreover, the year 1909 was an economic 
slump year, therefore prices of all types of goods declined generally. This may have been 
one factor that adversely affected net value (in £) of exports.   
The year 1909 was also particularly significant because the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty signed in that year and the border demarcation that followed between Siam and 
the British Malayan authorities resulted in the partial loss of Siamese territories namely 
the states of Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu and Kelantan to British Malaya. However, Takbai, 
a place formerly under Kelantan, fell under Siamese jurisdiction and became part of 
monthon Pattani, following the border delineation. Takbai was an important port-station, 
which acted as a collecting centre for cattle from all the inland areas of the southeastern 
region. The increase in the number of cattle recorded under Pattani in 1909 must have 
included cattle exports from Takbai as well. While the supply from Siam increased, the 
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external demand for cattle may have remained the same, creating, therefore, a glut and a 
drop in cattle prices.     
A fast increase in the number of cattle exported was recorded for the period 1911-
1912, followed by a sharp drop in 1913. The outbreak of cattle disease in 1913 was the 
reason for the significant drop in numbers. Nevertheless, the port of Pattani continued to 
function as a central port-town dealing chiefly in cattle supplies to the FMS and 
Singapore markets. The Siamese government too attempted to promote the breeding of 
southern cattle to meet the demand for work animals by the country’s rice farming 
industry. Two main factors contributed to Pattani’s position as a main cattle producer: 
the people and its natural environment.    
 
The Malays as Cattle Farmers  
 One of the reasons given for the success of cattle farming in the pak tai 
(southern) provinces, and in particular the province of Pattani was the presence of a large 
Malay population there, who reputedly “have a better knowledge of cattle”.421 What this 
knowledge was or how it was used to breed cattle remains unclear. Reports made at the 
annual provincial governors’ meetings (prachum puwa ratchakan changwat) made 
similar claims, stating that cattle farming was the main occupation of the people of 
monthon Pattani and cattle ranked as the province’s most important item of trade.422        
 It is interesting to note that while most writers refer to Malays in British Malaya 
as a non-pastoral race, the reverse was said of the Malays of Pattani. James Low’s 
comments in his account of the British Settlement of Penang makes for an interesting 
comparison. Low observed that the Malays in Penang were not cattle breeders. The job 
                                                 
421 NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, “Report On Southern Tour”, G. Harvey to Phra Kasetra Raksha, 24 July 1917.   
422 NA, R.6, KS 13/1902, “Supporting animal husbandry in monthon Pattani as agreed at the Provincial 
Governors’ Meeting on the 24 Nov 1924” in Report on the Provincial Governors’ Meeting compiled as 
“kan raksa lae bamrung pasusart ti pattani”, 11 December 1924.      
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of rearing cattle for dairy produce was in the hands of Indian settlers in the settlement 
whereas beef supply to the state came from cattle imported from Kedah and Pattani.423 
Almost a hundred years later (1936), an annual report on the Federated Malay States and 
Straits Settlements reported the lack of enthusiasm by kampung (village) Malays to keep 
or breed livestock. The report stated that efforts by the government to induce the 
formation of co-operative societies among Malay smallholders involved in breeding 
goats with a view to increasing the income of the members failed.424 No explanation is 
available for this difference between the two communities of Malays. One possibility is 
that the Malays of Pattani learnt cattle-breeding skills from the Pathan population in 
Pattani or many of them were of Pathan origin.   
There is ample evidence to show that, unlike the Malays in Penang and elsewhere 
in the FMS, the Malays in Pattani were inclined towards cattle farming as an economic 
activity and were very successful at it as well. A report presented at a provincial 
governors meeting in 1924 explains that the people had khwam niyom ti di (meaning they 
had a strong preference) for cattle breeding.425 Various natural factors contributed to the 
success of cattle farming and the profits from the activity encouraged the local Malays to 
improve further their knowledge and skill in breeding cattle. These factors vis-à-vis the 
alleged innate skills of the Pattani Malays as cattle farmers appear to be the reason for 
the success of cattle farming in the pak tai provinces.   
The soil profile of Pattani was another important factor. The highest percentage 
of coastal saline soil occurs in the peninsula of Thailand:  about 63% of total area found 
in the country. Saline soils refer to soil containing sufficient soluble salts in the root zone 
                                                 
423 James Low, The British Settlement of Penang, KL: Oxford University Press, 1835 (reprint 1972), p. 
182.   
424 Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Societies in the Federated Malay States and Straits 
Settlement for the period 1 Jan 1936 to 31 Dec 1936, KL: FMS Government Press, 1937, p. 9.     
425 NA, R.6, KS 13/1902, “Supporting animal farming”, Report of the Provincial Governors’ Meeting, 
11Dec 1924.  
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(below the soil surface) that ensures the growth of a crop plant. Coastal saline soil in 
Thailand is found largely scattered along the coastline in the southern region.426 This 
type of soil formed from marine sediment and tidal marsh deposits promotes vegetation. 
This perhaps contributed to the availability of lush and suitable grazing areas for cattle 
thus the success of cattle farming in the pak tai provinces. 
Furthermore, Pattani’s close proximity to big trade centres such as Penang and 
Singapore encouraged the growth in cattle farming. There was a ready market available 
for cattle from Pattani and systems of marketing the produce were in place as well. 
Besides, the cost of transporting the cattle to port cities such as Penang and Singapore 
was relatively low, thus the transportation cost incurred did not accrue excessively on the 
selling price or reduce the profit margin excessively.427    
 
Animal Breeding Practices: Malay-Muslims and Siamese-Buddhists  
 Different beliefs and practices of Malay Muslims compared to that of the Thai 
Buddhists in Siam contributed to the success of Malays over their Buddhist counterparts 
in rearing cattle. The practice of bull fighting, common among the Malay population of 
the southern provinces, for example, may have been a stimulating factor in the cattle 
farming business.428 Most adult Malay males aspired to breed a champion Samson. So 
much effort and time was put into breeding and grooming these animals to be a jagoh 
(champion) that it is not surprising that the Malays had developed a skill for breeding 
cattle which was borne out of a passion for bull-fighting.  State reports spoke of the ill-
                                                 
426 Noparat Bamroongrugsa, “Saline Soils in Thailand’ in Pierre Le Roux and Jacques Ivanoff (eds.), Le 
Sel De la Vie: En Asie Du Sud-est, Prince of Songkla University and Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique: Thailand, 1993, p. 258.   
427 NA, R.6, KS 13/1902, “Supporting animal farming”, Report of the Provincial Governors’ Meeting, 11 
Dec 1924.  
428 Bull-fighting and cock-fighting was also a popular past-time activity among the Malays of northern 
Malaya (e.g. in Kelantan). See W.A. Graham, Kelantan, A State Of The Malay Peninsula, Glasgow: James 
Maclehose And Sons, 1908, pp. 84-86.    
 188
effects of this tradition on the people and the industry because of the focus on the habit 
of betting on the animals competing in bull-fights. In other words, it encouraged 
gambling While it is difficult to attribute any merit to bull fighting, for the animals were 
physically harmed in the fights, it is difficult to deny that this passion for breeding 
champion bulls may have had a significant impact on the general enthusiasm for rearing 
cattle.     
It is important that local peculiarities are understood from the viewpoint of the 
people because it can provide useful information on their economic preference. Unlike 
their Buddhist counterparts in the central and northern regions, Malay Muslims were not 
bound by religious beliefs that discouraged animal slaughter. Neither were they averse to 
the castration of old and weak oxen and buffalo to avoid the animals propagating similar 
breed. This does provide a cogent explanation as regards why the southern states, and in 
particular the Malays, were more successful at cattle rearing.                     
 
Land Suitability   
 In a document dated 1917, Siam’s Minister of Agriculture wrote that “ [in] the 
monthons Nakorn Sithammarat, Pattani and Surathani there exists a fairly considerable 
number of buffaloes and in various parts of these monthons the country is well adapted 
for breeding grounds for them”429  
 Coastal or seaside regions were most suitable for the successful rearing of oxen 
whereas buffaloes bred well in the highlands (in other words darat or elevated inland 
areas) away from the salty seawater.430 The annual monsoon season proved the most 
difficult period for cattle farmers. As most of the cattle (both oxen and buffaloes) farmers 
                                                 
429 NA, R. 6, KS 13/1371, Draft No. 98/10954, Prince Rajaburi, Min. of Lands and Agriculture to Prince 
Yugala, 23 Nov 1917.  
430 NA, R.5, KS 13/1371, Report from the Director of Agriculture, monthon Nakhon Sithammarat to Dr. 
Harvey, Vet. Surgeon for Ministry of Agriculture, 25 June 1917.  
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were first and foremost rice farmers, their labour and attention were devoted to working 
on the rice fields, for the monsoon season and the rains that came with it coincided with 
the start of the paddy planting season. Animals in the lowlands were moved to higher 
grounds to avoid losses due to flooding. Feeding the animals during this period was 
cumbersome to the farmer because the higher grounds were almost always situated a 
long distance away from the village. The animals were somewhat neglected and, with 
little or almost nothing to eat, they soon fell prey to diseases.    
 Severe outbreak of cattle diseases, such as the one in 1913, caused the death of 
many animals leading to an acute shortage of draft animals and livestock. The farmers of 
the central plains who depended on plough-cattle to work their rice fields were greatly 
affected. To overcome this shortage and to ensure rice farming work was not hampered 
by the lack of draft animals, the Siamese government, through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, proposed an experiment which was to use buffaloes from the southern 
region in the central plains.  
The Rangsit project was mooted in 1917 to try to discover whether the buffaloes 
from the southern region, viz., Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani, were suitable for 
farming work in the central part of Siam. A number of cattle both male and female were 
bought by the Ministry of Agriculture and consigned to Bangkok by rail. An 
experimental farm was founded near the Klong Rangsit (Rangsit Canal) area in the 
central plains.  
The experimental cattle farm was established in the same year that an 
experimental rice farm was established in the Rangsit area (1916/17). Most of the 
landowners in the Rangsit area were prominent members of the government. These 
officials or elites, who would have been the beneficiaries of both the Rangsit rice and 
cattle experimental farms, had the financial means and influence to gain government 
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support in the Rangsit project.431 Buffaloes, in particular, were necessary to ensure the 
success of rice farming there. However, attempts to use the southern type buffaloes in the 
central plains, failed. W.A. Graham, in a reply to Prince Rajburi (also called Prince 
Mano) noted that: 
the experiment has shown that the buffaloes of the peninsula are not fitted for 
use in the central plains and therefore that the pak tai provinces are useless as 
breeding grounds to avoid good losses in time of epidemic in the plains.432     
                  
The project failed to overcome the problem of scarcity of buffaloes to work in the 
rice fields of the central plains.  Even before the result of the experiment was known, 
Prince Rajburi had suggested that the government restrict the export of buffaloes, 
especially female animals. He cautioned the authorities to “keep in mind the fact that the 
country may at some time want all the buffaloes that the monthon pak tai can supply”.433 
The restriction on the export of buffaloes was suggested mostly to compensate for the 
loss of animals due to disease and to overcome the shortage of plough-cattle to work on 
the rice fields. Besides, the government had also been informed, through a report 
submitted by the state veterinarian, that the high price offered by cattle dealers from 
Penang induced farmers to sell all their stock and rely on their friends who owned 
buffaloes to plough their fields for the next subsequent planting season. Referring to 
Penang as “a sort of vampire for southern Siam”, the report claimed that cattle dealers 
bought their supply from farmers cheaply and resold them at very high prices, earning 
                                                 
431 Large landholdings by government elites in prime-located areas, which were also well irrigated by the 
most advanced water control schemes such as those in the Rangsit area,  led to allegations that the state 
prioritized elite needs over the interest of the mass of the Siamese population.  On the subject of state/elite 
interests versus the masses in Thai economy, see David Feeny, The Political Economy of Productivity: 
Thai Agricultural Development, 1880-1975, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982. For a 
discussion and counter-argument of this issue, see Ian Brown, Economic Change in Southeast Asia, c. 
1830-1980, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 177-183. On canals and elite landlords see 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand, Economy and Politics, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, pp. 16-19.  
432 NA, R.5, KS 13/1371, “raingan bok laksana lae akan kong krabe monthon pak tai  ti auw ma todlong 
chai ti na todlong klong rangsit “ Report on buffaloes from the southern provinces which were brought to  
the Klong Rangsit fice fields.”, see handwritten note at the bottom of the title page of the report, written in 
English  by Mr. Graham, undated.     
433 NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, Draft No.98/10954, Prince Rajaburi, Min. of Lands and Agriculture to Prince 
Yugala, 23 Nov, 1917.    
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substantial profits from the transaction.434 To counter this problem, the government, 
through their respective provincial governors, instructed the farmers to reserve four to 
five buffaloes for work on the rice fields and sell only the surplus, those that were old 
and of little use. The sale of female animals was not allowed.    
 It is clear that the supply of buffaloes was of great concern to the Siamese 
government, because it had serious repercussions on the survival and maintenance of the 
rice industry – the mainstay of the national economy. When the farmers in the central 
plains were affected by shortage of draft animals, quick actions had to be taken by the 
government. The supply of cattle from the north and northeast had been depleted owing  
to the outbreak of cattle diseases. The attention was now directed to the south, where 
buffaloes were aplenty and where cattle generally bred well and were sought by cattle 
traders from abroad mainly from Penang and Singapore.      
 
Cattle Disease, Quarantine Centres and Cattle Export-Import Restriction 
Cattle diseases hampered rice farming and consequently peasant and government 
earnings. The export of livestock would also be drastically reduced and this would 
severely affect the income of the cattle farmers and the government. The prevention of 
cattle diseases therefore became a government priority.    
In the early decades of the 20th century, diseases affecting cattle continued to 
plague the rice farming and cattle trade of Siam.  A disease causing excessive bloating of 
the animal’s belly, for instance, often afflicted buffaloes. A common problem affecting 
large numbers of buffaloes in the south almost every year, this disease when not 
medically treated would kill the animal within two days. Apart from this, a disease 
known as Quarter Ill, also affected the buffaloes. This disease, referred to as khai ka (leg 
                                                 
434 NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, “Report on Southern Tour”, G.J. Harvey, Govt. Veterinarian to Phra Kasetra, 
Director of Agriculture, 24 July 1917.    
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fever) in Thai, affected the legs of the buffaloes, causing sharp pains and consequently 
incapacitating the animal.435 There were other known types of diseases afflicting live 
stock animals including cattle.            
The most common cattle diseases were rinderpest and anthrax. The anthrax virus 
was spread through infected dead animals buried in the ground. The ground became 
enriched with anthrax spores, which would be carried to the surface of the soil by worms, 
spreading the virus to the crops. Cattle grazing and feeding on these crops became 
infected or contracted the disease when the animals ingested the crops. Ploughing the 
land for farming could also transmit the bacteria from the deeper layers of the ground to 
the surface and infect the crops.436 In Siam, however, the occurrence of anthrax in 
animals was less common compared to rinderpest, a highly contagious cattle disease.437             
 Rinderpest first appeared in the archipelago in the 1880s. The disease was first 
detected in 1879 among cattle imported from Bengal to Java followed by a similar 
occurrence among livestock imported from India to Sumatra.438 From this period, the 
disease spread and persisted in most parts of South and Southeast Asia until late 1950s 
causing catastrophic damages in some places.439   
 Siamese cattle, in particular, were often suspected of being infected with the 
disease. Records from the British Malayan side such as the FMS gazettes and Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council papers provide details on areas and ports where cattle 
                                                 
435 NA, R.6, KS 13/1371, Agricultural Office, monthon Nakhorn Sithammarat to Dr. Harvey, Veterinary 
Surgeon for Ministry of Agriculture, 25 June, 1917.    
436 A. Besredka, Local Immunization, Specific Dressings, (edited and translated by Harry Plotz) London: 
Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1927, p. 10.    
437Rinderpest was recognized as a disease primarily affecting cattle after the European epizootic of AD. 
376-386. It was widespread first in Europe during the ravaging European Wars when armies marched with 
their trek oxen. The rinderpest infection was believed to have come to Europe from the east, either the 
Caspian basin or the Russian and Hungarian steppes. In the 19th century, a growing sea borne international 
trade in live cattle caused the widespread dissemination of the rinderpest disease.  Control measures and 
active research in the laboratories of veterinary schools in Europe helped to stamp out the disease in 
Europe by the 1930s. See W. Plowright, Rinderpest Virus in Virology Monographs No. 3, Wien, Austria: 
Springer-Verlag, 1968, p. 27. 
438 This information is from a work in progress by Dr. Raden M. Fernando of Nanyang Technological 
University (NTU), Singapore.     
439 W. Plowright, Rinderpest Virus in Virology Monographs, p. 27.  
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imports were prohibited indicating the prevalence of the disease there. Siamese records 
give evidence of state-sponsored measures to control the cattle epidemic in the country. 
Considering the large amount of revenue earned by the state from the cattle trade, 
stringent actions on the part of the Siamese government to introduce disease prevention 
measures became imperative. These included the slaughter of affected animals, 
regulations calling for hygienic conduct at the slaughterhouses, and strict quarantine 
requirements at the ports of exit. Abattoirs too were located at designated areas. A State 
Veterinary Department was established with expert European members leading the 
department. The state veterinarian travelled to the southern provinces on inspection tours 
to educate the local agricultural officers and the people on proper breeding and castration 
methods.          
 
The Effects of Cattle Disease on Exports from Siam 
In the 1920s, with the advent of the peninsular railways, cattle from Pattani and 
other southern states began to be exported direct to the FMS (Perak, Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan, Pahang). Apart from railways, cattle also arrived in the FMS through the 
coastal ports of these states such as Teluk Anson (now Teluk Intan) and Port Weld (now 
Kuala Sepetang). Although statistics on the number of cattle (heads) imported into the 
FMS is difficult to ascertain, there is, however, tangible evidence that there was a regular 
cattle trade between Pattani and the FMS. 
According to the list of principal commodities imported direct by the FMS for the 
year 1928, cattle were listed as being primarily imported from Siam. Table 6.2 provides 








Cattle $  1,644,584 
Rice Bran $  1,180,269 
Teak $     148,530 
Salt $     136,974 
TOTAL $ 16,021,161 
 
Source:   Supplement to the FMS Government Gazette, “A List of the principal commodities imported 
direct, with the names of the countries of supply in the order of the value of their trade”, in Federated 
Malay States Government Gazette, KL: Federated Malay States Government Printing Office, Vol. XXI, 
Jan-June 1929, p. 29 (Appendix M).     
 
Cattle were the second most important item, in terms of value, imported by the 
FMS from Siam; it accounted for more than 10 percent of the total value of imports. 
Even in the years prior to 1928 i.e. 1926-1927, when Siam was placed second after India 
as the main cattle supplier to the FMS, the value of cattle imports from Siam was in the 
range of 3.5 to 4 percent of the total value of imports. Table 6.3 gives the value of cattle 
imports from Siam between 1922 and 1930.  
 
Table 6. 3: Cattle imports from Siam into the FMS (1922 -1930) 
 
Year Value ($) Total value of FMS import from Siam ($) 
1922       97, 180 997, 298 
1923     252, 476 1, 069, 966 
1924     362, 843 523, 772 
1925     264, 862 604, 548 
1926∗     190, 400 4, 689,753 
1927     312, 413 8, 759, 873 
1928 1, 644, 584 16, 012,161 
1929 1, 988, 832 15, 104, 620 
1930     956, 454 13, 272, 136 
 
Source:  “Annual Report on the Trade and Customs Department” in Federated Malay States Government  
Gazette, Supplement for the year 1923-1931, KL: Federated Malay States Government Printing Office.   
Note: 
* From 1922 to 1925, Siam was the main supplier of cattle to the FMS followed by India. In the year 1926, 
however, Siam was placed second after India ($426, 295), as the major supplier of cattle into the FMS. For 
the same year, India was the FMS’ main rice supplier whereas by 1928, Siam had overtaken India and 
became the main supplier of both cattle and rice to the FMS.       
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There was a rapid decrease in the value of cattle imports between 1924 and 1926. 
During this period, cattle imports into the state of Perak in the FMS were prohibited 
owing to rinderpest. The statement of quarantine (Gazette Notification 519, dated 23 Jan 
1925) in the FMS Government Gazette enforced in 1925 stated that “importation of 
cattle from Siam into Perak is prohibited until further notice”.   The ruling, however, 
made an exception to cattle imported from Pattani, which could be imported into Perak 
through the quarantine stations specifically mentioned in the Gazette. The stations named 
were located at Padang Lapang Ninering, Padang Simpang Perak and Padang Sepor, all 
in the district of Upper Perak.440  
Then in 1927, the value of cattle imports increased (almost two fold) followed by 
a period of rapid increase sustained over a period of two years (1928-29). Through a 
separate Gazette dated 23 Dec 1927 (Gazette No. 7040), cattle from the west-coast states 
of Setul, Kantang (in Trang), Phuket, Krabi and Phangnga, could also be imported via 
sea through Teluk Anson and Port Weld.441 This could have contributed to the increase 
in the number of cattle imported by the FMS from Siam, corresponding therefore to the 
increase in the value of cattle imported between 1927 and 1929.  
Meanwhile, the exceptions to cattle import from Pattani and the ports on the 
west- coast, however, were subject to a veterinary certificate issued by the Siamese 
government authorizing export. The exception to allowing cattle imports from Pattani 
through the designated quarantine stations remained until 1935. Through a Gazette dated 
31 May 1935, the import of cattle, buffaloes, sheep and goats from Siam into the state of 
Perak was “prohibited absolutely”. This was likely due to a widespread outbreak of 
                                                 
440 Federated Malay States Government Gazette, No. 21, Vol. XVII, KL: FMS Government Printing 
Office, 23 Jan 1925.    
441 Federated Malay States Government Gazette, Vol. XX, 6 Jan 1928.  
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rinderpest in Siam, believed to be out of control, forcing an absolute prohibition of cattle 
imports from that country.442  
In June 1934, rinderpest was first noted in Singapore and “various circumstances 
strongly incriminated the Siamese cattle” as the likely source of the outbreak.443 
Singapore stopped imports from Siam but continued to get its supply of beef cattle from 
its other source- Bali (then under Dutch rule).444 The occasional supply that arrived in 
Singapore markets from French Indochina too ceased after 1935 following the discovery 
of the same cattle disease among Saigon cattle.445 A list of Singapore’s main cattle 
suppliers and the number of cattle imported by Singapore between 1932 and 1935 is 
provided in Table 6.4.    
 
Table 6. 4: Importation of beef cattle, Singapore (1932-1935)446
 
Origin 1932  1933 1934 1935 
Unfederated 
Malay States  
202   
(heads) 
367 488 78 
Netherlands 
Indies 
10,379 6,362 6,007 6,599 
Siam  2,216 7,270 11,496 5,869 
French Indochina - 16 - 1,864 
Total 12,797 14,015 17,991 14,410 
     
Source: Annual Report of the Veterinary Department of the Straits Settlements for the year 1935, Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council Paper, No 118, 1936, p. 3.    
    
                                                 
442 See FO 371/20302 (Siam), 1936, “Siam, Annual Report, 1935”, p. 23.   
443 Annual Report of the Veterinary Department of the Straits Settlements for the year 1935, Straits 
Settlements Legislative Council Paper, No. 118, 1936, p. 4.    
444 This affected the price of Siamese cattle in Singapore. The price of cattle exported from Siam was 
subject to the demand and supply of meat and the more general condition of trade in the region as well as 
the occasional outbreaks of disease. Cattle were priced on a live-weight basis. The average weight of the 
oxen ranged between 750 to 800 lbs. In 1934, cattle prices ranged between 6 ½ (Bangkok cattle) to 7 cents 
(South Siam cattle) per lb. live weight. In 1935 prices dropped to 6 cents (Bangkok cattle) and 5 cents 
(South Siam cattle) per lb. live weight. Cattle disease as well as over supply from the previous years 
contributed to the lower prices.  See Annual Report of the Veterinary Department of the Straits Settlements 
for the year 1935, Straits Settlements Legislative Council Paper, No. 118, 1936, p. 6.          
445 Annual Report of the Veterinary Department of the Straits Settlements for the year 1935, Straits 
Settlement Legislative Council Paper, No. 118, 1936, p. 4.   
446 Data for 1935 indicates that Singapore may not have stopped all cattle imports from Siam immediately, 
the number of cattle imported in that year reduced by almost half compared to the preceding year. This 
suggests that Singapore may have made exemptions to cattle imported from certain parts of Siam, which 
were not affected by the rinderpest disease.  
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Meanwhile, in the Federated Malay States, through the Diseases of Animals 
Enactment of 1936, “importation of cattle for slaughter only was allowed subject to 
restriction” from Southern Thailand.447 Despite this legislation, imports of cattle from 
Siam, in practice, were discontinued until 1940 when restricted import of cattle for 
slaughter from southern Thailand resumed.448             
Based on the figures of cattle imports from Siam in Table 5.3, it is noted that 
cattle continued to be imported into the FMS throughout the period between 1925 and 
1930 when there was in fact a government order prohibiting imports from Siam except 
those from Pattani and later extended to include the south west-coast states. It can be 
surmised that the supply of cattle from Siam to the FMS came chiefly from monthon 
Pattani and, to a lesser extent, the south west-coast states because imports from all other 
places in Siam were prohibited. The substantial value of the cattle trade indicates the 




Cattle exported abroad were subject to a government tax. Cattle port-stations 
such as Takbai may have also been a central tax collecting station. As mentioned earlier, 
the district of Takbai in monthon Pattani used to be a central market for cattle from all 
over the Pattani administrative circle. Foreigners, according to a Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury (Krasuang Phrakhlang Mahasombat) document, used to buy their stock of 
cattle at Takbai and exported them to states nearby. Cattle exported from here came from 
various localities in monthon Pattani. 
                                                 
447 I have emphasized the phrase “for slaughter only”. 
448 Federated Malay States Government Gazette, Vol. XXXII, No. 15, 4 July 1940.  
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 After 1909, when the district of Takbai, formerly under the state of Kelantan 
became part of monthon Pattani, the Siamese government waived the collection of poll 
tax and corvee labour there for a year. 449 Then in 1911, the poll tax resumed, the King 
announced an annual tax of 2 baht per person, the same amount that the people of this 
district paid to the state of Kelantan prior to the take-over. The government, however, 
gave small concessions in commercial taxes. The same year, King Rama VI, issued an 
edict proclaiming exemption of taxes on the produce of this district except for liquor and 
opium for a period of three years, in an attempt to win over the people’s trust as well as 
to show goodwill on the part of the Siamese government. 
Foreign traders were quick to take advantage of the Siamese government’s 
generosity. During a High Commissioners’ meeting (prachum thesaphiban) in Bangkok, 
the High Commissioner for Pattani, Phraya Sakdi Seni, pointed out to the King that the 
exemption of taxes was exploited by foreign traders who bought cattle at a cheaper rate 
in this province and sold them at a higher price elsewhere. Phraya Sakdi proposed a tax 
on cattle exports from Takbai in view of the revenue it could earn for the Siamese 
state.450 Little is known of the outcome of this meeting or the rate of the proposed tax. 
What is certain, however, is that the Siamese government had long considered increasing 
the tax on cattle exported from Siam.       
An earlier document dated 2 March 1899, stated that taxes on cattle exported 
from Bangkok between 1897 and 1899 were fixed at 2 ticals per head. The amount 
according to the report was too little considering the huge profits that the cattle-dealers 
made out of selling their stock of cattle. Acting Medical Officer for Siam, H. Campbell 
Highet, suggested in 1899 that the export tax on cattle should be doubled and the extra 
earnings from tax revenue should be used to build government abattoirs at Bangkulern, 
                                                 
449 FO 422/64, Siam. Further Correspondence, Pt. XXI, 1909. Inclosure in No. 155, Mr. Wood to Beckett, 
Senggora, 2 Aug 1909.   
450 NA, R. 6, Kh. 18/2, “Tax on Cows and Buffaloes”, 8 Dec 1910 (R.S. 129).   
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an area near Bangkok with a predominantly Muslim population.451 Alternatively, he 
proposed charging the cattle dealers an additional 1 tical per head rental fee on the cattle 
that they had purchased while under compulsory quarantine (a minimum period of 8 
days) prior to their shipment abroad. Meanwhile, the report discouraged any increase in 
the slaughter tax, which at that time, was fixed at 2 ticals per head for bullocks and 1 
tical for calves.452 This was one of the few rare reports that provide information on 
export tax on cattle and implies strongly that cattle was indeed a significant export item 
and revenue earner for Siam.  
 
The Impact of the Railway on Cattle Exports from Siam 
The completion of the southern railway meanwhile facilitated and expanded the 
trade in cattle between south Siam and the FMS. Reports suggest that, by 1928, cattle 
from the southern Thai states were increasingly transported via rail through the east coast 
railway network to states such as Pahang and other states in the south-east and south of 
the Malay Peninsula, indicating that the formerly popular overland cart route fell into 
disuse with the onset of the peninsular railways.       
The railway brought advantages to the Malay cattle breeders of the Pattani region 
as well. For example, buffaloes purchased from Phattalung for resale in Pattani, 
previously taken overland, could be transported quickly and more conveniently via the 
railway.453  There was also a noticeable increase in the number of pigs and poultry sent 
                                                 
451 Bangkulern, spelt variously as Bangkolem and Bankolern is likely located in the area of Klong Toey in 
Bangkok today. Again in 1932, a proposal was made for a new abattoir for all types of livestock in 
Bangkulern. See FO 371/15532.       
452 NA, R.5, Kh. 14.2 K/22, H. Campbell Highet, Acting Medical Officer to Phraya Thewaite [Thewet], 
Director Local Sanitary Department, 2 March 1899.   
453 NA, R.5, Y.Th. 5.5/25, Mr. Gittins Report to Phraya Sukhumnaivinit, 24 Aug, 1906, p. 11   
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by rail from Siam to the FMS, Phattalung and Songkhla being the chief forwarding 
districts.454   
Apart from the increased volume of animals exported, the railway also facilitated 
disease prevention strategies. A report from the Veterinary Department of the FMS 
claimed that the railways also allowed for better control of the movement of (animal) 
stock and the prevention of diseases. The report stated that: 
… the railway now runs direct from the Siamese border, and cattle may be 
moved direct from any station en route on the East Coast Railway to the 
slaughter houses of the larger towns and other places in the south-east and south 
of the peninsula.455
 
Veterinary inspections at quarantine stations, set up at main railway stations, 
reduced the irregular supply of cattle for export owing to outbreak of diseases and export 
prohibitions imposed on Siam by the importers.  The death of animals while on board 
steamers and sailing vessels owing to the long journey was also avoided. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Malays and south Indian Muslim/Kling (including Pathan) traders dominated the 
long distance overland cattle trade in southern Siam. Unlike the trade in tin, the cattle 
trade does not appear to have been part of the royal or provincial-elites’ trade network. 
Local people were free to engage in the rearing and trading of cattle. The cattle trade was 
not per se the selling and buying of cattle; other items of merchandise must have been 
transported using these animals as carriers of goods. Upon arrival at market points, both 
the goods and the animals were sold. Cattle dealers too must have engaged in not only 
the buying and selling of cattle but other commodities as well.   
                                                 
454 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, “Siam’s Railways”, an appreciation by Mr. Anthony, 26 March 1923, pp. 
2-5.  
455 Federated Malay States Government Gazette, Supplement, “Annual Report of the Veterinary 
Department For The Year 1933”, 7 Sept 1934, p. 4.   
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 So much of the subject is still based on conjecture because details such as the 
timing of the trade expeditions (were these done at the end of the monsoon season or 
after the rice harvest season?) are lacking. So too is information on the motives of the 
Malay traders: were they profit-motivated and was their trade based on economies of 
scale? These questions remain unanswered. The Malay trader may have gone on long 
distance trade overland to seek knowledge and experience in order to widen his horizon. 
It may have been a post- rice harvest activity. 456 There must also have been the regular 
“career” traders whose primary occupation was to trade. 457
The developments in overland infrastructure such as railways and roads, in the 
long run, inevitably contributed to the demise of the Malay overland traders.  But within 
the period under study, the subject deserves to be given due attention in discussions 
regarding the relationship between Bangkok and its southern provinces. While culture 
and religions are very important, the greater part of human activity is based on the 
acquisition of material needs in order to survive.  But in the case of Pattani, economics 
itself is closely related to cultural diversity.   
                                                 
456 There were traders in the past who engaged in trade not so much for profits but for the opportunity to 
travel and gain knowledge (experience). Moermen’s study of the traders of Chiangkam, a town in Chiang 
Rai, north Thailand, provides examples of how trade was part of the “kinship network /solidarity” and 
through trade members of the same clan (relatives) and age-mates visited one another while at the same 
time gained knowledge of other places. See Michael Moerman, “Chiangkham’s Trade in the ‘Old Days’”, 
in G. William Skinner and Thomas Kirsch (eds.), Change and Persistence in the Thai Society, Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1975.  
 Andrew Forbes’ research on the Cjin Ho Muslims of northern Thailand indicates that the income from 
trade was saved and eventually used to perform the obligatory Haj (for Muslims).   See   Andrew D.W 
Forbes, “The “Cin-Ho” (Yunnanese Chinese) Caravan Trade with North Thailand During The Late 
Nineteenth And Early twentieth Centuries”, in Journal of Asian History, Vol. 21, 1987, p. 6. See also, 
Mala R. Sathian, ‘Northern Siam, 1867-1910’, pp. 234-235.        
In the context of the Malay traders of the Pattani region, it is possible that these traders engaged in trade as 
a post rice-harvest activity, the extra income earned may have been useful as a saving to (i) buy land (ii) 
pay for “a wife” i.e. dowry for a bride and (iii) to perform the Haj. Similar to the “merantau” tradition of 
the people of Sumatra (particularly of Minangkabau ancestry), the young Malay men of Pattani today leave 
home, mostly to nearby Malaysia, in order to earn money to pay for a “bride” back home (Malay: mas 
kahwin).  See Mala Rajo Sathian and Saroja Dorairajoo, “Being Malayu the Thai way: Perceiving the 
Thai-Malaysia Border from a People’s Perspective”.          
457 A well-known “career-trader” among the Malays of Kelantan was Tok Janggut, who used to trade 
regularly between Kelantan- Pattani and Trengganu. The man, alleged to have acquired invulnerability and 
super natural qualities, later led a rebellion against the British in Kelantan.  See Ibrahim Nik Mahmood, 
“The To’ Janggut Rebellion of 1915”, in William R. Roff (ed.), Kelantan, Religion, Society and Politics, p. 
66.     
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             During the period of Siam’s administrative reforms (1880s-1920s), Pattani 
experienced numerous changes.  The evolution of a Western-type bureaucracy in 
Bangkok impinged on Pattani’s political status and, at the same time, precipitated 
economic development there.  
            Hitherto Pattani has been perceived very differently by those outside Thailand 
and, even within Thailand, knowledge of the region continues to be scanty.  Thai 
historiography focuses largely on central Thailand; the north comes second; and the 
south is a distant third.  As such where Pattani is concerned, a noticeable knowledge gap 
exists mainly in the area of its economic development in modern times.   
The region experienced economic changes both in volume and kind beginning 
from the 19th century.  Apart from a rise in output as a result of increasing production to 
meet export targets, there were changes in the key players involved as well as the mode 
of trading and marketing. Change also occurred in the form of the optimum utilization of 
the natural attributes of the region, endowed with certain mineral resources and well 
suited   for specific economic activities. The role of traditional regional markets, at the 
same time, was enhanced by the growth in production while new markets emerged to 
help sustain the growth in output. The management of resources became bureaucratised 
with the introduction of legislation and taxes by the central government. This 
unavoidably benefited certain groups and disadvantaged others.  
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 Increasing government control over the region naturally eclipsed the traditional 
economic and commercial role of the southern ruling elite. In particular, it changed the 
traditional relations between the Malay elites of Pattani and the ruling elites of Bangkok 
(the central government). Direct government control over elite properties, such as mining 
land and salt farms, affected the income and position of the Pattani elites, hence their 
angry reaction to the reforms in the early days. In short, the state had replaced the Raja as 
the de facto proprietor of land and resources.  
While the traditional role of Malay elites waned with increasing central control 
over economic and fiscal matters of monthon Pattani, the role of the Chinese was greatly 
enhanced through Siam’s policy of privileging Chinese who were “experienced in 
business” to serve as a bulwark against foreign business interests. This was most evident 
in the mining sector and, as a consequence, altered the relations between the political 
elites (Malays) and the economic elites (Chinese). 
Trade, in earlier times, and later, tin as well as cattle, constituted the more 
important sectors of Pattani’s economy. These three major sectors kept Pattani in 
constant touch with the north and western parts of the Malay Peninsula and, via its own 
port, with Singapore too. The involvement of numerous groups in the tin and cattle 
economy was a significant feature of the multi-faceted aspect of Pattani’s economy and 
society within which there was a strong presence of non-indigenous groups, especially 
Straits Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian Muslims. As the number of foreigners 
increased, Pattani’s economy gradually came under the control of outsiders. 
It must be emphasized that although the larger proportion of the population of 
Pattani comprised peasants and fishermen, there were also indigenous trading groups 
operating along the coast (hilir) as well as in the interior (darat). Thus Pattani society 
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was never isolated; the people always engaged in trade domestically as well as 
regionally.  
In the present study, the term “connected experience” has been used to 
demonstrate the close link between the economic and commercial dynamics of   southern 
Siam and that of the northern Malay areas. The workings of these zones were determined 
by the availability of resources, a network of markets which involved overland and sea 
routes to collect and distribute goods, modes of transportation to facilitate haulage of 
goods (such as bullock-carts, elephants, river boats, coastal steamers) as well as the 
railway in later years.  
The general economic environment of the region, viz., the demand for and supply 
of products were crucial variables in determining the success of the economic zones. The 
tin and cattle zones operated along a system which present-day development economics 
theorists would probably call “niche competitive advantage”, referring to an international 
production system using specialization based on comparative advantage in terms of cost 
and quality.458  
 Applied to situations in the past, this simply means that a product that was 
available in abundance in a particular place because of a combination of variables, such 
as soil, climate, labour, local culture and markets, was sold to a neighbouring area where 
there was a demand for the product or where it was scarce. The latter place, devoid of the 
natural resources, provided complementary facilities or infrastructure for the production, 
processing and marketing of the goods emanating from the former.  The tin mining 
sector in Pattani certainly operated in this manner. This vertically integrated industry 
depended on smelting, shipping and financial support from Penang and, to a lesser 
                                                 
458 The term borderless economy succinctly describes this notion in the present day.     
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extent, Singapore, whereas the source of tin ore came primarily from the producing areas 
in Phuket, Pattani and Nakhon Sithammarat.  Capital too was largely imported.459   
Economic change in Pattani was also brought about by technological change and 
scientific advancement.  For example, developments in mining technology (the dredge 
and modern smelters), road and railway construction as well as telegraphic 
communication had a major impact on the tin sector. Similarly, research into animal 
husbandry and the eradication and prevention of diseases, with the progress in health 
sciences, were part of the significant changes, which boosted the cattle economy of 
Pattani.     
The transformation, which occurred during the period under study also brought 
about a blurring of the traditional dichotomy between the darat and the hilir. Both the tin 
(hilir) and cattle (darat) sectors were affected by change. As tin became exhausted 
around the hilir, miners moved inland towards the hilly parts of the darat where tin 
resources were still abundant. But the miners were from the hilir so that there was no 
occupational change where the darat and hilir population were concerned.  There was, 
however, a closer geographical juxtaposition of people from both areas.  
The cattle sector was more specifically affected by the improvement in 
infrastructure. The construction of roads did not make it less common for cattle to use 
the trans-peninsular route because motor vehicles had not yet made an impact in that part 
of Siam. But the coming of the railway, which linked Siam with Singapore via the west 
coast and the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, made the jungle tracks redundant. And 
since the railway passed though the hilir rather than the darat, it contributed, to some 
                                                 
459 Kenichi Ohmae proposes a similar idea. According to him, three key industries are fundamentally 
borderless: transportation, financial institutions, and telecommunications. He adds that “transportation 
crosses borders, capital from financial institutions criss-crosses borders, and telecommunications by 
definition is a global industry”. See Kenichi Ohmae, “How to Invite Prosperity from the Global Economy 
Into a Region”, in Allen J. Scott (ed.), Global City-Regions, Trends, Theory, Policy, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p.36.     
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extent, to the movement of people, in this instance, from the darat to the hilir as the 
cattle had to be driven to the hilir to be transported by rail to Singapore or the FMS. The 
export of beef too henceforth was undertaken from the hilir. 
Those more familiar with the modern history of the Malay Peninsula have often 
asked why Siam was adamant that it should retain Pattani in 1909 but surrendered Perlis, 
Kedah and Kelantan.  A comparison of Bangkok’s administrative cum economic links 
with Pattani (as demonstrated in the present study) with its similar links vis-a-vis Perlis, 
Kedah and Kelantan (which have been studied by several scholars) will reveal that, on 
the eve of the 1909 Treaty, Pattani was economically more valuable to Siam.460  
Administratively too, the Siamese government was of the opinion that the 
“Siamese Malay States [i.e. Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah] were a source of trouble, 
weakness, danger and annoyance rather than of profit to Bangkok”.461 To Siam, Kelantan 
and Trengganu “had never formed an integral part” of the kingdom.462 Furthermore, 
Bangkok claimed that it lacked effective control over the three Malay states of Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Kedah, the first mentioned being the most troublesome because of British 
schemes (such as the Duff concession) to wrest the state from Siamese control.463 Thus 
Siam agreed to enter into a general treaty with Britain and proposed the transfer of its 
rights over these Malay states to Britain, largely, on the basis of administrative 
                                                 
460 For example, by 1904, Kedah was practically bankrupt. See Shahrom Ahmat, Kedah, Tradition and 
Change In a Malay State, Chapter 3 (The Financial Problems of Kedah). Wu Xiao An in his study on 
Kedah also concludes that the state although rich in land and resources, lacked capital, market and 
technology to develop these resources. He adds that Kedah was “a weak state caught between the British 
and the Siamese”. See Wu Xiao Ann, Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, p. 177.    
461 Mohamed B. Nik Mohd. Salleh, “Kelantan in Transition: 1891-1910”, in William R. Roff (ed.), 
Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay Society, p. 52.   
462 Ibid. 
463 On the Duff concession see L. R. Robert, “The Duff Syndicate in Kelantan 1900-1902”, JMBRAS, Vol. 
45 (1), 1973, pp. 81-110.    
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considerations. I t was also Siam’s wish to “see the last of British extraterritoriality” in 
its kingdom, and to this end, Siam agreed to the Treaty of 1909 with Britain.464          
When British authorities made counter-claims suggesting the transfer of the 
khaek muangs of the Pattani region on the basis of geographical, ethnic, cultural and 
historical connections with other Malay states under British rule, Siam was quick to 
reiterate that the transfer of Pattani was “out of the question”.465 This was in line with 
Siam’s rationale for suggesting the transfer of the northern Malay states in the first place, 
which was made from the standpoint of administrative considerations. Compared to the 
northern Malay states, Siam had established a strong and effective control over the 
Pattani Malay states, gradually but forcefully since the thesaphiban reforms of the 1890s. 
By 1902, it had replaced the old Malay ruling elites and administered the khaek 
provinces directly through its officers appointed from Bangkok. Besides, unlike the 
northern Malay states particularly, Kedah and Kelantan, Pattani was not in debt, 
bankrupt or lacking economic resources, on the contrary the region demonstrated great 
economic and trade prospects especially through its connections with major regional 
markets such as Penang and Singapore.    
Clearly, Pattani’s existing trading ties with the British ports of Penang and 
Singapore as well as its physical proximity to territories in the Peninsula, already under 
British political control, had important administrative and political implications for Siam. 
On the one hand, Siam needed the revenue from this region to fund its administrative 
reforms; on the other, it wanted to forestall British economic interests in the isthmian 
                                                 
464 Ibid. Britain’s agreement to surrender its extra-territorial rights in Siam in return for the transfer of the 
northern Malay states is, to my mind, the most important incentive for the Treaty of 1909. British extra-
territorial rights in Siam reiterated through the 1897 Secret Convention proved a major bane to the survival 
of Siam’s independence and sovereignty. The Secret Convention of 1897 was abrogated through the Treaty 
of 1909. On the pre-1909 transfer talks see, Thamsook Numnonda, “Negotiations Regarding The Cession 
of Siamese Malay States 1907-1909”, JSS, 55 (2), 1967, pp. 227-235.       
     
465 Quoting Siamese (American) Advisor Strobel in response to request by British official Paget in CO 
273/343, Enclosure in Despatch, 2 April 1908, as cited in Mohamed B. Nik Mohd. Salleh, “Kelantan in 
Tarnsition”, p. 54.     
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territory. Both considerations forced Siam to tap into the resources of the Pattani region 
and, at the same time, urgently exert a strong political and economic control over it.   
The Siamese adopted two approaches to gain a strong grip over Pattani’s 
economy. One was to favour Chinese over European (particularly British) traders. The 
other was to introduce legislation as well as administrative agencies, such as the 
Department of Mines (1896), to regulate the awarding of concessions and to supervise 
the implementation of state policies.  
In the first instance, the Chinese were collaborators in Siam’s plans to minimize 
British influence in the region. This partnership was mutually beneficial. To Siam, 
granting mining concessions to the Chinese earned her not only revenue from royalties 
and taxes, but also their loyalty to the Siamese crown. To the Chinese, a partnership with 
Bangkok guaranteed the survival of their source of income and livelihood. Siam acted as 
the patron; the Chinese were the clients. At the same time, this strategy helped Siam to 
prevent the entry of foreign concessionaires.   
The second approach is most evident after the introduction of the Mining Act of 
1901. Guidelines to application for mining licences, types of licences available, payment 
of licence fees, and royalty rates regulated the process of awarding concessions. 
Provincial offices of the Department of Mines were also established in Phuket (1895) 
and Pattani for more efficient control and supervision of the mining activities there. The 
legislation, moreover, served to control or monitor activities of the Malay Raja who 
tended to establish relations with the British and offer   concessions to foreign 
individuals without Bangkok’s consent. Although, traditionally, there was little 
interference from Siam in the domestic economic and revenue matters of the Malay 
states, individual concessions given by the Raja to foreigners alarmed Siam for these 
would likely lay open Siam’s economy to manipulation by foreign companies and 
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individuals. The mining legislation reduced or withdrew the powers of the Raja in terms 
of the award of mining concessions or licences.  
Historian Panee Ouansakul in her work on tin mining in south Siam claimed that 
changes in the tin mining sector did not benefit the national economic system as a whole. 
She argued that change was limited to activities related to mining as well as those groups 
involved in the sector. 466 It is perhaps true that the changes in the tin sector did not affect 
the whole economic system but, in the context of regional economy, such changes were 
indeed significant. The participation of foreigners as well as Chinese from the 
neighbouring region in the mining sector, for example, changed the status quo in terms 
of land holding and land leasing. The development of roads and related infrastructure as 
well as the shift to a cash economy contributed to general economic growth in the 
southern tin-mining region.  In other words, although the changes in the tin mining 
sector, when seen from the perspective of the whole Siamese economic system, may 
seem marginal, they were in fact substantial within the context of the regional economy.        
Meanwhile, commerce, like the administration, became bureaucratised as rules, 
legislation and local agents of authority, tightened links between Bangkok and the 
provinces under the new centralized administration.  As a result, again Malay elites lost 
their traditional sources of income, and this time the Chinese elites too found their 
economic position threatened. For example, the Chinese who enjoyed a monopoly over 
coastal shipping were adversely affected by the Siamese state railway, which provided an 
alternative mode of transportation.   
  However, these changes notwithstanding, local commercial networks, the trade 
connection between the southern region and Penang, and the sakdina-like (feudal) 
patron-client trade relations remained uninterrupted. In other words, despite 
                                                 
466 Panee Ouansakul, ‘Tin Mining and Economic Change in Southern Thailand, 1868-1931’, Chapter 4.  
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centralization, Pattani continued to enjoy the advantage of commercial intercourse with 
the regional centres of trade such as Penang and Singapore. On the contrary, the 
administrative reforms in the northern part of Siam, in particular the former tributary 
state of Chiang Mai, resulted in the centralization of both its administration and its 
commerce. As early as the 1890s-1900, while Siam was still implementing the first phase 
of its reforms, the northern muang of Chiang Mai had begun to trade mostly through and 
with Bangkok, and no longer dependent on its former trade network with Moulmein in 
Burma467.  
 It has been demonstrated here that where the tin and cattle trade of the south was 
concerned, the network involving Pattani, Penang as well as Singapore continued to 
operate as in earlier times. In other words, Pattani’s commerce, to a large extent, 
remained “non-centralized” in character. Bangkok was a distant trading partner even in 
the late 1920s and 1930s when rubber too was exported from the south to Singapore. The 
significant change, however, was that Bangkok introduced tariff walls, trade restrictions, 
and the exports from the southern region were included in Thailand’s trade and customs 
records as a constituent part of the exports of the nation, unlike the period before the 
1920s when exports from the south were not included in the customs returns of Bangkok. 
The functioning of the economic zones (tin and cattle) was interrupted only in the sense 
of tariff and customs requirements when borders “tightened up”.   
It is pertinent to add that, despite the central government’s intervention, the 
economic relationship between Bangkok and Pattani was not in effect a complete 
disadvantage to the latter. On the contrary, it helped to facilitate economic growth. If 
nothing else, it resulted in the more systematic organization of economic activities.  In 
                                                 
467 See Mala Rajo Sathian, ‘Northern Siam, 1867-1910’,pp. 224-229.  
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due course, the introduction of modern infrastructure also helped considerably to render 
economic production and transactions more efficient.          
Again, contrary to general impressions, Pattani was not an isolated, remote and 
undeveloped part of Thailand.  It had seen and experienced significant change in more 
recent times, and its economic history bears comparison with that of many of the 
Peninsular Malay states or that of other parts of Thailand, such as Isan or the north-
eastern part of the country. 
            Scholars writing within the paradigm of minority discourse (an attempt at 
“centring” those who have been marginalized) often present their arguments within a 
purely political construct, neglecting the economic scenario, or they engage in economic 
discourse with a political bias. The present study is an attempt to help to integrate the 
economic with the political perspective rather than to replace the latter with the former. 
Many questions no doubt remain unanswered. For instance, despite the tendency these 
days to see Pattani and Kelantan as “twin brothers”, it has been demonstrated here that, 
economically and commercially, for a long time, Pattani’s links had always been closer 
with the west coast of the Peninsula, in particular Kedah.   
             There are writers too who continually question what they consider to be 
Bangkok’s propensity to emphasize political hegemony to the neglect of religio-cultural 
hegemony in the region. But this is usually the result of inadequate research into Pattani 
society per se as well as its broader historical links with Bangkok. It is hoped that this 
work, focusing on the economy of the Muslim south, and therefore breaking away from 
the tradition of writing with a marked political slant, can help to alter the existing 
perception of Pattani which has remained that part of Thailand considered by the 
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Buffalo being unloaded at the Port of Singapore. In the middle is a picture of a man 
dressed in traditional Indian dothi, likely an Indian Muslim cattle trader. 
 
 
Source: K.G Tregonning, Home Port Singapore, A History of Straits Steamship 
Company Limited 1890 – 1965. 
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